Educated into Violence: The Colonial Origins of Separatist Rebellion

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Abstract

Why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? Existing explanations take a snapshot view of separatists, assuming that their perceptions are objective. They do not account for how groups end up in a position or why they come to this conclusion. Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. What students learn influences the nature of grievances and opportunities for social mobility. I argue that colonial education policies structure group perceptions of inclusion in the new state, becoming particularly salient in the lead-up to independence. Penetrative education policies encourage the development of a national identity by strengthening the attachment of minority groups to the colonizer and bonds within the same community. As a result, rebellion tends to happen sooner because it is easier for groups to identify conditions of discrimination. In contrast, shallow education policies do not strengthen reliance on or association with the colonizer and instead promote political fragmentation within groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallowly educated groups are less likely to feel targeted on the basis of that identity. This ultimately delays rebellion. I utilize archival data from colonial officials and semi-elite interviews as evidence for process-tracing in two cases: the Moros in the Philippines who are late seceders and the Karen in Burma who are early seceders.
"It is in the encouragement and promotion of education on these lines that the government can perhaps do most to strengthen the national unity of the Karens."

–Donald M. Smeaton

“…having no means of communicating with the Moros except through their own dialects, the knowledge of the Arabic system of writing and of the local dialects become necessary as qualifications for office and as part of the curriculum of the primary schools.

–Najeeb M. Saleeby

Introduction

After World War II, regions such as Southeast Asia underwent a wave of independence through rebellion or negotiation. Despite the diversity within Southeast Asian colonies, state borders often coincided with the boundaries settled by colonial powers. These borders have predominantly remained intact and separatist claims are often viewed as “exceptions to be explained” rather than a norm (Reid, 2010, p. 48). Among these exceptions are early seceders, who wage separatist rebellion soon after that a colony’s independence, and late seceders, who “develop only after a prolonged period of frustration and conflict” (Horwitz, 1985, p. 259). Even when similarly aggrieved ethnic groups are denied their own independence, this variation persists. Why do some separatists rebel sooner than others? I argue that colonial education policies facilitate the development of national identity which, in turn, affect group perceptions of extensive threats that can trigger separatist rebellion.

Rationalist explanations about the onset of rebellion focus on resources, opportunity, political instability, or state weakness. Yet not all groups take advantage of

1 Donald M. Smeaton served several positions in Burma, including Chief Secretary, Chief Commissioner, and a member of the Governor-General's Legislative Council of Burma. See Donald M. Smeaton, The Loyal Karens of Burma (1887), 222-23.

2 Najeeb M. Saleeby served several positions in the Philippines, including Captain and Assistant Surgeon in the Department of Mindanao, Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes in charge of Moro Affairs, Superintendent of Schools, and a member of the Legislative Council of the Moro Province. See Najeeb M. Saleeby, The Moro Problem: An Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Moros of the Philippine Islands (Manila, 1913), 24.
windows of opportunity and rebel, even with the resources. In short, rationalist explanations conclude that rebellion occurs when resources and opportunity indicate feasibility. The empirical evidence for these theories is mixed. Moreover, scholars assume that rational conditions are objectively apparent. In focusing on opportunities or resources, rationalist theories of rebellion downplay how group perceptions of these factors influence the onset of separatist rebellion in the first place. Emotive explanations, on the other hand, do consider perception and its role in subjective determinations of relative conditions or threats. In some cases, scholars focus on specific perceptions such as that of threat, backwardness, or political exclusion on the eve of independence (Hortwitz, 1985; Wimmer, 2002; Ray, 2016). Perceptions can be shaped by structural or

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subjective conditions (Slater and Soifer, 2020; Siddiqi, 2019). But studies that measure perceptions rarely account for how groups end up in that position or why they come to this conclusion, respectively. In general, this literature maintains that the more intense the grievances, the more likely that a group is to rebel. Again, however, the evidence is highly uneven. Not all aggrieved groups rebel. Moreover, groups do not always rebel when their grievances first become apparent.

Resources, opportunities, and perceptions of these factors are important. But this literature is predominantly focused on the conditions immediately before rebellion. By taking this snapshot view, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. I address the gap in both sets of explanations by focusing on the role of education.

Contrasting education policies influence the onset of separatist rebellion in a two-step process. First, education policies influence the development of a national identity through colonial attachment and group cohesion. Penetrative education policies crowd out local identities while shallow policies do not. Then, the development of this national identity structures the likelihood of a group recognizing and mobilizing against extensive threats. Penetrative policies make it easier for groups to perceive extensive threats because their sense of that identity is strengthened. Mobilizing is easier, since groups shared a common education experience. Shallow education policies divide the education experience of groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallow educated groups are also less likely to feel targeted based on that identity in the first place.
The main argument in this paper is that the onset of separatist rebellion has roots in education policies of the colonial period. It is not colonialism alone, but socialization through policies of education, that separatist rebellion occurs. In order to understand the logic of early and late seceders, it is necessary to consider how colonial education makes it easier to identify with and mobilize behind a national identity. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources along with semi-elite interviews, I demonstrate two causal pathways through process-tracing. I find that shallow policies in the Philippines resulted in a weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion. Thus, the separatist rebellion of Muslims in the Philippines was delayed. I find the opposite in Burma, where penetrative policies facilitated the development of a national identity through a stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion. As a result, Karen separatist rebellion was more immediate.

