Linkages, Strategies, and Identities in Filipino Diaspora Mobilization for Regime Change

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ABSTRACT. How does linkage between the homeland and hostland shape the strategic choices and public identity claims of diaspora activists in their struggle for homeland regime change? Comparing the mobilization of Filipinos in the U.S. and the Netherlands from 1972-1982 to overthrow the dictatorship of Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, the study shows that linkage influences the arenas of contention, interactions among field of actors, and symbolic resources that, in turn, shape strategic decisions and identity claims. I argue that strong linkage between the U.S. and the Philippines provided migrants and exiles an accessible institutional target for their claims-making and broad network of allies, thus promoting the pursuit of foreign policy lobbying. Weak linkage (Netherlands-Philippines), however, involved a narrower set of players and thus drove activists to create opportunities for mobilization—often in the international public sphere. In both countries, activists’ framing of collective action oscillated between particularistic and universal as the web of relations contracted and/or expanded.
In recent years, scholarly interest on diasporas as important political actors that engage strategically in homeland projects has grown. Although research on established diasporas such as those of Jewish, Cuban, and Irish continue to dominate the field, current theorizing has begun to look at the cases of modern diasporas that include the Albanians, Haitians, and Mexicans in their struggles for independence, post-disaster recovery, and democratization. A common theme in the literature is the degree to which diasporas are often able to take advantage of opportunities and resources in liberal democracies and thus influence the conduct of their home governments (Cochrane 2007; DeWind and Segura 2014; Koinova 2014; Lyons and Mandaville 2012; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Smith 2000; Waldinger 2015). While their effectiveness in instituting change in their homeland remains debatable, scholars acknowledge the ability of diasporas to pursue nationalist projects and make claims in mainstream political spaces in their hostland.

From the early 1970s to the late 1980s, Filipinos living in foreign countries became involved in the transnational struggle to overthrow the two-decade authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. Heterogeneous groups with different ideologies comprised the movement in the U.S., where the oldest and biggest Filipino communities outside the Philippines reside and where four U.S. administrations supported the Marcos regime. Initially invoking human rights norms, activists launched a nationwide campaign for the withdrawal of military and economic aid to Marcos and lobbied members of the U.S. Congress. Eventually, they deployed identities in a language that defined the Filipino

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1 Without seeking to resolve conceptual debates about the term, I use a definition by Shain (2005:51-52) who describes diaspora as, “a people with a common national origin who regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of the national community of their home nation, a status held regardless of their geographical location and their citizenship outside their national soil.”
transnational imaginary vis-à-vis the U.S. colonial experience and national interests.

Shain (1994/95) considers the anti-Marcos campaign of Filipinos in the U.S. as “one of the most successful and multifaceted diasporic efforts to unseat a nondemocratic regime” (p. 830). Reflecting on his downfall, Marcos (1989) stated that his negative reputation in the U.S. was due to the activities of “the articulate and well-financed representatives of anti-Marcos expatriates residing in North America” whose attendance at “the hearings in the U.S. Congress were given the widest circulation by the American press” (Marcos p. 94).

In contrast, in non-traditional countries of destination\(^2\) such as the Netherlands, groups focused on isolating the Marcos dictatorship in the international community and rallying for legal recognition of the two armed liberation movements fighting the regime—the National Democratic Front (NDF)\(^3\) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).\(^4\) Filipino activists in Europe accomplished these objectives through the convening of a public opinion tribunal, where they deployed universal human rights norms and principles in delegitimizing the Marcos government. They also drew on the narrative of the migrant worker exploited by the world capitalist system in making identity claims. While the tribunal endorsed the particularistic agenda of the NDF and MNLF, it also institutionalized and mainstreamed the discourse on the struggle for democracy and human rights with regard to the Philippine situation.

\(^2\) Immigration scholars in the U.S. have applied the concept of “non-traditional destination” to cities without a substantial immigrant presence historically. I adopt this term to countries where a small proportion of Filipino migrants have settled only in the last five to ten years due to weak ties.

\(^3\) The NDF is the umbrella organization of several leftist groups supporting the revolutionary struggle of the Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines and its guerrilla wing, the New People’s Army.

\(^4\) Founded in 1969, the MNLF is a secessionist political organization in the Philippines that waged an armed struggle against the Philippine government to achieve an independent land for Filipino Muslims.
Filipino movement organizations in the U.S. and the Netherlands had the same grievances and demands about the homeland government as well as shared goal of regime change, yet they differed in the means of framing and pursuing these respectively. Extant theories on diaspora mobilization—based on research findings of single successful cases of ethnic group lobbying—claim that environmental and organizational factors shape tactics and outcomes in homeland-oriented activism (Ahrari 1987; Haney and Vanderbush 1999; Heindl 2013; Moore 2002; Smith 2000; Uslander 1998). Recently, scholars have used social movement theory to explain the emergence and trajectory of homeland-oriented activism of migrants and exiles (Adamson 2012; Amarsingam 2015; Fair 2005; Koinova 2014; Lyon and Uçarer 2001; Sökefeld 2006; Wayland 2004). However, while both bodies of scholarship have been valuable in accounting for macro-level structures and processes, they remain inadequate in explaining meso-level variations and shifts in strategic choices and public identity claims of the same diaspora group in different national and historical contexts.

