

# Cash or Carry? Targeting Low Income Voters in Mayoral Election

Joe Amick

University of Texas at Austin

May 19, 2016

Draft Paper for SEAREG Meeting, University of Michigan, June 3-4, 2016

## Abstract

This paper utilizes a household survey of two regency-level elections in Indonesia to explore micro-economic factors that explain who is targeted by campaigns leading up to two elections in Indonesia. It uses a list experiment to show that direct survey questions to voters about accepting transfers from campaigns elicits mostly honest responses from respondents. It then argues that by accounting for the diminishing marginal utility of voters for different types of transfers from campaigns, whether cash or in-kind goods, campaigns can target low income voters more effectively. This happens because small costs associated with accepting in-kind transfers, as compared to cash transfers, reduces the net utility for high income voters relative to low income voters.

**Keywords:** vote buying, targeting, Indonesia

**Acknowledgements:** Original research for this paper was conducted with the support of the MacDonald Dissertation Fellowship granted by the Government Department at the University of Texas at Austin.

*“It is not enough for candidates to spend money on vote-buying; it is essential for them to direct that money through the right channels. There were numerous reports of candidates spending large sums of money, but failing to win election(s) as a result of having chosen the wrong [broker]” (Callahan and McCargo, 1996).*

## **Introduction**

In the lead up to two mayoral elections in Central Java in late 2013, candidates from multiple parties distributed rice, eggs, cooking oil, and prayer mats to prospective voters, and a significant numbers of people accepted these.<sup>1</sup> However, the costs involved for both the campaigns and the citizens were not trivial. The campaigns had to procure and distribute these items across villages, sometimes even up into the mountainous regions of Java. Once goods are accepted, citizens have to transport these home, which can be costly when many don't have their own private mode of transportation. Given this, why didn't they just distribute cash?

The extant literature doesn't explain this yet. It focuses on how campaigns know which voters to target, not whether different types of transfers impact vote buying patterns. For example, explanations rooted in clientelism argue that iterated contact between patrons and clients over time is what allows vote buying to persist (Hicken, 2011; Stokes et al, 2013). In this framework, the patron would presumably learn the client's preferences over time and decide

---

<sup>1</sup> As will be explained below, the in-kind goods in these elections are generally from a group of items called *sembako*, or *sembilan bahan pokok*, which translates in “the nine staples”. There are other items provided during election time, for example a Malay-style Islamic head covering for woman called a *kerdung* and prayer mats given by Islamic parties, but mostly items are rice, eggs, oil, noodles, and other food items.

what type of transfers, whether in-kind or cash, better suit their voters. However, traditional political structures in Indonesia, which might sustain these relationships, are eroding (Buehler, 2009).

Explanations for vote buying rooted in spatial voting frameworks require ideological parties and ideological voters. These frameworks do not attempt to answer this question. In fact, this framework assumes all transfers between a campaign and the voter are substitutes, meaning one dollar worth of rice is equally as valuable to a voter as one dollar in cash (for example, see the voter utility function in Nichter, 2008). Further, Indonesian political parties are not easily differentiated along an ideological spectrum *and* attachment to political parties is weak, leading one to question how useful the political variables in the spatial voting framework are for assessing Indonesian vote buying patterns (Pratikno, 2009, Mujani and Liddle, 2010).

So how does one explain the use of in-kind transfers in these elections? This paper argues that in-kind transfers improve the ability for campaigns to target low-income voters more precisely. Low income voters are important to target because they sell their votes at higher rates and because those votes are cheaper to buy on average (Stokes et al, 2013). This is because two mechanisms are simultaneously at play. First, the value of transfers to voters accepting them are subject to the law of diminishing marginal utility, which is conditional on that person's income. And second, in-kind transfers require the recipient to incur a small cost, which reduces the overall value of the transfer to the recipient. Therefore, by placing a small cost on potential voters, higher income voters should be screened out of accepting in-kind but not cash transfers. From the campaign's perspective, this is desirable because as Hicken (2011, p. 299) notes, "poorer voters appear to be more susceptible to clientelist offers than richer voters." Although campaigns are unable to identify potential supporters using more traditional means in Indonesia,

such as party attachment, they can implement a screening mechanism on the transfers themselves by providing in-kind transfers, increasing the odds that they target voters who will value these private transfers more. Since not all poor voters sell their votes, this is the first step to understanding variation in vote buying patterns within the population of poorer voters. Finally, this explanation differs from supply-side theories, which focus on buying bulk in-kind goods at discounted prices and from normative explanations that argue cash transfers do not build trust between voters and campaigns as in-kind transfers do. These alternative explanations are discussed below.

The empirical part of this paper utilizes original survey data collected from two mayoral elections in Central Java by the author. Indonesia is an advantageous place to survey the presence of vote buying because Southeast Asian democracies tend to report its occurrence in higher numbers than other countries (Schaffer, 2007). Specifically, one rural and one urban regency were surveyed in Java that held elections simultaneously and were geographically proximate. Within the Indonesian government, regencies are the level of government that sit below the central and provincial governments, but above the sub-district and village governments.<sup>2</sup> The closest comparison in the United States would be to counties and cities, with the caveat that cities were geographically separate from counties -- i.e. cities did not sit inside counties but next to them. This level of government is of interest because more than 25% of all public revenues are transferred to and spent by them (Rasyid, 2003, p.67-8).<sup>3</sup> Plus, regencies have a substantial amount of autonomy from the central and provincial governments. Moreover,

---

<sup>2</sup>The Indonesian words are *Kabupaten* for rural areas and *Kota* for urban areas. Despite the urban-rural distinction, both executives have the same authority.

<sup>3</sup> Note, 25% are transferred through the general allocation fund, while additional transfers are made through other mechanisms. Therefore, 25% is the lowest possible estimate of the share of public expenditures made by district-level governments. When other public funds are included, regency-level governments are responsible for managing over 30% of the total share of public expenditures made by any public entity in Indonesia.

regency-level elections are non-ideological (Pratikno, 2009; Buehler, 2009; Buehler and Tan, 2007), and the population in this part of Java is homogenous, allowing the study to focus on individual voters, rather than groups of voters (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Finally, utilizing a survey provided the means to collect disaggregated data capable of examining the theory proposed in this paper, alternative theories, and assess the validity of key variables in the analysis.