This paper proceeds as follows. I begin with outlining the two causal pathways of my theory before situating it in a review of the literature concerning rebellion, rival hypotheses, and mechanisms of education and violence. I then demonstrate both causal pathways through my cases studies: the Moros who are late seceders and the Karen who are early seceders. I then conclude with a summary and three areas of contribution.

**Theorizing About the Onset of Rebellion**

Contrasting education policies influence the onset of separatist rebellion in a two-step process (*Figure 1*). First, education policies influence the development of a national identity through colonial attachment and group cohesion. Penetrative education policies consist of a universal or standardized curriculum, instructors from the majority, common language, and wide enrollment. These policies facilitate the development of a national
identity by strengthening in-group attachment. Shallow education policies do not strengthen association with the colonizer and instead promote fragmentation.

Second, education policies structure the likelihood of recognizing and mobilizing against threats. Extensive threats, which clearly target based on national identity, are particularly salient catalysts. Penetrative policies make it easier for groups to perceive extensive threats because their sense of that identity is strengthened. Mobilizing is easier, since groups shared a common education experience. Shallow education policies divide the education experience of groups. Without encouraging the development of a national identity, shallow educated groups are also less likely to feel targeted based on that identity in the first place.

Figure 1: The Process

The process begins with colonial education policies, which consist of formal decisions about schools serving the colonized population. This excludes decisions natives made over their own schools. I categorize two types, penetrative and shallow, that I operationalize using criterion from literature on education and conflict: curriculum, instructors, language, and enrollment (Matsumoto, 2015).

Colonial education policies affect two things that are salient for the formation of group identity: colonial attachment and group cohesion. Colonial attachment is the relationship of the group and the colonial power. A stronger attachment makes it more
likely that a group will be considered as favored by the colonial power. Favored groups are more likely to be targeted by unfavored groups, reinforcing their sense of being an other. *Group cohesion* is the relationship of members to each other. Stronger group cohesion bodes well for the development of a national identity.

Both colonial attachment and group cohesion shape a group’s *perception of inclusion*. Social mobility, career advancement, and political representation affect this perception. Extensive threats weaken this perception. Groups that share a common education experience are more likely to develop a national identity and thus perceive extensive threats on its basis. It is the perception of these issues that ultimately structures if a minority group will be an early or late seceder (*Figures 2-3*).

![Diagram of Penetrative Education Policies](image)

**Figure 2: Penetrative Education Policies**

Penetrative education policies strengthen colonial attachment and group cohesion. The initial, and often main, organizer for schools is the colonial power. Penetrative policies ensure a shared experience of instruction and its content, which results in a stronger shared group identity. A stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion increase the likelihood that a group will have weaker prospects for inclusion, since they are distinct from other groups, and mobilize for rebellion better. When coupled with how colonial powers can educate groups differently, differences between groups are solidified.

Penetrative education policies ultimately result in early seceders. The combination of
stronger colonial attachment and group cohesion reinforce a group’s national identity. Commonality between members is reinforced by education and they are treated as a cohesive other.

![Figure 3: Shallow Education Policies](image)

**Figure 3: Shallow Education Policies**

Shallow education policies weaken colonial attachment and group cohesion. When fewer students enroll in public schools, they associate less with the colonial power. Public schools, which are sites of colonial authority, do not become places where a group benefits from the colonial administration. In addition, students cannot have a shared education experience in which they learn the same things simultaneously when there is not a critical mass enrolled. A weaker colonial attachment and group cohesion decrease the likelihood that a group will perceive an extensive threat. Thus, shallow education policies ultimately result in late seceders. The lack of colonial attachment or group cohesion does not facilitate the development of a national identity that can identify or mobilize against threats, regardless of how extensive it may be.