This study addresses two research questions. First, why did the diaspora movement for Philippine regime change vary significantly in demands, arenas, and tactics by host-country? Specifically, why did the movement in the U.S. focus on foreign policy lobbying, despite closed opportunities due to U.S. government’s consistent backing of the Marcos regime, while its counterpart in the Netherlands pursued non-state channels? Second, why did the transnational activists in the two countries express a

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5 Environmental factors include convergence with the hostland’s short- and long-term strategic interests, ideological compatibility with the executive, government permeability to ethnic influence, and favorable public opinion while organizational comprise political unity and group strength, demographic size, assimilation in the host society, and financial resources among others.
Filipino collective identity based on both particularism and universalism, when highly
parochial and territorially-based identities are the most effective ways to mobilize a
diaspora? Lastly, how did strategic choices shape public identity claims—and vice
versa—of the movement?

I show that examining the linkage between the homeland and hostland can explain
these changes, differences, and similarities. Adopting an interactive and relational
approach to strategy and identity (Jasper 2004, 2012; Maney et al. 2012; Meyer and
Staggenborg 2012; Polletta and Jasper 2001), the study demonstrates that how the
homeland and hostland are connected to each other economically, politically, and socially
influences the arenas of contention, interactions among field of actors, and symbolic
resources that, in turn, shape strategic decisions and identity claims. I argue that strong
linkage between the U.S. and the Philippines provided migrants and exiles an accessible
not only an institutional target for their claims-making and broad multiorganizational
field of allies but also discourses and frames on which they could anchor their claims,
thus promoting the pursuit of foreign policy lobbying. Weak linkage (Netherlands-
Philippines), however, involved a narrower set of players and thus drove activists to
create opportunities for mobilization—often in the international public sphere. In both
countries, activists’ framing of collective action oscillated between particularistic and
universal as the web of relations contracted and/or expanded.

I proceed with this article by reviewing theories on social movement strategy and
on the impact of homeland-hostland relations on diaspora mobilization. Next, I present
the methodology of the study, followed by the empirical findings of my two cases. I then
provide a theoretical discussion of the research results and conclude with the contributions and implications of the findings for the study of diaspora mobilization more broadly.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT STRATEGY AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Strategic decisions and identity claims are fundamental to collective action. However, although collective identity in contentious politics has received significant attention from sociologists in the last decade, its relationship with strategy remains largely undertheorized (Jasper 2004; Smithey 2009). Strategy lies between structure and agency, wherein activists make choices based on an assessment of the political environment, cultural climate, available resources, and their own perceptions of effectiveness (Ganz 200; Jasper 2012; Maney et al. 2012; Meyer and Staggenborg 2012).

While strategies are often considered as rational decisions selected on the basis of probability of success, they are in fact also statements about identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Bernstein (997:535) argues that “expressions of identity can be deployed at the collective level as a political strategy, which can be aimed at cultural or instrumental goals.” Social movements make public identity claims through the process of framing, which involves “conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam 1996:6). Frames provide individuals and organizations a way to identify an unjust condition or event, specify blame or cause, offer prescriptions for change, motivate action, and articulate a collective identity (Gamson 1995; Jasper 1997; Klandermans and Goslinga 1996; Zald 1996). To take advantage of the existing salience
of a particular policy or problem, activists often deploy frames that connect their issues to
the broader discourse—a process called “frame bridging” (Snow et al. 1986). Thus, in
framing, culture can be strategic, and any strategy is inherently cultural (Polletta 2012).

Activists may construct collective identities—including those rooted in structural
inequalities—in different ways (Polletta 1994). Among migrants and exiles, nationalism
can easily mobilize emotions such as love, loyalty, and pride, especially during high
points of contention (Tarrow 2011). But actors in diaspora activism may simultaneously
create new, hybrid identities and solidify primordial bonds (Lyons and Mandaville 2012).
An interesting question is: under what political conditions are particularistic and
universal identities deployed strategically?

Lastly, activists deliberate on appropriate strategies based on interaction with
other players in the arena of political contention, which include state targets and other
forms of authority; bystanders and potential allies; mass media; movement adherents and
supporters; and opponents (Ganz 2000; Meyer and Staggenborg 2012; Polletta and Jasper
2001). These other players do not simply constitute elements in the political opportunity
structures; rather, they themselves are agents engaged in cultural performance,
interpretation of outcomes, and strategic decisions based on the institutional context
(Jasper 2004). As they act and react to each other’s maneuvers in a shifting environment,
they become more embedded in the norms and conventions that govern their interaction
within a particular setting (Polletta 2012). Thus, Meyer and Staggenborg (2012:18)
suggest that to understand movement strategy as dynamic process, we need to look at
“how a changing web of relations in a multiorganizational field of actors constrains and enlarges strategic options over time.”

HOMELAND-HOSTLAND LINKAGE AND DIASPORA MOBILIZATION

Specifying the political conditions that explain variation in strategies within movements leads to a more holistic understanding of collective action (Bernstein 1997). The growing literature on diaspora mobilization has focused on the conditions that enable migrants and exiles to influence the policy of their host government towards their homeland through ethnic lobbying and other forms of formal state engagement (Baser 2015; Bercovitch 2007; DeWind and Segura 2014). Essentially, homeland-hostland state relations constitute an important element of the transnational political opportunity structure for diasporic claims-making. However, Koinova (2014:1047) observes that state-centric theoretical approaches merely “capture institutional and policy variation, not their implications for transnational diaspora politics.”

To be sure, the relations between the hostland and homeland states significantly affect the propensity for diaspora mobilization, especially when the two are embroiled in conflict or when the government in power in the homeland is extremely dependent on the material and symbolic sponsorship of state authorities in the hostland (Shain 1994/95). If the hostland government’s official posture on the homeland is important to the latter’s survival, diasporas can leverage their position in liberal, pluralistic, and multicultural states to exert pressure on their homeland vis-à-vis another external actor (Grugel and Kippin 2007; Karpathakis 1999; Shain and Barth 2003; Watanabe 1984). Thus, foreign policies can shape opportunities for migrants and exiles by identifying a specific target,
opening access to the institutionalized political system, and connecting to elite allies in
the host society.