The remainder of the paper will unfold as follows. First, previous studies of voter targeting in the literature will be discussed. Second, the theory will be laid out, possible alternative explanations will be considered, and empirical implications identified. Third, the survey will be outlined in detail and its results analyzed. Finally, the paper concludes with a summary of the study's theory and main findings.

### **Targeting in the Literature**

The canonical targeting studies in the distributive politics literature often approach the topic from the perspective of the party or candidate. The original debate was concerned with which blocks of voters were targeted by campaigns for redistribution: blocks of core constituents or blocks of swing voters (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). More recent work analyzed targeting by geographic areas, rather than typologies of voters, but also aggregated individual voters to their geographic characteristics for analysis (Calvo and Murillo, 2004). In all of these studies the theoretical focus is on targeting *blocks* of voters with resources in exchange for electoral support, not individuals *within* those blocks.

More recent work shifts the focus from targeting groups to individual voters (Stokes et al. 2013; Nichter 2008; Stokes, 2005; Finan and Schechter, 2012). These papers come in two varieties. One set draws on the spatial voting framework to explain vote buying dynamics (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1970). The other draws on studies in the behavioral sciences of how reciprocity effects decision-making (Sobel, 2005). In all of these studies, however, the primary puzzle is why vote-buying remains a stable part of politics despite the possibility of voter defection, defined as voters taking money or goods from a candidate, then voting for a different candidate. Defection is their primary concern because the private ballot box makes monitoring voters difficult. Each of the studies explain this puzzle by describing which types of voters are targeted and how this overcomes the need for monitoring inside the voting booth.

In a creative application of the spatial voting framework, Nichter (2008) argues that vote buying works, and thus defection is unlikely, because core constituents *can be identified* and targeted by campaigns. Although core constituents were unlikely to vote for opposing parties, they could easily stay home on Election Day due to the costs associated with voting. In short, campaigns are paying for political participation, not votes. Stokes et al. (2013) also build their theory using a spatial voting framework. They argued that swing voters are targeted by distributive politics, but intermediaries redirect resources to core constituents. In this study intermediaries, or political brokers, provide local knowledge of, and personal ties to, voters that the campaigns themselves do not possess. Therefore, the brokers are able to reduce the likelihood of defecting. However, this study also relies on the intermediary's ability to identify swing voters, defined as those voters who are equally ideologically distant from two different candidates, and core constituents, defined as those voters who are ideologically proximate to the

candidate. Also note that in this framework, there is no differentiation between the types of transfers given to prospective voters: two dollars' worth of eggs would be equal to two dollars in cash to a voter.

The key lesson from this discussion is that both theoretical perspectives utilize an ideological spectrum to explain who is or isn't targeted by campaigns. One prominent exception is Finan and Schechter's (2012) work on targeting. They show that political brokers in Paraguay target those individuals who are intrinsically reciprocal, irrespective of their closeness to the center of that broker's network, and that these social preferences partially explain why vote buying endures. Their focus on variation in social, rather than political preferences, highlights the need to expand the range of voter-level variables examined in this literature to explain which voters are targeted by campaigns. This study contributes to the vote buying literature by explaining how variation in voters' economic preferences for different types of transfers affects which voters accept those transfers, and ultimately sell their vote.

### **Indonesian Context**

The theory in this paper begins with the premise that the current models for vote buying are insufficient to explain many Indonesian elections. This rests on three pieces of evidence. First, in local Indonesian elections there are no major cleavages within localities for parties to form around. Many cleavages that exist in Indonesia more broadly, rarely exist in the small and homogenous jurisdictions where regency elections take place. The elections studied here in *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* fit this profile.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> *Kota* is the administrative term for a city, *Kabupaten* is the administrative term for a rural area, and *Tegal* is a proper noun

One common cleavage in Indonesia is religion, but these two elections were conducted in areas where the overwhelming majority of the population was both Muslim and ethnically Javanese. The government statistics agency (*BPS*) does not provide exact figures on the percentage of individuals following a given faith, however, one crude measure of homogeneity is the number of places of worship officially reported in the government data. In 2013, *Kota Tegal* had one Chinese temple, two monasteries, eight churches and 533 mosques (BPS Kota Tegal, 2013). Although the rural regency doesn't provide data on non-Islamic places of worship, this area is less diverse because of fewer ethnically Chinese-owned businesses. Given this, *Kabupaten Tegal's* statistics agency reports even more places for Muslims to pray (*tempat ibadah*), specifically 4,304 locations (BPS Kabupaten Tegal, 2013). This descriptive evidence is supported by the survey used in the paper, which shows about 99% of respondents in the sample from *Kota* and *Kabupaten Tegal* are Muslim (see Appendix 1).

The Islamic community in Indonesia is diverse in its own right, however there are generally two large groups recognized. These groups are sometimes referred to as *modernists* and *traditionalists* (Burhani, 2103). Moreover, these two groups are affiliated with two separate political parties so a political cleavage within Islam remains possible. To address this, a question on the survey used in this study asked all respondents who identified themselves as Muslim whether they identified with either of these groups. Approximately 85 percent of the respondents who identified as Muslim said they identified with the *traditionalist* group, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, while only 9.5 percent they identified with the *modernist* group *Muhammadiyah*. The remaining respondents indicated they didn't identify with either.

Second, party ideologies are generally uninformative in Indonesia, especially for local elections. Area studies scholars argue that the relationship between parties and candidates in

local elections is mostly pragmatic. The candidate's decision to run under the banner of a given party is based on convenience and meeting minimum threshold requirements for parties to field a candidate, rather than the candidate's political ideology (Buehler, 2009; Buehler and Tan, 2007).<sup>5</sup> A voter cannot simply look at the party ID next to the candidate's name and know what that candidate is likely to do once in office. Even in national elections where party politics are thought to be stronger in Indonesia, survey data from the national election in 2009 indicate that party identification is becoming weaker over time (Mujani and Liddle, 2010).