**Literature Review**

The study of separatist rebellion spans literature on ethnic conflict, rebellion, and nationalism. In order to structure my assessment and critique, I divide my literature review into three sections: conditions for separatist rebellion; rival hypotheses to colonial education policies; and competing mechanisms for education and violence.
Conditions for Separatist Rebellion

On one hand, rationalist explanations of rebellion spend a lot of time identifying factors that make rebellion appealing, either because there are resources or windows of opportunities that make success feasible. If these arguments were true, then we would expect to see far more early seceders since new states are more likely to experience political instability and weakness (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Yet not all groups take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede even when they have the resources to do it. Furthermore, wealthy and poor groups alike make separatist demands. In focusing on opportunities or resources, rationalist theories of rebellion downplay how groups perceive these factors. Some groups choose to rebel when they do not have enough resources or when success looks unlikely. In addition, other groups do not rebel when they have resources or could succeed. These instances suggest that perception plays a bigger role than what is accounted for by rationalist explanations.

On the other hand, emotive explanations emphasize the importance of subjective determination and relative conditions in spurring rebellion because groups perceive these conditions as unequal. More recent studies of rebellion consider political exclusion or, very specifically, perceptions of backwardness on the eve of independence. These perceptions, or what some call “subjective evaluations” play a role in onset (Ray, 2016). But these studies do not account for how groups end up being excluded or why they end up perceiving that they are worse off relative to others.

Without considering education, these explanations miss what shapes the underlying conditions for rebellion that affect group positionality and perceptions of it. Education addresses what these two categories of explanations for rebellion miss: the
development and salience of national identity, in relation to things like resources, opportunity, or deprivation. Education serves as the means by which groups have better career opportunities or access to resources. Inequality can easily be fostered by cutting some groups off from education entirely. I focus on both the content and process of education, linking what students learn and how they learn it to how they form a common identity and perceive extensive threats.

Rival Hypotheses

Support from other governments or the diaspora can provide groups with the resources or motivation necessary for rebellion (Forsberg, 2013; Collier and Hoffman, 2004). But the efforts of the diaspora are less relevant during the colonial period since a diaspora does not exist yet. Moreover, it was unlikely that a state would stand against a colonial power to support a rebellion in the colony, even if co-ethnics were involved. I will demonstrate that international support alone is not an immediate cause for rebellion. All it does it help prepare a group to mobilize until an extensive threat occurs or extend the duration of a rebellion after it starts (Elbadaw and Sambanis, 2000).

Arguments about how early seceders are motivated by perceptions of backwardness do little to operationalize this concept (Hortwitz, 1985; Ray, 2016). One solution has been to focus on the role of ethnic exclusion on the eve of independence (Wimmer, 2002). Exclusion becomes salient when it involves those in power favoring their own members at the expense of others. However, exclusion alone is still an insufficient explanation for the onset of rebellion. It is a proximate cause that does not address why some groups feel excluded or why some worry more about exclusion from state offices and government contracts while others do not. In order to understand the
origins of exclusion from careers in government, distributional benefit from the public purse, or even political representation, it is necessary to move backwards from the eve of independence to the period preceding it: colonialism. More broadly, exclusion on the eve of independence does little to explain late seceders other than to indicate that ethnic exclusion became salient at some point after independence. Yet these arguments do not describe the threshold or tipping point in which ethnic exclusion causes rebellion. I address the underlying conditions that shape how groups identify exclusion as salient.

A timelier rival hypothesis concerns the presence of other groups. There is evidence that the rebellion of one ethnic group in a state can cause a “domino effect” in which other groups rebel, too (Forsberg, 2013; Walter, 2003). There are two consequences concerning early and late seceders if these arguments are true. First, we should expect to see more late seceders only after governments have made concessions. Yet this leaves little consideration for early seceders, especially the ones who rebel first. Second, there should be more early seceders acting simultaneously during armed struggles for independence. But this is not the case. Moreover, it does not explain the logic of late seceders who ignore a period of state weakness. My theory provides a way to understand the logic of both early and late seceders along with when late seceders finally rebel.

A series of rival hypotheses from the existing literature concerns pre-colonial political centralization (Ray, 2019). My aim is not to disregard pre-colonial legacy arguments entirely. Rather, I rule out pre-colonial factors for my specific outcome of interest. Pre-colonial conditions are less salient for separatist rebellion because of object of their action, the entity from which they wish to secede, is a state that is a direct
colonial creation. I rule out pre-colonial conditions on the basis that colonialism, whether rule was direct or indirect, set societies on a decisively new course.

The last rival hypothesis I rule out is a state’s pathway to independence. Colonies can become independent through armed resistance or peaceful negotiation. Minority groups are at a disadvantage in either scenario, since they lack the numbers to wage a successful resistance or the votes to influence negotiations. Situations of armed resistance should be more conducive to secessionists because, unlike negotiations, minorities do not need permission to participate. Between the two states in Southeast Asia that achieved a negotiated independence, the Philippines and Burma, there is variation in early and late seceders. This suggests, at the very least, that negotiation alone is an insufficient explanation. Instead, I consider how factors of education influence how groups perceive the terms of negotiation and what it means for inclusion in the newly independent state.