Yet, diaspora mobilization might not center on influencing policymakers in
hostland state institutions, especially if the hostland’s foreign policy is not important or
closed to homeland goals. Instead, activists may fund opposition parties and insurgent
movements to help bolster their ability to depose the regime in power in their countries of
origin (Amarasingam 2015; Byman et al. 2001; Fair 2005). Through their ties with
hostland state and civil-society actors, they may also seek other formal institutional
venues at the regional and supranational levels to create external pressure on the
homeland government from above (Bolzman 2011; Koinova 2014; Tsutsui and Shin
2008). As in Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) boomerang model, diaspora political
entrepreneurs\(^6\) bypass the homeland and hostland states and engage in campaigns with
the help of transnational advocacy networks. When their countries of origin have dense
and strong connections to the West, they can exert considerable influence due to the
extensive nexus of actors and flows of resources that they draw upon (Pérez-Armendáriz
and Crow 2010; Whitehead 1996).

Thus, homeland-hostland linkage does not simply constitute the opportunity
structures for diaspora movements but also a shifting arena and a field or relations that
influence strategy and identity. Linkage, essentially, encompasses the myriad networks of
interdependence that connect individual polities, economies and societies to each other

\(^6\) In collective action, a “political entrepreneur,” often part of a privileged group, is an individual willing to
bear the costs of social action irrespective of the position taken by others who are also interested in the
action’s outcomes (Olson 1965).
and enable the transmission of international influence, especially in efforts to democratize authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010). This study focuses on how activists make strategic choices and public identity claims within these linkages, with differences in the U.S.’s and Netherlands’s density of ties and cross-border flows to the Philippines offering empirical and theoretical insights.

**DATA AND METHODS**

The data for this paper come from a wide range of sources, including interviews; archival documents; and published historical accounts. I conducted data collection in the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the U.S. from 2012 to 2014. The primary sources consist of written records of social movement organizations; unpublished personal accounts of activists; government documents; and news accounts in ethnic and mainstream press. I gathered these from the personal archives of activists and the various collections on the Philippines at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam, the University of the Philippines-Diliman Main Library in Manila, the Suzzallo and Allen Libraries of the University of Washington in Seattle, and the Asian American Studies Center of the University of California, Los Angeles.

I also conducted 53 in-depth semi-structured interviews, averaging 75 minutes each, with movement participants. Using an interview schedule, I had face-to-face conversations with 52 key informants—10 in the Philippines, 25 in the Netherlands, 17 in the U.S.—and one through Skype, an application that provides video chat and video call

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7 Levitsky and Way identify six dimensions of linkage that are important: economic (flows of trade, investment, and credit); intergovernmental (including bilateral diplomatic and military ties); technocratic (share of the homeland’s elite that is educated in the hostland); social (flows of people across borders); information (flows of information between the homeland and hostland); and civil-society (especially transnational activist networks).
services. I selected my key informants using snowball sampling, which is commonly used for members of a population that have not all been previously identified and are more difficult to locate. This is especially the case for Filipino activists who worked clandestinely in both the Netherlands and the U.S. I interviewed until I reached a “saturation” point, that is, when no new information was being elicited. Sampling sought to maximize variation in the sex, legal status in the host society, and migrant generation of the informants (see Table 1). The bulk of my data from interviews coalesce around remembrances, analyses, and interpretation of the current state of affairs when diaspora mobilization took place.

I also used data from authoritative academic studies, especially historical accounts and theoretical analysis done on my empirical cases. Secondary sources were useful in identifying individuals and organizations that were involved in the movement for homeland regime change. For each study on Filipino-American mobilization during the dictatorship, I listed those commonly mentioned and identified as significant. I used this as proxy for consensus among scholars of the actors’ historical importance. In contrast, studies on Filipino mobilization in the Netherlands are scant and I depended primarily on the opinion of Filipino and Dutch scholars in identifying movement participants. I crosschecked the information they provided with a list8 of registered Filipino organizations provided by the Philippine Embassy in the Netherlands.

I coded my archival and interview data using MaxQDA software. Based on the

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8 The embassy’s most recent record, dated 2002, lists a total of 94 Filipino organizations in the Netherlands, with 43 religious, 22 business, and 20 social clubs. The rest are considered advocacy organizations.
tenets of process tracing in case study methods (George and Bennett 2004), I focused on both detailed chronology and snapshots of specific moments and turning points that permit a good interpretation of change and sequence in diaspora mobilization. After constructing a narrative that purports to throw light on how diaspora mobilization came about, I converted this chronicle into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

U.S.-Philippines Security Alliance and Foreign Policy Lobbying

The strong relationship between the United States and the Philippines was a product of forty-eight years of colonialism, which created the conditions for the dependence of post-Commonwealth Filipino elites on U.S. endorsement and patronage to achieve economic and political power. Marcos’s ascendance to power was a product of this colonial legacy. Against the backdrop of the war in Vietnam, the U.S. championed the election of Marcos—a staunch anti-communist—to the presidency in 1965 and provided him the infrastructure to advance his rule that would last for twenty-one years. When Marcos officially imposed martial law on September 21, 1972, the White House, the State Department, and the American Chamber of Commerce publicly supported his actions. From 1972 up to the restoration of representative democracy in 1986, the U.S. consistently backed the authoritarian government of Marcos.

Despite U.S.’s unwavering support for the dictator, anti-martial law groups in the U.S. targeted the economic and political foundation of the regime and the ties that bind Marcos to the U.S., primarily through ethnic lobbying. Why would activists focus on
state engagement when the institutionalized political system is closed to social movement claims? I show that the density of ties between the U.S. and the Philippines allowed for the development of a broad alliance network and activation of state-centered symbols and narratives that facilitated the creation of ethnic lobbying power among Filipinos in the U.S.