Pratikno (2009) surveys the first round of regency-level elections and finds that the rules for fielding a candidate led to approximately 70% of the first 192 elections to be supported by a coalition of parties, rather than a single party. In his analysis, he lays out a two-by-two typology of party ideology - with Islam-Secularism on one axis and Elite - Populist along the other axis - and finds that those coalitions did not follow any inherent ideological logic. He concludes that party-coalitions are based on meeting the minimum requirements for fielding a candidate, rather than any ideological beliefs shared by coalition parties.

To reiterate an important point, the voter-level targeting literature utilizes a spatial model of voting behavior, which begins with the premise that voters can place themselves along an ideological spectrum and identify the distance between themselves and the candidates.<sup>6</sup>

However, in the Indonesian context described above, the ideological component disappears

---

<sup>5</sup> To field a candidate, a political party must hold at least 15% of the seats in the regency-level legislature or have received at least 15% of the votes in the last election. When the party does not meet this requirement by themselves, they can form coalitions so that the combined number of seats or votes surpasses 15%.

<sup>6</sup>Both Stokes et al (2013) and Nicther (2008) use a similar formulation for their base model. The model in Nicther (2008) is as follows:  $u_i = -\frac{1}{2} (X_i - V_i)^2 + b_i - c_i$ , where  $u_i$  is the utility of person  $i$ ,  $X_i$  is the ideological position on the political spectrum for candidate  $i$ ,  $V_i$  is the position on the ideological spectrum for voter  $i$ ,  $b_i$  is the benefit given to voter  $i$  for their support, and  $c_i$  is the cost of voting. However, in the Indonesian context, the model reduces to  $u_i = b_i - c_i$  because  $-\frac{1}{2} (X_i - V_i)^2 = 0$

because the terms in that part of the formal model cannot be defined. If a voter cannot identify where the candidate's beliefs sit along some ideological dimension, they cannot assess the distance between their own beliefs and the candidates' beliefs to decide which candidate best represents them. However, spatial models of targeting require this to explain variation in vote buying patterns. In effect, the ideological part of the formal model equals zero leaving only the private transfer and the cost of voting terms with values assigned to them. Under these circumstances, individuals would simply vote if the benefit is greater than the cost of voting and only for those campaigns who transfer the largest benefits.

Without a clearly identified ideological component, spatial models of vote buying become overly deterministic. Therefore, additional sources of voter-level variation are needed to explain targeting patterns. Finan and Schechter (2012)'s work on social preferences provides one source of voter-level variation, yet to this author's knowledge, no studies attempt to examine variation in voter-level economic preferences of the transfers themselves. This study fills this gap.

### **Vote Buying, Not Clientelism**

The term vote-buying is used here because clientelism generally refers to long-term, iterative relationship between a patron and client (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007; Auyero, 2000; Hicken, 2001, Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). It is a broader concept than what the data here measure. In countries where parties are relatively strong, distinctions between vote buying and clientelism have been classified depending on the population targeted. Stokes et al. (2013) relied on party labels to distinguish between the two terms in their conceptualization of non-programmatic politics. Specifically, they defined patronage as benefits directed at party-members contingent upon the individual's political support, while vote-buying was defined as

resources also contingent upon political support, but aimed at the population of voters more generally (Stokes et al., 2013, p. 7). Schaffer and Schedler (2007) drop political party-membership from his definition of patronage and defines it as an asymmetric relationship between individuals, families, or communities and a patron that spans a longer period of time. Alternatively, his definition of vote buying is when candidates “offer particularistic material rewards to individuals of families at election time” (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007: p.5).

There are two important points to highlight here. First, both definitions of clientelism have longer time horizons than what the data in this project measure. While many respondents in the survey may actually be in a patron-client relationship with the candidate or someone involved with the campaign, the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow one to determine the extent of any patron-client dynamic in the voting population. However, the data does measure whether an individual received cash, or some other in-kind benefit, from a campaign in the days or weeks preceding the election, which fits with both above definitions of vote-buying.

Second, the political party affiliation of candidates in regency-level elections in Indonesia is often uninformative. This is often a result of the electoral rules, which require candidates to be sponsored by a party that received either fifteen percent of the vote from the previous legislative election or holds fifteen percent of the current legislative seats in that regency (Pratikno 2009; Choi 2009). Political parties that do not meet this threshold, can create coalitions whose combined percentages meet this threshold. Since parties are necessary for a candidate to run, political parties raise funds by selling their party’s sponsorship for cash. This behind-the-scenes bartering often matches candidates to parties, rather than ideology or some other unifying force,

and creates distance between the party and the candidate during regency-level elections (Buehler, 2009; Buehler and Tan, 2007).

Generally speaking, party affiliation is becoming weaker in Indonesia, even in national elections where they organize for control of the legislature. Survey data from the national election in 2009 indicated that party identification has become less important over time (Mujani and Liddle, 2010). For these reasons, this paper focuses on vote buying rather than clientelism and on a definition of vote buying that does not rely on identifying party-members or stable relationships between parties and individuals over time.

### **Theory and Alternative Explanations**

Calvo and Murillo (2004) notice that there are large differences between public and private wages in Argentina, and that this creates an opportunity to distribute rents using public employment to distribute patronage. Their theory highlights that it is impossible to have perfect knowledge of the rate of each individual's diminishing utility for wages, and as such, governments have to set at a flat wage rate within a single jurisdiction. From an economic perspective, this makes the distribution of wages inefficient because there are people who would have joined the patronage network for less than the set public wage.

This logic can be applied to the distribution of goods at election time. In the survey used here, voters who were offered goods at a certain location, were often targeted at a set benefit level. For example, voters who lived on the same block might all have been given approximately three dollars in cash or they might have all been given 2.5 kilograms of rice and ten eggs. Generally, one didn't see much variation in the benefit given when they attended the same political event or lived on the same street. As with setting a flat public wage, the distribution of

resources using a flat benefit for a given location will lead to inefficiencies, which could lead to variation in whether benefits are accepted by individual voters.