*Mechanisms of Education and Violence*

The literature concerning education and political violence highlights several mechanisms, which also have shortcomings that I summarize in Table 1. The tolerance literature argues that education can reduce violence by creating shared norms. Education increases an individual’s critical thinking and cognitive skills, enabling them to empathize better with individuals who have a different background. Education also socializes students into accepting norms about equality that are more likely to lead to peace (Lange and Dawson, 2009). Other mechanisms focus on how education promotes violence. The frustration-aggression mechanism suggests that educated individuals use violence as recourse for grievances because they better understand, participate in, and expect more from their political context. These arguments imply that any curriculum
should lead to less violence. If this mechanism is correct, then the most-educated individuals should be the least likely to rebel. However, this is not the case. One of the founding members of the MNLF in the Philippines was a former university professor.

The critical socialization literature emphasizes how schools can be segregated based on an exclusive identity such as ethnicity, thus making violence between groups more likely. This may not always be carried out with malicious intent. But this practice may also reinforce differences in identity or limit social contact between groups, reducing the likelihood that relationships will form between them. Moreover, separated schools can thwart efforts to create a common identity through a shared language or history. It is also more likely to result in separate curriculums. This can be especially damming for broad nation-building projects.

The critical socialization literature does not go far enough in its assessment of the context and content of education. It implies that separation between groups can result in conflict. But separation can also be uneventful. The content of the process rather than the process alone may make a difference in the onset of rebellion. It is not merely a matter of literacy, but also of what is being read. This assessment is consistent with existing studies that focus on how educational systems grapple with differences (Gallagher, 2004).

Table 1: Addressing the Shortcomings in Mechanisms Linking Education and Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Factor</th>
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<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>Emphasis on process of education rather than content</td>
<td>Curriculum</td>
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<td>Language</td>
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<td>Frustration-Aggression</td>
<td>Emphasis on process of education rather than content</td>
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Establishing a common language is an important component of national identity. Anderson discusses this in depth in *Imagined Communities*. But these are not the same thing. However, common language is
Critical Socialization  | Assumption that separation alone leads to conflict | Enrollment

Focuses solely on student interaction | Instructors

The argument I put forth in this paper most closely aligns with the critical socialization literature. I argue that the mechanism at work in this process is through education as a common experience. Education facilitates the development of a national identity. It is not simply that students are learning the same things. What matters is that students are sharing a formative experience in the classroom.

**Methodology & Cases**

My theory is focused on explaining the process of how colonial education policies and the onset of rebellion are linked. Because it is a multi-step process, process-tracing is a suitable method for gaining causal traction on each of the steps that link my independent variable to my dependent variable. Process-tracing is a form of within-case analysis that makes descriptive and causal inferences based on pieces of evidence that are part of a temporal sequence of events. I draw from primary documents, secondary historical accounts, and interview accounts to demonstrate this sequence.

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6 Many studies of education and its role on nation-building emphasize mass schooling. This is important but it is not the only thing that matters. I consider mass schooling as one component of penetrative education policies. But I also couple mass schooling with what students are learning. Darden and Grzymala-Busse adopt a similar approach in their focus on the timing and content of mass literacy and onset of communist rule. See Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006.

7 Instructors are hired and maintained under the authority of the colonial power. Their presence is a proxy for colonial reach. Gellner discusses the role that instructors play as part of a pyramid of schooling. See Gellner, 1983, 34.

Turning to Burma and the Philippines holds several significant variables constant. First, both colonies experience a bifurcation in their administrative structure based on where minorities lived. The Philippines was split between civilian rule for the Christian areas and military rule for the Cordillera Autonomous Region and Muslim Province. Burma was divided between Ministerial Burma and the Frontier Areas. Second, religious conversion served as a key factor in the colonization of both cases. The Philippines was a Spanish colony for several centuries prior to American and Japanese colonialism. The Spanish succeeded in converting many locals to Christianity. In Burma, American Baptists were active prior to British colonial efforts. Baptists succeeded in converting many locals, as well. Third, both cases underwent a negotiated independence.

While Burma and the Philippines have significant similarities, there is also variation in my variables of interest for both the Muslims and the Karen. It took some time for “Moro” to be used within the community and its use is still contested in some circles. Broadly, it refers to at least 13 different tribes in the Philippines who all practice Islam, albeit with some variation. Various sultanates engaged in treaties with different powers. Muslims resisted efforts of Spanish conversion, being pushed further south into Mindanao and Sulu in the process. In addition, they resisted efforts of any colonial power to subjugate them and demonstrated a capacity to rebel several times throughout the colonial history of the Philippines. The Moros were never favored by the colonial power. In summary, they had a common basis for identity, experience with self-rule, geographic concentration, shared history of oppression, and demonstrated capacity to rebel. Existing studies argue that these factors are salient: the Moros should have been most likely to rebel during Philippine independence. Yet they do not. Instead, they delay.