Several anti-martial law groups were formed from 1972 to 1982 (see Table 2), but four were the largest in terms of size and scale of mobilization. One was the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP). Building on movement discourses on U.S. foreign policy during the height of anti-Vietnam War mobilizations, NCRCLP framed the Philippines as potentially becoming another Vietnam to draw parallels and extend the critique of U.S. foreign policy. Another organization was the Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino (Union of Democratic Filipinos [KDP]), which drew inspiration from Filipino working-class leader Andres Bonifacio and his anti-colonial secret organization that led the revolution against Spain. KDP connected the authoritarian rule in the Philippines to the development of monopoly-capitalism in the U.S.

Exiled former Philippine Senator Raul Mangalapus formed the Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), which attracted disenfranchised ex-political leaders who had fled the Marcos regime. In his speech at the founding convention, Manglapus spoke about the significance of the formation of MFP just a few blocks from the White House, “where it all began 75 years ago,” referring to U.S.’s decision to annex the Philippines at the turn
of the century.\textsuperscript{9} In confronting the U.S. for the Marcos regime, MFP tapped into American people’s commitment to the ideals of liberal democracy. Lastly, the Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) rallied non-Filipino allies to oppose U.S. government support for the Marcos dictatorship. Like NCRCLP, FFP also voiced concerns over the “increasing threat of another Vietnam in the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{10} As Americans, the members felt a moral obligation to ensure that the public was aware of the direct support the U.S. was providing to authoritarian regimes.

Because U.S. economic and military aid to the Philippines kept Marcos in power, congressional lobbying was a key strategy that organizations pursued individually or through alliances such as the Anti-Martial Law Coalition/Coalition Against the Marcos Dictatorship. Initially framing the situation in the Philippines as a human rights issue, lobbying centered on cutting allocations for the Philippines in the Foreign Assistance Act. The approach was to use moral shocks (Jasper 1997), wherein activists showed evidence of U.S.-supplied artillery and weapons used to crush people’s movements, shut down mainstream mass media, and maintain political prisons across the archipelago among others. The use of human rights frames was a strategic choice to seize the opportunity presented by Marcos’s imposition of martial law. It was also based on their assessment of the political circumstances and available resources for mobilization.

What is the most appropriate response for martial law? Being based in the United States and understanding what kind of support that the US

government could give to the Philippines, I think it was important to try to unite the broadest cross-section of the Filipino community against the dictatorship. We knew there were those who supported the dictatorship. We also recognized that, based on our history in organizing the community, there was still a lot of conservatism—a lot of patriotism towards the US who would support whatever the US posture was towards the dictatorship… We recognized that we needed to have a broader approach to build consensus in the Filipino community to oppose dictatorship and that was to have it pitched to civil liberties.11

In the context of the rise of U.S.-backed dictatorships Latin America and the continued intervention of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, Filipino activists found allies among representatives who were calling for a fundamental reorientation of U.S. policy toward the Third World. These included Senators Alan Cranston (D-CA), George McGovern (D-SD), and James Abourezk (D-SD) as well as Representatives Donald Fraser (D-MN) and Tom Harkin (D-IA). Abourezk, for instance, introduced amendments on the 1973 bill that would deny assistance to any country that imprisoned its citizens for political purposes and prohibit the use of aid for police, prisons, internal intelligence, and maintenance of security forces. The activists also found elite adherents among representatives of states where a large Filipino constituency existed, such as California, New Jersey, and New York. Within U.S. civil society, academics and labor organizations—including the United Farm Workers of America and International Longshore and Warehouse Union—

11 Catherine Tactaquin, interview by the author, Oakland, CA, USA, August 15, 2014.
registered support for the movement. A few days after the Senate approved $91.5 million in military aid for the Philippines in 1974, 120 prominent Americans demanded the restoration of constitutional democracy in the Philippines in a full-page advertisement in the December 18, 1973 issue of The New York Times.

In May 20 to June 24, 1975, a few months after the fall/liberation of Saigon and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House of Representatives’ Committee on International Relations, headed by Fraser, convened hearings on the human rights situation in the Philippines and South Korea, signaling to activists a transformed atmosphere for campaigns directed at U.S. foreign policy in the region. For the first time, the U.S. Congress invited opponents of Marcos to testify on the political situation in the Philippines.12 Throughout their sworn statements, the witnesses held the U.S. accountable for the egregious conditions in the Philippines, arguing that Marcos would not have the capacity to repress his people without aid intended to protect U.S. interests in Asia. In accusing the U.S. for its acquiescence to Marcos’s authoritarian regime, the witnesses put on trial America’s commitment to Western liberal democracy that it had introduced to the archipelago during its colonial rule. They also argued that, as a global leader and champion of government by the people, the U.S. needed to uphold the tenets of democracy in its former colony.

MANGLAPUS: …If U.S. military aid is not withdrawn, that reckoning

12 These included MFP president Manglapus; Bruno Hicks, an American priest who worked in the Philippines for 10 years and was detained and deported after the declaration of martial law; Joseph O’Hare, also a cleric and associate editor of the Jesuit publication, America Magazine; Primitivo Mijares, a personal advisor to Marcos who defected and was living in the U.S.; Amelito Mutuc, former Philippine ambassador to the U.S.; and Gerald Hill, a lawyer for the Lopez family, one of Marcos’s wealthy adversaries.
will eventually come, delayed and, I am afraid, perhaps bloody. *America will lose a great friend in Asia, one which only 30 years ago shed the blood of thousands of its sons and allowed its cities and countryside to be devastated so that the war might be kept from American shores and American democracy, itself, might survive.*

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O’HARE: …In 1898, when Philippines revolutionaries accepted American assistance in the belief that the Americans would help them gain their independence from Spain, President William McKinley had a divine inspiration that convinced him that it was the mission of the United States to “civilize and christianize” the Philippines although the country at that time was predominantly Catholic… Now, after 75 years of American dominance, *for Americans to ease their conscience about the disappearance of constitutional government in the Philippines by the view that the will to self-rule was only a foreign American importation, this may be the ultimate condescension and the final betrayal* (italics supplied).  