Recall that spatial models in the literature only include one term to represent private transfers. This term can represent the transfer of a private good or simply cash. However, cash will generally be more efficient than in-kind transfers because it is fungible. Therefore absent perfect information about voters' individual preferences across different benefits, a set transfer of cash to a group of people will be more efficient in raising their wellbeing because they can use that money for their most desired purpose. There will be individuals who highly prize whatever good is being distributed -- including eggs, rice, oil, and prayer mats -- but there will also be people who are offered goods that would prefer cash making the private distribution of goods by campaigns to these individual voters inefficient. Given this logic, why would a campaign ever target voters with in-kind goods?

There are a number of possible answers to this question. First, they may get a bulk rate on staple goods or they may procure them from leakage in government programs. If this is the case, inefficiencies are less of a concern to candidates than those using their own money. However, this explanation only addresses why a campaign might *supply* in-kind goods, not whether an individual voter would be more willing to accept them from a campaign. Put differently, it explains why a campaign might choose one type of transfer over the other without taking into account who will be willing to accept that transfer.

A second explanation is that transferring cash might be seen as a violation of social protocol or undermine norms of reciprocity between voters and the campaign. The logic here is that providing cash to someone in exchange for electoral support has a very formal, transactional


feel to it and undermines trust between both actors. Instead, to maintain the perception that a personal relationship exists between the campaign and voter, campaigns provide goods that could be interpreted as a gift. However, if this perspective were pervasive in the elections studied here, then one would expect to see more in-kind goods changing hands than cash. However, approximately 39% of respondents accepted cash, while 35% accepted in-kind goods in the survey data used here (see Appendix 1, Table 2). Moreover, a t-test assuming the difference between these two averages equals zero generates a p-value of 0.09 (not shown). While this isn't strong evidence these two means are different, the direction of the difference contradicts this explanation as cash transfers outnumber in-kind transfers. If providing cash to voters violated local norms, one would expect the percentage of citizens who accepted cash to be much lower than those who accepted in-kind goods.

The overwhelming majority of houses in Indonesia use rice, oil, and eggs on a daily basis so one might assume these items are close to interchangeable with cash transfers. However, there is a cost born by the person accepting these goods, including the cost of transporting the goods home, possible spoilage, differences in preferences between that good and cash, among other things. Even if in-kind goods are perfect replacements for cash, which is only true if that individual was going to buy that good with their next purchase, there remain costs associated with accepting them. While this cost may be small, the benefits involved in vote buying operations are also small in absolute terms -- the cost doesn't need to be high for it to be a large enough proportion of the overall benefit to impact an individual's decision to accept the in-kind good or not. The reader should note that buying votes with cash imposes no such costs on the voters accepting it; cash can be transported in one's pocket, it won't spoil, and it allows the voter to buy whichever good they want with it.

Applying this logic to understand who accepts transfers from campaigns, and thus who can be targeted, requires one more step. If one assumes poorer voters value transfers at higher rates, and that their marginal benefit of those transfers is higher than relatively wealthier voters, then the costs associated with in-kind transfers from campaigns to voters should screen out those relatively wealthy voters when in-kind goods are offered to them, but not when cash is offered.

Figure 1 outlines this logic in simple economic terms. It illustrates a stylized example of two individuals with different marginal utilities for transfers from campaigns. The y-axis represents the utility someone gets from a given transfer, while the x-axis represents the value of that transfer, be it in dollars or some other currency. The top line labeled *Poor* represents the utility function of a lower income individual, relatively speaking, while the lower line labeled *Rich* represents the utility function of a high income person. Following basic microeconomic theory, both functions are decreasing in their returns for each additional unit in net value. However, the poor person's utility has a much steeper slope near the origin representing the fact that transfers are more valuable to them.

Figure 1: Marginal Utilities for Transfers of Different Voter Types



The vertical line labeled  $V_1$  represent the value of a *cash transfer* from a campaign to an individual. This value is costless in the sense that it requires no additional effort to accept or has no chance of diminishing in value once it has been accepted (e.g. unlike food spoilage). The line labeled  $V_2$  represents the net value of an in-kind transfer of  $V_1$  if it has associated costs equal to the line labeled *Cost*. In other words,  $V_2$  has the same value as  $V_1$  prior to the imposition of any costs associated with accepting the transfer, but the net value decreases once that cost is incorporated. The reader can see that once the cost is incorporated, the decline in utility is much greater for the rich person than the poorer person because the shape of their individual marginal utility functions.

This stylized example is simply meant to demonstrate the underlying dynamic at play when voters either choose to accept transfers from campaigns. The reader should notice that poorer voters will accept most transfers offered while richer voters will be screened out. The point of this analysis isn't that each individual voter calculates their individual marginal utilities in their head and decides whether they should accept the transfer or not. It is more subtle than that. When someone is offered cash they can simply accept it, put it into their pocket, and convert into whatever that individual chooses at a later date. However, when someone is offered an in-kind good, such as five kilograms of rice or a prayer mat, the richer person is more likely to question whether they need more rice at this very moment or whether they need an additional prayer mat to go with the others they have at home. It also leads to one very simple prediction: private transfers during campaigns should better target poorer individuals when in-kind goods are used because richer voters will screen themselves out. To see whether this is the case, the following sections analyze original survey data from two elections in Indonesia where vote buying is prevalent.

### **Survey Methodology, Social Desirability, and List Experiment**

This paper uses data from an original survey conducted in two regencies in Indonesia, *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal*, which are both located in the province of Central Java. Respondents were randomly selected from voter lists compiled by Indonesia's General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum*). In each regency, the election commission conducts a door-to-door census in the months prior to an election that captures all of the Indonesian citizens over seventeen years of age whose official residence is that address. Those names are added to the official voter rolls, which are kept by poll workers at each polling station on Election Day. This census is a list of all possible voters in each of the elections studied so a random sample

drawn from these lists produces a representative sample of the electorate for that election. This is exactly what was done to generate the sample for this survey.

Although common in Indonesia, vote buying is an illegal activity, so direct survey questions on vote buying may not be valid measures of the phenomenon. In their research in Nicaragua, Gonzales Ocantos et al. (2012) showed that social desirability bias can impact analysis of this kind. In their survey, less than 5% of respondents responded *yes* to having received gifts from a campaign in their study, however a list experiment revealed that approximately one in four respondents had done so. They warn that direct measures of vote buying could be misleading. However, is this finding specific to Latin American countries?