9 A comparison for how each case defies the theoretical expectations can be found in Appendix B
There is significant variation within the Karen regarding dialect, religion, and location. Within-group variance along these factors should have made it less likely for the Karen to rebel. The two main dialects are Sgaw and Pwo Karen. While Baptist efforts succeeded the most with the Karen, not all of them are Christian. Some are Theravada Buddhists while others are animists, sometimes referred to in colonial documents as “heathen Karen.” The population was often described as scattered, with a concentration of Karen near the Thai border and Tenasserim further south. There was also not a history of pre-colonial Karen political organization, let alone a state. While they were in the minority, the Karen experienced British favor in civilian administration and military/police hiring along with political representation. They formed a Karen National Association (KNA), which advocated for the education, representation, and economic plight of the community as a whole. While the KNA was a considerate effort of representation, the community was still incredibly heterogeneous and scattered. They had no experience of self-rule and experienced relatively less tension during colonial rule. All these factors indicate that the Karen should have been less likely to rebel during Burmese independence. Yet their onset was immediate.

**Muslims and Shallow Education Policies**

The Americans established mass education, even though education policies for Muslims were shallow. Unlike Spain, they established administrative control everywhere, calling the Muslim majority area the Moro Province (MP) in 1903. The Department of Public Instruction would later be responsible for when the MP became Mindanao and Sulu (MS) (Carpenter, 1916). Filipinization, the process of increasing Philippine
leadership, merged the Department of Public Instruction in the Moro Province into the insular government’s Bureau of Education (BE) (Milligan, 2004).

**Enrollment**

Overall enrollment increased by 300% in the first ten years of American colonialism (Coloma, 2004). Enrollment increased far more once the Filipino controlled legislature took over education policies for MS: 33,000 + students were enrolled in 1920 (Kalaw, 1919; Milligan, 2005). Christian Filipinos made up a majority of overall enrollment, even in the Muslim-majority MP. Thus, total enrollment among those eligible in the MP was low. Of the 2,114 students in 1903, 240 were Muslim (Wood, 1914). In 1907, 17% of students enrolled in MP were Muslim, despite making up 90% of the population. In 1909, 8% of the Christian population was in school but 1/10 of 1% of the Muslim population was enrolled (Cameron, 1909). In 1913, 10% of the Christian population was enrolled in contrast to ½ of 1% of Muslims (Pershing, 1913; Carter, 1913). Retention rates were also low across the board. In the MP, most students enrolled were below the fifth grade (Orosa, 1913).

Most importantly, the Americans did not eradicate the pre-colonial system of Islamic education in the Philippines. Madaris, Islamic schools, were an alternative to the public school system. Pandita schools were small classes that took place either in the mosque or the pandita’s home. Muslim elites sent slave children to the American schools, and funded pandita schools for their sons (Manaros, Magdalena, and Lacar, 1987; Orosa, 1923). Unlike Muslims, private schools made it possible for Christians to have a common learning experience, one that solidified their national identity. Muslims
did not have a common education experience, since panditas only served a few at a time. Thus, the community remained fragmented.

Instructors

Christian Filipinos were the main instructors under the Spanish and the Americans. They led catechism schools due to priest shortages, making it easier to establish their own private schools later (Schwartz, 1971). The first instructors in American schools were soldiers who took over Spanish garrisons (Barrows, 1995). Soon after, 600 American teachers sailed to the Philippines on the USS Thomas (Zimmerman, 2006). The Philippine Normal School was established in 1901 to train Filipino teachers. Naturally, Muslims could not teach in catechism schools. Only a few taught in American public schools, even by 1915 (SPI, 1914). There were 74 instructors in the MP in 1904: 15 Americans, 50 Christian Filipinos, and 9 Muslims. By 1914, there were over 230, in which 15 were American and 16 Muslim. School administration was also heavily comprised of Christian Filipinos (Pershing, 1913; Milligan, 2005). If such was the case in the MP, a Muslim majority area, the situation in Christian areas was hardly better.

The Department of MS tried to incentivize instructors in the MP by providing housing, higher salaries, and the “privilege of acquiring homesteads” (Osias, 1921). Few took the offer as Americans and Christians were wary of teaching in Muslim areas without American protection (Milligan, 2005). American officials struggled to find teachers in these schools “who [were] familiar with English and Moro” (Wood, 1906). The threat of more Christian Filipino instructors coming into MP/MS was not extensive. Even if it was, there were not enough students enrolled to perceive it as such.