Changes in the composition of the U.S. Congress in 1975 emboldened activists to strengthen lobbying efforts. With 291 elected to office, the Democrats, who were sympathetic to the anti-martial law movement, controlled the House of Representatives.

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13 Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session, May 20, 22, June 3, 5, 10, 12, 17, and 24, 1975.
More importantly, according to FFP’s assessment of opportunities, the political climate and dynamics among the elite after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam offered an auspicious moment for advocating an overhaul in U.S. foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

From the start, the dominant perspective on Congress work in the anti-martial law movement was that of exploiting contradictions within the ruling elite through mass pressure... During this period, the ruling class displayed less homogeneity than in normal times. There was debate in ruling circles over the thrust of US foreign policy after the disaster in Vietnam... Thus, during this period, the area of maneuver for exploiting the contradictions within the elite in the field of foreign policy was slightly greater than in “normal times” (italics supplied).14

Yet, in spite of numerous congressional hearings on the Philippines, the enactment of legislative measures to curtail aid to authoritarian regimes including the Human Rights or Harkin Amendment (Section 116) to the Foreign Assistance Act,15 and the election of Jimmy Carter who pledged to administer a foreign policy based on human rights, Marcos received military aid at a continually increasing rate.16 Recognizing the limitations of lobbying based primarily on appeals to Americans’ commitment to

15 The amendment states: “No assistance may be provided under this part to the government of any country which engages in consistent pattern of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country.”
16 Prior to the declaration of martial law (1969-1972), the total U.S. official military assistance to the Philippines was $80.8 million. This figure doubled to $166.3 million in 1973-1976. In 1977, the Philippines received $74.6 million in U.S. arms sales alone (Bello and Rivera 1977).
democracy or human rights framework, activists shifted their strategy and targeted the essence of U.S.-Philippines bilateral relations—the Military Bases Agreement. U.S. aid was essentially about the need to maintain friendly relations with foreign governments for geopolitical reasons (Steinmetz 1994). Movement leaders knew that as long as U.S. politicians considered the bases as crucial to national security, lobbying efforts founded on moral shocks and pleas would be futile.

A challenge for the activists was portraying the bases as unnecessary for the protection of U.S. economic and military interests. In the context of the Cold War, the Subic Naval and Clark Air Bases in the Philippines became the most strategic among all overseas basing facilities, allowing the U.S. to project its forces into both Pacific and Indian Ocean regions and thus maintain dominance in the whole Asian continent. For U.S. politicians, fortifying the bases in the Philippines was imperative especially since after the Second Indochina War, the Soviet Pacific Fleet established itself in the naval facilities of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and the airfields of Cambodia.

However, since the suspension of bases talks during the Ford administration, public consensus on overseas military installations began to change. Academics, journalists, and former generals started to challenge the importance of the bases in providing security to the American people. Editorials, opinion columns, and news reports expressed consternation over the degree to which politicians would give in to Marcos’s demands to keep the U.S. bases in the Philippines, at the expense of American taxpayers and the sovereignty of the Filipino people (see Lescaze 1977; Matthews 1976; The New York Times 1976, 1977 among others). These provided an opportunity for anti-martial
law groups to target the fiscal foundation of the bases and appeal to U.S. national interests. FFP used its taxpayer frame to discredit the benefits of maintaining overseas bases, in light of problems in the domestic front. It portrayed the bases as a misappropriation of government funds that could otherwise be allocated to programs and services for citizens that the U.S. military installations are supposed to protect.

In a hearing on aid to the Philippines by the House Appropriations Committee held on April 5, 1977, FFP testified on the human rights situation in the Philippines, the continued importance of the U.S. bases, and specific program requests for the Philippines in the 1978 fiscal year. In the statements, the anti-martial law organization attempted to create further doubts among the political elite on the continued value of the U.S. bases by appealing to their commitment to American liberal democratic principles.

Despite the Human Rights Amendment, the Carter Administration has exempted the Marcos regime from human rights consideration and the question remains: Do the U.S. bases in the Philippines serve U.S. national interests and do they constitute “overriding security considerations”?

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*We believe that these distant installations are of no vital strategic importance and only serve to corrupt traditional American values by being pawns of the Marcos regime in its demands for more U.S. dollars in order to sustain itself.* Further, we believe that a foreign policy based, not solely on military supremacy, but on a respect for freedoms, sovereignty
and human rights of other peoples best serves our long-term and genuine national interests (italics supplied).\textsuperscript{17}

Although legislators were sympathetic to the demands of the activists, the U.S. executive continued to accommodate Marcos’s demands. By the end of 1978, the Carter and Marcos presidents signed a deal that gave the Philippine government nominal control of the U.S. bases and $450 million in military aid for five years. Lobbying efforts declined in the 1980s as the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions altered the opportunities and resources for the movement against Marcos.