To assess whether social desirability bias is an issue in this data, a list experiment was also conducted to gauge whether under-reporting was a serious issue here, and if so, what its magnitude was. Respondents were randomly allocated into two groups. The first group was asked to count and report the number of individuals who got involved in politics, whether they discussed with a friend who they planned on voting for, and whether they donated money to a candidate or worked for that candidate without compensation. The treatment group was asked to count and report on these three options plus whether they got money or in-kind goods from a campaign.<sup>7</sup> By randomly allocation respondents to control and treatment groups, the list experiment allows one to estimate the percentage of people who responded in the affirmative to omitted option in the control group by taking the difference between the two group averages. In

---

<sup>7</sup> They were asked if they were given *Sembako*, which is a short for *Sembilan Bahan Pokok*. This translates loosely into “the nine staples.” Specifically, *sembako* includes rice, oil, sugar, salt, meat, eggs, corn, milk, and kerosene.

this case, the omitted response in the control group was whether the respondent got money or in-kind goods from a campaign.

The results from the list experiment can be seen Table 1. The difference in means between the control and treatment groups is 0.51 and significant (t-statistic is -5.3,  $p < 0.1$ ). Since the other three counts are statically equal across both groups, the list experiment estimates that approximately 51 percent of survey respondents accepted either cash or some other good from a campaign before the election, compared to 47 percent of respondents who said so through direct questioning. This comparison shows that receiving cash or goods was underreported as the literature suggests, however, the level of underreporting in this data is only about 4 percent. This result is consistent with the literature that says Southeast Asian democracies tend to report vote-buying in higher numbers than other regions (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). To the extent that social desirability bias exists in the region, it is less of an obstacle when studying vote-buying than in other regions.

**Table 1 – Percent of Respondents that Accepted Transfers**

<b><u>List Experiment: Comparison of Means</u></b>			
	<b>Treatment</b>	<b>Control</b>	<b>Difference</b>
Mean	0.82	0.31	0.51
SE	0.09	0.04	
		T	-5.32
		p-value	0.000
		N	302
<b><u>Direct Survey Question: Frequency</u></b>			
	<b>Count</b>	<b>Percent</b>	
Yes	151	47.5	
No	167	52.5	
Total	318	100	

## Empirical Analysis

The dependent variable in this analysis is whether someone accepted money, in-kind goods, or both from a campaign before the election. This variable is recorded at this level of detail because the survey was designed to record all types of transfers from each campaign to each respondent. Each survey asked the respondent whether they had any contact with someone from each of the campaigns. Then if the person said *yes*, they were asked a series of additional questions including whether they accepted cash, and how much, or any in-kind goods from the campaign, and what they were. The dependent variable was then coded zero for individuals who did not receive anything from any campaign, one for individuals who accepted cash only, two for individuals who accepted in-kind goods only, and three for individuals who accepted both. There is no theoretical justification to order these discrete outcomes so the below analysis utilizes a multinomial probit model, using individuals who did not accept transfers of any kind as the base outcome for all statistical models. Moreover, the data do not allow one to order the monetary values of in-kind goods. It is impossible with the information available in the survey to discern whether the total value of a prayer mat and headscarf given to one voter is more or less than the value of 12 eggs and a bag of rice given to a separate voter. Due to these reasons, the analysis opts to use a multinomial probit model.

The theory presented here makes a few key assumptions that need to be considered in the analysis. First, as one's income goes up the likelihood of accepting a gift from a campaign decreases. Therefore one would expect to see a negative coefficient on the variable recording the individual's income. However, the theory rests on the assumption that there are diminishing

marginal returns to private consumption as individuals move up the income ladder too. Given this, the theory would also expect that including a squared income variable in the model would better fit the data. Note, this assumption is quite common in the literature (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Stokes et al., 2013).

Recall, the key to the analysis of the theory presented here is that in-kind transfers impose a cost on the voter who accepts them, which should better target individuals who value private transfers more. Moreover, these individuals should be poorer on average. Therefore one should expect to see a relationship between income and the outcome that includes in-kind transfers, but not the outcome for cash transfers *only*. This is why the construction of the dependent variable is broken into four categories: no goods accepted, only cash accepted, only in-kind good accepted, and both were accepted. The theory would expect the above relationships to be conditional on one's income. Specifically, that the relationship should hold for those respondents who accepted in-kind transfers, but not for those individuals who accepted cash.

One additional variable is included as a control. Hicken (2011: p. 299) suggests that formal employment, which is likely correlated with income, could incentivize voters to pay closer attention to, and base their votes upon, policies rather than direct transfers. This is because those voters have a larger stake in public policy outcomes, for example, tax policy since those voters will pay a larger share into public revenues. Since individuals in formal employment are likely to earn more, the relationship between income and vote buying could be the result of this correlation. Including this control allows one to ensure that a negative relationships between income and having accepted any transfers from a campaign, isn't the result of having omitted this variable. The results of these regressions can be seen in Table 3:

**Table 2: Weighted Multinomial Probit Regressions**

<b>Outcome</b>		<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>
Cash	Income	-0.039 (0.065)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
	Income <sup>2</sup>		-0.0 (0.002)	0.00 (0.00)
	Formal Employment			-0.41 (0.52)
	Constant	-1.2*** (0.19)	-1.3*** (0.19)	-1.0*** (0.22)
In-Kind	Income	0.07 (0.043)	0.41*** (0.14)	0.34** (0.14)
	Income <sup>2</sup>		-0.02** (0.01)	-0.02** (0.01)
	Formal Employment			0.28 (0.48)
	Constant	-1.42*** (0.18)	-1.71*** (0.24)	-1.66*** (0.29)
Both	Income	0.03 (0.04)	0.25** (0.12)	0.21* (0.12)
	Income <sup>2</sup>		-0.02* (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
	Formal Employment			0.3 (0.4)
	Constant	-0.62*** (0.15)	-0.78*** (0.18)	-0.75*** (0.21)
<i>N</i>		267	267	233

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Note: The base outcome for these regressions is those voters who didn't accept cash or in-kind goods from any campaign.