Curricula
Spanish schools mimicked curriculum in Spain for Spanish students while catechism schools taught Christian doctrine and minimal literacy to natives. Young men had the opportunity to continue education in Spain before returning to the Philippines. Moreover, familiarity with European schooling and Spanish exposed Christian Filipinos to European ideals regarding independence (Moses, 1905; Schwartz, 1971). To access higher education, students had to take an exam on English grammar, U.S. history, geography, arithmetic, and physiology (SPI, 1904; SPI, 1905). These topics were covered in Spanish, and some Christian, schools. Christians were also more likely to service in the civil service since they were more likely to pass the exams (Coloma, 2004).

Muslims did not have the same access or opportunities. The curricula of public schools in the MP had separate objectives. Christians were prepared for self-government while Muslims were prepared for assimilation. Supplemental vocational training, such as in agriculture, were provided to teach Muslims employable skills. In addition, Americans expected to civilize the Muslim population through schooling (Milligan, 2005b).

Language

Christian experiences with Spain’s colonial education system facilitated the development of a national identity. Without a mass education system, few Christians spoke Spanish aside from educated elites. Less than 10% spoke Spanish and fluency was poor among those who did (Pershing, 1913; Moses, 1904). Several Christian nationalist leaders, such as Manuel Quezon, kept their records in Spanish (Quezon, 1914). But Tagalog grew more common among Christians as friars converted natives, something that was not the case for the Muslim population. Even the elites who learned Spanish spoke Tagalog.
Individual leaders in the MP influenced language policies. Leonard Wood, first Governor of the Moro Province called local languages, “crude, devoid of literature, and limited in range” (Milligan, 2005). He supported instruction in English (Wood, 1914). This contrasted with Governor Task Bliss and Superintendents of Public Instruction Najeeb Saleeby and Charles Cameron who supported local language instruction (Bliss, 1906). Textbooks were printed in Arabic. Moreover, Saleeby created readers for the Tausug and Maguindanao in Arabic script (Figure 4A-4B) (Saleeby, 1905; Milligan, 2005; Wood, 1906). There were other groups within the Muslim community to whom he did not tailor. American colonial officials recognized that even pandita schools were reinforcing differences within the Muslim community by facilitating reading and writing in the local dialect that used a modified Arabic script (Cameron, 1909b; Milligan, 2005b).

While the goal of these accommodations was to make it easy to learn American ideas and eventually become literate in English, the actual outcome was that the Muslim community remained fragmented. Children in “pure Moro districts” received instruction in their dialects first (Saleeby, 1905; Milligan, 2005; Wood, 1906). This demonstrates the importance of a unifying language or script in developing a national identity (Anderson, 1983). Pandita schools and low Muslim enrollment in public schools magnified the lack of a common education experience. Differences were not only reinforced internally through culture or language, but also by uneven recognition by the American colonial apparatus.

*Figure 4A-4B: Excerpts from the Maguindanao Primers*
Muslim Development of National Identity & Late Seceders

While there were clashes between the Muslim population and American colonial officials, these were not instances of separatist rebellion in the name of self-governance on the basis of identity. Instead, revolts were in response to threats to local life or the authority of the datus: collection of the cedula tax; disarmament campaigns; compulsory education in schools that did not teach shari’a; payment for road construction; enforcement of monogamy; or actions of the Philippine Constabulary (Abinales, 2015; Tan, 1977; Che Man, 1990; Gross, 2007).

Colonizers labeled them as a single category, but there was a lack of cohesion within the Muslim community. There were “inter-Muslim conflicts” in which Muslim
leaders worked against one another rather than together another against the Americans. Allegiances shifted (Tan, 1973; Abinales, 2009; Abinales, 2000). In addition, there were mixed reactions to continued American rule: “each ethnic group responded to American military occupation based on how it affected their own areas, not ‘Moro Mindanao’” (Abinales, 2004b). The population was described as “greatly disunited” and having a “tribal character” since a different Islamic tribe inhabited each district (Saleeby, 1913; de Tavera, 1901).

The lack of cohesion also made it easier for Americans to subdue revolt. The Battle of Bud Dajo (1906) was an armed response to the cedula tax (Gowing, 1979). Muslims in the Cotabato district complied with the cedula tax while many in the Lanao and Sulu districts opposed. Even when leaders such as the Sultan of Sulu stopped resisting the tax, their followers did not all follow suit (Gowing, 1968; Gowing 1983). Other Muslim communities, such as the Maguindanaos, Maranaos, and Samals did not participate in resistance against the tax “simply because they knew nothing of them” (Abinales, 2014). In 1912, Muslims in Sulu and Lanao rebelled against a disarmament campaign. Both battles resulted in American victory with numerous Muslim casualties, even when Muslims had firearms (Gowing, 1968).

There was not a national identity just yet. Without one, there could be no rebellion for self-rule either. Moreover, the limitation of information and coordination hindered the possibility of mobilizing a separatist rebellion.