\textbf{Regime Isolation, Nongovernment Tribunal, and Promotion of Human Rights Norms}

Compared to the U.S., the Philippines has weak linkage with the Netherlands. Economic relations only developed significantly in the 1960s, with the Netherlands as an export destination for Philippine agricultural products and an important investor in the Philippines through Dutch multinational companies such as Unilever, Shell, and Philips (Muijzenberg 2001). The Philippines also became a beneficiary of Dutch official development assistance in the mid-1960s. In the early 1970s, as the human rights situation worsened under the Marcos regime, direct support declined and aid was almost exclusively channeled to nongovernment organizations (Eldik Thieme 1992). Development cooperation through this arrangement led to the forging of political ties between Dutch and Filipinos beyond the confines of state relations (Quinsaat 2016).

Migration of Filipinos to the Netherlands began in the 1960s, consisting mostly of factory workers and hospital employees. With the official institution of Philippine labor export policy in 1974 and the normalization of out-migration by constructing overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) as “modern-day heroes,” the migrant population expanded in the 1970s and included contract-based au pairs and entertainers in Amsterdam, workers of oil rig companies in the North Sea, and seafarers of commercial-shipping flag states docked in Rotterdam. The demographic composition changed with the entry of political refugees starting in the mid-1970s. As Marcos intensified his campaign to quash the communist insurgency, the CPP-NDF began sending cadres in Western Europe both to escape persecution and to build diplomatic relations with socialist parties (Quimpo 2007). Dutch solidarity groups—such as the Filippijnengroep Nederland (Philippine Group Netherlands)—and religious missionaries initially provided the social infrastructure that could provide Filipino migrants and exiles to engage in the movement for regime change in the Philippines. The chain migration of CPP-NDF exiles—who, like the Filipino political refugees in the U.S., also belonged to elite and middle-class families in the Philippines—facilitated the creation of a Filipino movement community with strong ties to civil-society groups in the Netherlands, including the Dutch left.

With minimal ties to the Philippines, Dutch foreign policy did not matter as much to the survival of Marcos’s authoritarian regime and thus could not serve as an international democratizing pressure. In addition, because of small-scale migration flows established only in the 1960s, the Filipinos in the Netherlands have not achieved a degree of assimilation into Dutch society, a source of leverage for migrants vis-à-vis their host
government. Thus, despite the presence of sympathetic elite allies within the Dutch state—such as the coalition government of Christian Democratic Appeal and People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy—and new social movements in the Netherlands, opportunities for policy influence at the state level were closed.

The venue for pressuring Marcos shifted in the international public sphere, where popular opinion would hold the regime accountable for transgressions of universal norms and principles. Initially drawing on their support from Dutch civil society and state actors, diaspora political entrepreneurs and solidarity activists turned to nongovernmental human rights tribunals, which would serve as arenas to express appeals to public conscience and to apply established rules and principles of international law. As Philippine solidarity groups emerged in other European countries including the Ireland, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, the goals of the movement against Marcos expanded. While delegitimizing and politically isolating the regime in the international community remained its primary purpose, the movement also regarded the tribunal as a venue to mobilize support and strengthen the legitimacy of the NDF and MNLF as representatives of the Filipino people (Quinsaat 2016).

Between 76 to 78, there was an idea in the solidarity movement to kind of develop a high profile [event] for the National Democratic Front, aside from putting on trial the Marcos dictatorship… The Lelio Basso Foundation was an important foundation in the sense of being a bridge between liberation struggles at that time.¹⁸

¹⁸ Brida Brennan, interview by the author, Utrecht, The Netherlands, October 14, 2013.
Thus, in 1978, activists filed a complaint to the Lelio Basso Foundation’s Permanent People’s Tribunal (PPT)\(^{19}\) based on traditional legal standards and those enshrined in the 1976 Universal Declaration of Rights of Peoples.\(^{20}\) From October 30 to November 3 in 1980, the PPT on the Philippines met in Antwerp, Belgium to examine the case presented by the NDF and the MNLF on behalf of the Filipino and Bangsamoro peoples respectively. In its final verdict, the tribunal found “that the Marcos regime by its reliance on ‘permanent’ martial law and numerous blatant abuses of state is deprived of legitimate standing as a government in international society and lacks the competence to act on behalf of the Filipino or Bangsa Moro people (italics supplied).” The PPT also condemned the U.S. for its role in “sustaining, supporting and encouraging the Marcos regime to act on behalf of its economic and global strategic interests” (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981:276-277). More importantly, the decision acknowledged and affirmed the authority of the NDF and MNLF, giving them the right to defend their people even through armed struggle.

The status of belligerency afforded to the NDF enabled the advancement of revolutionary work in the Netherlands, which encompassed building an overseas Filipino movement for the protection of the rights of Filipino migrant workers and for their involvement in political transformation in the Philippines (Quinsaat 2016). The inclusion

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\(^{19}\) The PPT grew out of the Bertrand Russell Tribunal II on Latin America in the early seventies. Lelio Basso, a socialist theoretician and leader of the Italian Socialists Party, transformed the second Russell tribunal into an ongoing structure for nongovernmental hearings. The PPT was formally inaugurated in Bologna, Italy on June 29, 1979. Before its session on the Philippines, the PPT had already held sessions on Western Sahara, Argentina, and Eritrea.

\(^{20}\) In its preamble, the declaration states: “Aware of expressing the aspirations of our era, we met in Algiers to proclaim that all the peoples of the world have an equal right to liberty, the right to free themselves from any foreign interference and to choose their own government, the right if they are under subjection, to fight for their liberation and the right to benefit from other peoples’ assistance in their struggle.”
of a migrant worker as witness in the tribunal gave OFWs the stature as not only victims
of the Marcos dictatorship but also as agents in the revolutionary struggle. In her
testimony, Celia Soliman, a Filipina migrant worker and organizer in Rome situated the
“untold pain, suffering and loneliness” within two systems of oppression: capitalism and
authoritarian rule. She elaborated the connection between labor migration, the insecurity
of OFWs in Europe, and the cultural, economic, and political repression in the
Philippines.