The first model is a bivariate model that simply assumes a linear relationship between income and each of the outcomes. This model is included to test whether the relationship is non-linear, and as one can see, the income variable is statistically insignificant for all three outcomes. The second model loosens the linear assumption by adding a squared income term. However, it

does not show the expected relationship described above. The expected value of the coefficients on both the income and income squared variables are for them to both be negative, which would suggest the highest probability of selling one's vote to be assigned to the poorest individual which decrease more rapidly as income increases. However, the income variable has a positive coefficient for both in-kind outcomes while the income squared variable has a negative coefficient. This implies that predicted probabilities increase at the lowest incomes before peaking, and then decreasing. The relationship between having accepted cash from a campaign and income remains insignificant however, just as the theory predicts.

The third model includes a dummy variable for those respondents who were employed in a formal sector, which mainly consists of government workers, private factory workers, or someone employed at one of the local malls or chains. Model 3 shows that formal employment is not driving the relationship between income and having accepted in-kind goods. The coefficients barely change and remain significant for all in-kind outcomes, but insignificant for the cash only outcome.

To more clearly see the relationship between income and each of the outcomes, one can plot the predicted probabilities for each outcome. This is done to explore why the above income coefficients were positive for in-kind transfers. While the coefficients did imply a curvilinear relationship between income and private transfers, they do not imply the same monotonically decreasing relationship the theory expects.

**Figure 2: Weighted Predicted Probabilities across Income Levels by DV Outcome**



Note: Predicted Probabilities Generated from Model 2. At the time of this survey, the exchange rate was approximately Rp 13,000 for every USD. Therefore, a value of 10 on the x-axis is approximately \$77 per month.

Figure 2 illustrates that the probability of accepting transfers increase from voters with very little income to those with moderate income (approximately US \$77 per month), then the predicted probabilities decrease for voters with higher incomes. In other words, those individuals at the very bottom of the income distribution, whom are assumed to be the most likely to sell their votes, do not accept transfers at as high of rates as those individuals who had moderate incomes.

One concern about these models is that they do not account for geographic effects. If socioeconomic status and the type of benefits distributed cluster in locations, which supply-side

explanations discussed earlier would suggest, then income may act as a proxy for geographic location. Recall that the comparative politics literature impress the importance of macro-level targeting to low-income areas (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Calvo and Murillo, 2004). Campaigns therefore might be targeting specific area that are generally poor, but missing the poorest residents in those areas. To address this, Table 3 provides the results of four models that include area fixed effects. Area dummy variables were included for each of the sub-districts located in these regencies.

**Table 3: Sub-District Fixed Effects Models**

	In-Kind	In-Kind	Cash	Cash
Income	0.25*** (0.1)	0.18* (0.1)	0.001 (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)
Income Squared	-0.02** (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.0)	-0.00 (0.01)
Formal Employment		0.64** (0.31)		0.07 (0.31)
Constant	-0.15 (0.4)	-0.17 (0.44)	0.42 (0.5)	0.42 (0.47)
<i>N</i>	253	217	259	227

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Note: Probit regressions with dummy variables for each sub-district. In-kind dependent variable coded 0 for all respondents who accepted in-kind goods and zero otherwise. Cash dependent variable also coded one for all respondents who accepted cash and zero otherwise. Sub-district dummy coefficients not shown.

For these models, the dependent variable has been recoded because including area dummy variables burns too many degrees of freedom in the multinomial probit set up. Specifically, the dependent variable for the models in Table 3 labeled in-kind were coded one if any individual accepted an in-kind transfer and zero for all others. Similarly, the models labeled cash coded all respondents who accepted cash as one and zero for all others. In effect, the final

outcome from the previous multinomial dependent variable was added to each of the first two outcomes.

Table 3 shows that all coefficients on income and income squared remain significant for the in-kind probit regressions, yet none are significant for the cash regressions, suggesting the original models are robust to area fixed-effects. In short, the geographic clustering of socioeconomically similar households and the types of transfers distributed by campaigns is not what is driving the principal results in Table 2.

Finally, it is plausible individuals need to be embedded in social or economic networks to become targets of campaigns. If this is true, it might be that the lowest-income voters are detached from networks that might make them targets of campaigns. Although this survey doesn't have data on individual voter networks, it does have information on whether that respondent had any contact with any campaign. Therefore, one can graph the predicted probabilities again by income, but this time with the sample restricted to just those individuals contacted by a campaign. Since this analysis reduces the sample to 180 respondents, the binary dependent variable used in the fixed-effects regressions is used. In Appendix 5, the results are presented and we can see that the predicted probabilities shift up somewhat for the poorest individuals accepting in-kind transfers in this restricted sample, suggesting that embeddedness in social or economic networks could partially explain why many of the poorest voters are missed, however, the overall shape of the relationship remains indicating additional voter-level characteristics are needed to explain the shape of the relationship between income and accepting in-kind goods. The reader should note that the cash acceptance line in this graph is very high for higher income earners, but the coefficients for income in this regression are insignificant so this line represents mostly noise.

## Discussion

Although this paper set out to understand why campaigns distribute in-kind goods at all. This question was posed to provide a framework to explore whether the individual economic preferences of voters could, at a minimum, partially explain the variation in who is targeted during elections. Much of the previous literature considered private transfers interchangeable, disallowing for economic preferences to enter voter's decision-making process. However, Finan and Schechter's (2012) work, which examined how social preferences by individuals affects who gets targeted during campaigns, demonstrated that examining non-political variables will be necessary to fully understanding which voters are likely to ultimately sell their votes. This paper makes a small step in that direction by examining how economic preferences, in addition to political or social preferences, impact a voter's decision to accept cash or other goods from a campaign. Although the results are from a small sample of voters in Java, it finds that not all poor voters accept goods, even those who are in contact with campaigns during election season. Many voters are more autonomous than scholars give them credit for, even the poorer ones (Wang and Kurtzman, 2007).