Three events are identified as causes of Muslim separatist rebellion. First is the Corregidor Incident/Jabidah Massacre, in which Muslim recruits were killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines in March 1968. In one account, trainees were massacred
after they wanted to back out upon realizing that their real mission was to invade Sabah, a Muslim-majority region in Malaysia, and not to fight communists (Vitug and Gloria, 2000; Muslim, 1994; Jubair, 1999). Demonstrations broke out across the Philippines and there were calls for President Marcos to resign, especially from prominent Muslim figures such as Congressman Rashid Lucman. Second was the violence in Lanao del Norte and Cotabato in which Christians threatened the victory of Muslim politicians. One of the most publicized was the Manili Massacre involving 70 Muslim civilians who were killed in a mosque in Manili, Carmen, North Cotabato (Larousse, 2011).

Both events attracted international recognition for Muslims in the Philippines. Libyan Prime Minister Muammar Gaddafi characterized these as genocide and brought the issue to the United Nations. Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco pledged aid to Muslims in the Philippines (Yegar, 2002). While the first two events can be considered as competing hypotheses for the onset of rebellion, rebellion was not a given at that time. More than 50% of people did not support secession and nearly 25% were not committed to the cause (George, 1980). Both cases were significant galvanizing events, but they were limited in scope. Rebellion would not take place without extensive threats to Muslim identity and a group that could perceive and mobilize against it.

Separatist rebellion took place soon after the third proximate cause in which President Marcos declared martial law in 1972 (George, 1980; Buendia, 1989; Noble, 1976). A majority of the declaration focused on the Communist threat. There was only one mention of Mindanao out of nine points determining “rebellion and lawlessness.” Yet this was enough. This specified martial law as an extensive threat against Muslims since the entire state was involved. Arguments focusing on how martial law triggered rebellion
are incomplete without explaining why. I argue that rebellion occurred soon after because a national identity had already developed in response to preceding changes in education policies.

Martial law had several ramifications for the Muslim community. It banned political groups and mandated a restriction of civilian firearms. Three weeks later, Marcos committed a division of troops to the Southern Philippines. Both actions increased the clarity with which the Muslim community was being targeted. Fighting in cities across the southern Philippines started a few days before Marcos’ deadline to collect arms. While the MNLF did not control all of the rebels, it was the main armed separatist organization (McKenna, 1998).

There are several indications that a Muslim national identity existed by 1972. The MNLF newsletter Maharlika stressed Moro as a “national concept” (Gowing, 1975). By the mid-1970s, at least 55% of Muslims were in support of the MNLF and rebellion against the government. This took the form of direct membership or provision of resources. In response to the Corregidor Incident/Jabidah Massacre, which involved mostly ethnic Tausugs, there were Maranao and Maguindanao Muslims who joined in training efforts that took place in Sabah (Noble, 1976). This demonstrates a sense of cohesion beyond just Tausugs that stretched to the broader Muslim community in response the Philippine government. Without the development of a national identity, the response to the extensive threat of martial law would not have been a separatist rebellion representing the entire Muslim community.

Changes in education policies after Philippine independence facilitated the development of a Muslim national identity. Congress created the Commission on
National Integration (CNI) in 1957, which provided scholarships for “cultural minorities” (Eder and McKenna, 2004). The number of Muslim college graduates increased as a result, since CNI scholarships assisted non-elites (Majul, 1985; McKenna, 1998). From 1955-78, Egyptian President Nasser promoted scholarships as part of his pan-Islamic programs. Over 200 Muslims from the Philippines studied overseas. Many went to Al-Azhar University (McKenna, 1998). Nasser’s scholarships reinforced the salience of Muslim identity through a common education experience. Students were selected on the basis of being Muslim. Their peers and instructors were Muslim, and their curriculum reflected a broader Muslim identity.

Al-Azhar graduates already taught in Muslim schools in the Philippines. But they were mostly from Indonesia (George, 1980). Nasser’s scholarships changed this. After being educated in Cairo, graduates returned to the Philippines and served as religious teachers for their communities. According to McKenna (1998), “It was much later before the presence of indigenous Islamic teachers had a commensurate effect on popular Islamic consciousness in the Philippines.” Pandita schools operated on a small scale. Graduates of Al-Azhar had experience in bridging an identity gap with Muslims from other states. Finding the commonality between Muslims in the Philippines was more likely after that experience. The extensive threat of martial law made this much easier, since the state viewed Muslims as a cohesive group.

Rationalist explanations for rebellion are unable to account for why Muslims rebelled after martial law 1972, but not sooner. Harsh military suppression and discrimination existed beforehand. By the early 1970s, it was evident that the Muslim community had resources. They were capable of resisting inter-communal violence
against Christians. The proclamation of martial law single out several violent incidents with the Muslim community which would not have been possible if they did not have enough resources to resist. A training program for Muslim guerilla fighters was established in 1969, demonstrating the desire and means to mobilize a rebellion (Mercado, 1984; Noble, 1983). But separatist rebellion did not occur until Marcos declared martial law. This is because his declaration was an extensive threat against Muslims on the basis of their national identity, serving as the necessary catalyst to finally trigger the onset of separatist rebellion. Rebellion occurred in response to this threat, however, because the first conditional of a national identity had finally developed.