The dream of finding better conditions abroad than in the Philippines
becomes a nightmare… the hard work and the inner pain; the
incomparable sadness; the separation from home and loved ones; the
adjustment to a new culture and a new language; legal papers to worry
about; anxiety about the police; the low and inadequate salary; the debts
incurred to come and which have to be repaid…

From among the migrants, the seeds of their organization is [sic]
already beginning. They realize that not only in organizing themselves will
they be able to fight to defend their rights, to work for better working
conditions and to be able to face the world with dignity and self-respect.

The roots of the problem remain, however… Marcos’ political and
economic policies which force thousands of Filipinos to go abroad to find
jobs due to unemployment at home…the policy of using migrant labor to
get foreign exchange. (Komite ng Sambayanang Pilipino 1981:106 [italics
supplied]).
The bridging of macro structures in the homeland and the daily ordeal that OFWs confronted at the micro level provided a framework for the construction of oppositional consciousness necessary for mobilization. Activists built upon Soliman’s testimony to create an identity that countered Marcos’s construction of OFWs as “modern-day heroes.” Most of the Filipino labor migrants in Europe possessed the status of middle class in the Philippines, who held professional jobs as teachers, civil servants, or bank employees. In mobilizing them, activists strategically deployed a class ideology to frame the experiences of those who have suffered dislocation from the homeland and marginalization in the host society. The narrative was that the process of labor migration had “sub-proletarianized” the Filipino workers, doubly exploited, first by the ruling class in the homeland and then by the people in their host societies. But despite the hardship they and their families experienced in the Philippines, they still maintained affective bonds and expressed loyalty to the nation, often through the celebration of its culture and its people (Quinsaat 2016).

After the tribunal, the number of Filipino political organizations in the Netherlands grew. They deployed a collective identity based on class, which allowed for the separation of the state from the nation and the imagination of a transnational community based on shared experiences of migration, separation, and exploitation, all of which were products of the capitalist system. Thus, the struggle against the structures that sustain the Marcos dictatorship was also a struggle for migrants’ rights. This connection was elaborated in the mobilization around Executive Order 857 in 1985, which legally mandated Filipino labor migrants to remit 50-70 percent of their basic monthly salary to
their beneficiaries through the Philippine banking system. Migrants regarded the decree as an assault on their right to personal income and as an attempt of Marcos to bolster the declining economy for his own private interests. By 1982, the movement against Marcos in the Netherlands had not only reached its goals of delegitimizing the regime in the international community and rallying support for the national liberation movements; it has also politicized a group of temporary economic workers who subverted the Philippine state and its discourse on Filipino migrants’ role in the nation.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

The mobilization of Filipino migrants and exiles in the U.S. and the Netherlands to unseat a homeland authoritarian government provides insights into how linkages between hostland and homeland states shape the strategy and identity of diaspora movements. Drawing from the literatures on social movement strategy and identity as well as state relations and diaspora politics, the article shows that the choices activists make with regard to their forms of collective action, public demands and identity claims, and arenas of contestation depend on the extent of economic, political, and social connectedness between the hostland and homeland. The stronger the linkage, the broader the field of players, the greater the leverage of diaspora groups in state channels.

Durable ties between the Philippines and the U.S. created the conditions for ethnic lobbying. Strong intergovernmental linkage—manifested primarily in the Military Bases Agreement—provided Filipinos in the U.S. an accessible institutional target for claims-making. While a conservative U.S. foreign policy in the Philippines and the U.S. president’s dominance in foreign policy decisions indicated closed opportunities for
influence, it did not preclude activists from pursuing lobbying. In the U.S., a coherent and unitary foreign policy is unlikely since Congress, which is permeable to constituency influence, has a crucial role in decision making (Shain 1994/95; Smith 2000). The U.S. Congress is an arena where movements can exploit conflicts within the U.S. foreign-policy establishment. Thus, although their goals diverged with U.S. strategic interests as defined by the executive, activists were able to make proposals in areas that required congressional role, such as cutting economic and military aid to Marcos in the Foreign Assistance Act.

The activists’ pursuit of foreign policy lobbying is also an outcome of robust homeland-hostland social connections, which enabled the creation of broad alliance network and information infrastructure needed to challenge the homeland state. This is particularly important in ethnic lobbying and interest group politics, where persuasion, facilitation, and bargaining characterize the interaction between a movement and its target. As the study shows, congressional hearings were the main forums for these interactions. The inquiries comprised of multiple actors such as the executive and legislature, mainstream mass media, and civil society, each of which an audience for the statements, symbols, and actions of other players (Jasper 2004). Adhering to institutional and procedural norms, witnesses used the facts-based testimonies to increase their leverage with and sow dissension among participants in contention.

In their campaign to decrease aid to the regime, activists adapted their demands based on their assessment of the political context, enlargement of the multiorganizational field, and their own perception of what is possible within the parameters of lobbying.
strategy. The shift in framing withdrawal of U.S. support of the Marcos dictatorship—from human rights to national interests—illustrates adjustments in movement strategy as activists interact with their targets and make judgments about their prospects in a particular political arena (Meyer and Staggenborg 2012). Since interests are themselves constructed, activists engaged policymakers in defining the foundation of U.S. national interests in a language that celebrated American liberalism and democracy.

Homeland-hostland linkages allowed activists to deploy symbols and activate narratives that alluded to the rise of the Marcos dictatorship as an outcome of U.S. colonization of the Philippines, thus grounding their claims and demands for the U.S. withdrawal of support to the regime. Because colonialism is a familiar discourse that defines U.S.-Philippines relations, even in congressional hearings on appropriations and human rights, activists foregrounded the colonial narrative and connected this to U.S. domestic and foreign policies. Although activists did not achieve their goal of significantly cutting aid to the regime, lobbying undermined the authority of Marcos in the U.S. Congress and thus prevented the formation of elite consensus around the necessity of maintaining his government for U.S. national interests.