While this is a small study with limited geographic coverage, it makes up for this shortcoming by disaggregating transfers into different types. The limited coverage is what allows one to measure the variation in economic preferences at all. Large cross-national surveys such as Afrobarometer lump all transfers during campaigns into one question, which allows scholars to test broad theories of vote buying cross-nationally, but prevents them from examining micro-theories based on individual preferences, such as the one outlined in these pages (for example, see Jensen and Justensen, 2014, p.222).

The implications from this paper are important because it highlights that not all poor voters sell their votes. Recognizing this may help scholars find clues to much larger questions than those examined here, such as, does vote-buying end solely when countries get richer or is this commonly found correlation masking more direct mechanisms. Although these results are in no way definitive, these results do suggest the latter.

## **Conclusion**

This paper examined whether the type of private transfer between political campaigns and individual voters improved targeting by screening out (relatively) higher income people. It presented theory that in-kind goods impose a small cost on the individual accepting the transfer, which impacts the net benefit of the transfer. When high income voters value these transfers less than low income voters, in-kind transfers do find their way into the hands of lower income people at higher rates. This is because high income voters choose not to accept in-kind transfers, even while still accepting cash.

The data largely support this idea and found that income was associated with accepting in-kind transfers, but not cash. Neither the theory, nor previous literature, predicted the curvilinear relationship that was found however. Both assumed a constant downward sloping relationship. Restricting the data to those respondents in the survey who were contacted by a campaign leading up to the election did increase the predicted probabilities of low income voters accepting goods, which suggests that it is consistent with the theory presented here, but it does not erase this curvilinear relationship entirely. While this analysis focused solely on the economic preferences voters, this suggests that additional non-economic and non-ideological factors are at play in deciding who gets targeted. This should be addressed in future research.

Despite this, this paper shows that patterns in who gets targeted for vote buying in contexts with low ideological salience, such as Indonesia, can be at least partially explained solely by economic factors. Therefore, more complete models of vote buying should loosen the assumption that all transfers are substitutes by allowing for variation in how individual voters prefer different types of transfers.

DRAFT

## Appendix 1

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Survey Data**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Sd</b>	<b>N</b>
Female	0.517	0.5	315
Years of Education	9.3	4.0	316
Monthly Income (Millions of Rp)	1.6	4.2	267
Muslim	0.997	0.06	317
Trips to Mosque per week	9.5	9.9	312
People per HH	5.1	1.8	315
Children under 18	1.5	1.4	312
Age of Respondent	41	16	306
Turnout	0.899	0.30	317

**Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Political Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Sd</b>	<b>N</b>
Turnout	0.899	0.30	317
Paid Cash	0.39	0.49	318
Paid In-Kind	0.35	0.48	318
Paid Cash and Voted for that Candidate	0.84	0.36	118
Paid In Kind Good(s) and Voted for that Candidate	0.85	0.37	105

## Appendix 2

### Survey Details and Methodology

The overall response rate for this survey was 56 percent, which totaled 318 completed surveys. Response rates for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* are 57 percent and 55 percent respectively. Local election officials indicated that a large percentage of individuals who did not vote in these elections were citizens from these areas that worked abroad or in another part of Indonesia.<sup>8</sup> Their permanent address remained in their home village with their families, however, they generally return home for the end of Ramadan celebrations and spend most of their time elsewhere. If citizens keep all their government papers, including their voter registration, at their village address the actual number of potential voters in local elections is smaller than the voter rolls would suggest. This has two sample design implications: first, response rates for the survey should resemble voter turnout rates. Those individuals, who spend their time outside their home village, should not be present for the campaign, the election, or when enumerators visit their houses to administer a survey. Second, when estimating the effective number of completed surveys, one would need to draw larger samples in areas where turnout was lower.

In Table 1 of this appendix, one can see that turnout rates from the *KPU* are 56 percent and 58 percent for *Kota Tegal* and *Kabupaten Tegal* respectively. These numbers are close to the survey's response rates. Also in that table, one can see an adjusted response rate. When a survey respondent refused or was unable to complete a survey, the reason for refusal was recorded. The adjusted response rate subtracts those individuals whose family indicated they

---

<sup>8</sup> Interview with election officials from the *KPU* in *Kabupaten Tegal*.

work or study in a different location, individuals who passed away after the KPU census, and those persons who moved in with their in-laws after marriage. This decreased the potential sample to 406 and the overall adjusted response rate to 78 percent.

**Table 1: Turnout Rates and Survey Response Rates**

<b>Voter Turnout</b>			
	<b>Kota Tegal</b>	<b>Kab.Tegal</b>	<b>Overall</b>
Registered Voters	196,339	1,183,537	1,379,876
Ballots	110,893	685,280	796,173
Turnout Rate	0.56	0.58	0.58
<b>Survey Responses</b>			
	<b>Kota Tegal</b>	<b>Kab. Tegal</b>	<b>Overall</b>
Surveys Complete	157	161	318
Respondents Drawn	274	291	565
Overall RR	0.57	0.55	0.56
<b>Adjusted Response Rates</b>			
	<b>Kota Tegal</b>	<b>Kab. Tegal</b>	<b>Overall</b>
Voters Outside Area	73	83	156
Adjusted Denominator	201	208	409
Turnout Rate	0.78	0.77	0.78

Note: Voter Turnout Data was obtained from the General Election Commission

Table 1 also shows that the number of respondents drawn were not random across the entire list, but drawn within each regency. This was done to leave open the possibility of comparative analysis across regencies because a true random sample would have produced too few respondents from *Kota Tegal* as it is about one-fifth the population of *Kabupaten Tegal*. Therefore simple inverse probability weights were constructed and used in the below analysis unless stated otherwise. These are calculate by simply taking the inverse of the likelihood that a given respondent was chosen. Since the sample was drawn from the complete voter list, this means the number of people on the voter list, divided by the number of people sampled for each regency.

### Appendix 3: Surveyor Fixed-Effects

Given that a number of the survey questions were sensitive, the individual abilities of enumerators at making subjects comfortable and eliciting information may come into play. If dummy variables for individual survey enumerators are correlated with the outcome variables here, it could bias the results. To address this issue, fixed-effects models are run as a robustness check. Table 1 in this appendix shows that the main results in this paper hold when surveyor fixed-effects are included as controls.

**Table 1: Surveyor Fixed Effects Models**

	<b>In-Kind</b>	<b>In-Kind</b>	<b>Cash</b>	<b>Cash</b>
Income	0.22** (0.09)	0.18** (0.09)	-0.009 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)
Income Squared	-0.013** (0.006)	-0.01* (0.006)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)
Formally Employed		0.23 (0.28)		0.14 (0.28)
Constant	-0.84** (0.385)	-1.14* (0.67)	-1.1** (0.42)	-0.03 (0.39)
<i>N</i>	267	232	267	226

\*  $p < 0.1$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Note: Probit regressions with dummy variables for each sub-district. In-kind dependent variable coded 0 for all respondents who accepted in-kind goods and zero otherwise. Cash dependent variable also coded one for all respondents who accepted cash and zero otherwise. Surveyor dummy coefficients not shown.


#### Appendix 4: Probit Regressions with Full Controls

The in-text regressions focus on economic variables because the theory outlined in this paper is directly related to each voter's economic preferences. However, the below models use a much larger set of voter-level controls and find the same relationship between income and transfer-type.

	Cash	In-Kind
Income	0.09 (0.09)	0.29 (0.11)***
Income Squared	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)**
Female	-0.23 (0.22)	0.10 (0.22)
Formal Employment	0.13 (0.3)	0.22 (0.3)
Savings	-0.00 (0.00)**	-0.00 (0.00)*
Age (years)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Education (years)	-0.05 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
Muslim Party	-0.71 (0.25)***	-0.23 (0.24)
Kids (# in HH)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Attend Mosque (#/week)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)
Rooms (# in House)	0.13 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Constant	-0.03 (0.8)	-1.78 (0.88)**
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.09
N	210	210

## Appendix 5: Predicted Probabilities of Respondents in Contact with a Campaign

These predicted probabilities are generated from probit regressions using income and squared income that have been restricted to those respondents who were in contact with a campaign at some point leading up to the election. The coefficients for income and income squared are statistically significant when predicting the in-kind dependent variable but not when predicting the cash dependent variable. The regressions used to generate this graph (not shown) included 180 survey respondents.



Note: In-kind dependent variable coded 0 for all respondents who accepted in-kind goods and zero otherwise. Cash dependent variable also coded one for all respondents who accepted cash and zero otherwise.

## References

- Auyero, Javier (2000). "The Logic of Clientelism in Argentina: An Ethnographic Account" in *Latin American Research Review* 36, 55-81.
- Badan Pusat Statistik Kabupaten Tegal. (2013). *Kabupaten Tegal Dalam Angka*. Slawi, Central Java, Katalog BPS: 0215.58050 33286.13.01
- Badan Pusat Statistik Kota Tegal. (2013). *Kota Tegal Dalam Angka*. Katalog. Tegal, Central Java: BPS: 1102001.337.
- Brodjonegoro, Bambang (2009). Fiscal Decentralization and its Impact on Regional Economic Development and Fiscal Sustainability. In Coen Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt (Eds.), *Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: Implementations and Challenges*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.
- Buehler, Michael and Paige Tan (2007). Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province. *Indonesia*, 84, 41-69
- Buehler, Michael (2009). The Rising Importance of Personal Networks in Indonesian Local Politics: An Analysis of District Government Head Elections in South Sulawesi in 2005. In Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (Eds.), *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.
- Calvo E, Murillo MV (2004). Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine Electoral Market. *American Journal of Political Science*. 48(4), 742-57
- Choi, Nankyung. 2009. Batam's 2006 Mayoral Election: Weakened Political Parties and Intensified Power Struggle in Local Indonesia. In Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (Eds.), *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.
- Cox, Gary and Mathew McCubbins (1986). Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game. *Journal of Politics*, 48(2), 370-389.
- Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto, Beatriz Magaloni, and Federico Estevez (Forthcoming). *Strategies of Vote Buying: Democracy, Clientelism, and Poverty Relief in Mexico*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dixit, Avinesh and John Londregan (1996). The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Distributive Politics. *Journal of Politics*, 58(4), 1132-1155.
- Downs, Anthony (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

- Hadiz, Vedi R. (2011). *Localising Power in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia: A Southeast Asian Perspective*. Stanford University Press.
- Kitschelt, Herbert and Wilkinson, Steven (2007). Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction. In Kitschelt, Herbert and Wilkinson Steven (Eds.), *Patrons, Clients and Policies- Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindbeck, Assar and Jorgen Weibull (1987). Balanced-budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition. *Public Choice*. 52: 273-297.
- Lipset, Seymore M. and Rokkan Stein (1967). Cleavages, Structures and Voters Alignments: An Introduction. In Lipset, Seymore Martin and Rokkan, Stein (Eds.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy R. Scully (1995). *Building Democratic Institutions- Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mujani, Saiful and R. William Liddle (2010). Personalities, Parties, and Voters. *Journal of Democracy*, 21(2), 35-49
- Nichter, Simeon (2008). Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1), 19-31.
- Pepinsky, Thomas, R. William Liddle, and Saiful Mujani (2012). Testing Islam's Political Advantage: Evidence from Indonesia. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(3), 584-600
- Pratikno (2009). Political Parties in Pilkada: Some Problems for Democratic Consolidation. In Maribeth Erb and Priyambudi Sulistiyanto (Eds.), *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders (Pilkada)*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.
- Rasyid, R. M. 2003. "Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia." In Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation Eds: Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.
- Stokes, Susan (2005). Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina." *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 315-326.
- Schaffer FC and Schedler A. (2007). "What is Vote Buying?" In Schaffer FC (Eds.), *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Tomsa, Dirk (2010). The Indonesian Party System after the 2009 Elections: Towards Stability? In *Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society*. Eds: Edward Aspinall and Marcus Meitzer. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore.

Vel, Jacqueline (2005). Pilkada in East Sumba: An Old Rivalry in a New Democratic Setting. *Indonesia*, 80: 81-107.

DRAFT