In contrast, the weak linkage between the Philippines and the Netherlands made the home regime not as susceptible to diplomatic and economic pressure from the hostland state. Foreign policy was unable to provide Filipinos with an established point of access into the institutionalized political system in the host society. This rendered lobbying an ineffective tool for Filipinos to challenge Marcos, despite openness of Dutch state institutions to anti-dictatorship movements and availability of sympathetic elites.
Activists, however, recognized that despotic regimes are still susceptible to foreign criticisms and animosity, especially in the wider sphere of global public opinion. Since the political culture in Western Europe was conducive to universalistic claims making, they created their own political opportunities through nongovernmental human rights tribunal and damaged the reputation of the Marcos regime through naming and shaming in international forums.

Thus, consistent with Koinova’s (2014) findings, engagement in transnational channels is not driven solely by blocked access to state institutions. In diaspora politics, the effectiveness of international democratizing pressure determines the venue for claims making. By delegitimizing the Marcos regime and holding the U.S. accountable for its support of authoritarian rule based on legal and moral standards as well as rallying support for national liberation movements, activists were able to leverage international public opinion to press for reforms in human rights at the minimum and to put Marcos and the U.S. under increased public scrutiny.

The institutional norms of the tribunal, combined with a narrower multiorganizational field composed mostly of transnational advocacy networks, limited the ways by which activists could make public identity claims. As actors become enmeshed in a web of relationships, their room for innovation also becomes constricted (Meyer and Staggenborg 2012). Thus, although the tribunal supported the agenda of the liberation movements, including their tactic of armed struggle, activists downplayed nationalistic frames. Rather, they deployed a class-based identity that fused cosmopolitan ideals and particularistic attachments based on the oppression and agency of migrants as
both Filipinos and workers in the global economy. This can be seen in the use of migrants’ rights frame in the opposition to Marcos’s policy of mandatory remittance.

The movement for Philippine regime change in both the U.S. and the Netherlands used the process of frame bridging to connect its demands to dominant national and global state discourses (e.g., national interests, security, human rights) as well as to the grievances and claims of various social actors (e.g., interventionism in U.S. foreign policy, migrants rights). This is because activists must work within the power structures and political cultures of their host countries, often appealing to unsympathetic administrations and indifferent publics. Framing also entails navigating the structures of meaning in shifting transnational social spaces.

The findings of the study raise important questions for scholarship on diaspora mobilizations. Can diasporas be mobilized solely through non-state transnational avenues where human rights and liberal universalistic values are the codes through which the community is imagined? How does homeland democratization affect the strategic choices and identity claims of movements? Understanding how diaspora activists make decisions in a shifting field of relations can help scholars capture the dynamics of diasporic contention and apply an agency-oriented, processual view of cross-border social phenomena (Faist 2012).

REFERENCES


International Organization 57: 449-479.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptors</th>
<th>Place of Residence During Mobilization</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15 (48%)</td>
<td>15 (68%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16 (53%)</td>
<td>7 (32%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solidarity Activists (Non-Ethnic Filipinos)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 (27%)</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Migrant Status of Ethnic Filipinos in the Host Country</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonresident alien (e.g., student visa)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee</td>
<td>17 (55%)</td>
<td>5 (23%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent resident</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6 (27%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>5 (15%)</td>
<td>9 (41%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Immigrant Generation of Ethnic Filipinos</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>23 (74%)</td>
<td>14 (64%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7 (32%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
<td>22 (100%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Principal U.S. Organizations Involved in the Movement for Regime Change in the Philippines, 1972-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Type of Organization</th>
<th>Main Chapters&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Major Activities</th>
<th>Framing of Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Katipunan ng Demokratikong Pilipino (KDP)</td>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>Cadre/revolutionary mass organization</td>
<td>Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Jersey City</td>
<td>Demonstrations, Community organizing, Publication of Ang Katipunan, Multisectoral campaigns, Networking with other revolutionary organizations, Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA</td>
<td>Anti-dictatorship as a struggle against U.S. imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP)</td>
<td>Washington D.C.</td>
<td>Formal membership organization</td>
<td>Boston, Chicago, Jersey City</td>
<td>Demonstrations, Lobbying in the U.S. Congress, Community outreach</td>
<td>U.S. support to Marcos as against principles of Western liberal democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Type of Organization</td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Filipino Patriots (IAFP)</td>
<td>Oakland, CA</td>
<td>Revolutionary mass organization</td>
<td>Los Angeles, San Francisco Bay Area, New York, Seattle, Washington D.C., San Francisco Bay Area, Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver</td>
<td>Demonstrations, Lobbying in the U.S. Congress, Publication of Philippine Information Bulletin, Community organizing, Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA, Alliance with other national liberation movements, Community organizing, Institutional support for the CPP-NDF-NPA, Networking with solidarity groups, Community organizing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugnayan para sa Pambansang Demokrasya</td>
<td>Chicago, IL</td>
<td>Revolutionary mass organization</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>Anti-dictatorship as a struggle against U.S. imperialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Martial Law Coalition/Coalition Against the Marcos</td>
<td>San Francisco, CA</td>
<td>Multi-organizational coalition</td>
<td>Boston, Chicago, Guam, Honolulu</td>
<td>Community outreach, Demonstrations, Lobbying in the U.S. Congress, Martial law as violation of international human rights norms</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Small chapters were created in suburban cities and towns where movement leaders visited, but these constituted the locus of organizing.*