The Karen and Penetrative Education

Enrollment

The Karen were heavily involved in the colonial education system both in enrollment and number of schools. They made up 2/3 of enrollment and attendance in public institutions for special classes in a given year. Furthermore, there was a significant gap, or what officials referred to as a longo intervallo, between Karen enrollment and the second highest group. Based on a 1913-17 Education Report, there were 34,896 Karen children in schools, which reflected 3% of the total Karen population. For context, about 6% of the Burmese population and 0.5% of the Shan were in school (Marshall, 1921).

It is also possible to make inferences about Karen enrollment based on how other groups were doing at the time. The number of Karen anglo-vernacular schools was rather stable while the total number of vernacular schools and corresponding enrollment steadily increased (Appendix A). There was a 25% increase in the enrollment of Karen

students in 13 anglo-vernacular schools to 2,822 students and in 1,165 vernacular schools with 32,047 students. For context, the number of Tamil and Telugu anglo-vernacular schools went from 11 to 15 schools and 1,622 students to 2,381 in the same five-year period.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Fifth Quinquennial Report 1912-13 to 1916-17,” 28.} Enrollment in the 1918-19 academic year reflect similar trends: 6,000 Shan; 5,000 Tamil and Telugu; 4,000 Talaing; 135 Lisaw; and 59 Gurkhas. These numbers pale in comparison to the approximately 32,500 Karen students enrolled.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19,” 1919, 22.} Even when a special school for the sons of Shan Chiefs was established in Taunggyi, in the Southern Shan States, a majority of the boys enrolled were Shans or Karens.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06,” 1907, 22.}

**Curricula**

Officially, Karen students had wide access to schools. In practice, this did not mean much. They could enroll in industrial schools where courses included printing, bookbinding, blacksmithing, cane-work, tinsmith, carpentry, weaving, needlework, and lace making.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08,” 1908, 17;} But colonial officials conceded that Karen students in the hills did not have much use for these skills back home.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08,” 1908, 17.} There were also opportunities for technical and vocational education. However, it was hard to work in industries such as commerce or industry since foreign workers dominated these sectors.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Octennial Report,” 5.} There was no medical college or school in Burma at the beginning of the 1900s, but scholarship holders could
attend the Calcutta Medical College. In Madras, there were 12 “Burma scholars” training as hospital assistants: 7 Burmans, 4 Mohamedans, and 1 Karen.\(^\text{17}\)

Karen education did not leave room for their group identity in the classroom. Initially, the curriculum of the vernacular schools was supposed to include a study of Karen dialects. This became optional since there was supposedly not a Karen literature that could be utilized for the purpose.\(^\text{18}\) Special textbook committees were later established during the Conference of Kachin Schools in 1915. This resulted in efforts to prepare textbooks for Kachin, Chin, Shan, Karen, and Talaging primary Standards. In addition, the number of native instructors who could teach with these textbooks increased.\(^\text{19}\) These efforts influenced the curricula of vernacular Karen schools. Karen dialects replaced Burmese as the medium of instruction.\(^\text{20}\) Despite this movement towards bringing Karen identity into the curricula, several years of schooling devoid of this had already taken place. The high numbers of Karen enrollment in years prior suggests that the penetrative education policies had already resulted in challenging local identity. Efforts to bring it in afterwards only resulted in reinforcing differences.

\textit{Language}

The main concern for education of the special classes was language. Burma did not try to impose a language, but Burmese ended up being “unavoidably imposed on schools for hill races” when they did not have their own language or teachers.\(^\text{21}\)

Accommodations were not made for the education of “wild and backward tribes” because

\(^\text{20}\) Ibid, 78.
\(^\text{21}\) Ibid, 77.
it was too hard to account for every language and script in schools. They were forced to learn English and their own language was only utilized for basics if the script was close to Burmese. There was also pressure to teach them Burmese as soon as possible since some instructors had to rely on interpreters.\footnote{Ibid, 32.}

The policy of British colonial officials was to discourage minor languages and dialects in favor of Burmese.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08,” 1908, 34.} As a result, Burmese or English was the medium of instruction, even in special schools.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Third Quinquennial Report (1902-03 -- 1906-07),” 30.} In some cases, officials noted that “local administration [refused] to have anything to do with Karen schools, unless the Burmese language [was] the vehicle of instruction and the medium of examination” (Smeaton, 1887, p. 220). Language policies in schools resulted in crowding out Karen identity, both in terms of the S’gaw Karen or Pwo Karen dialect.

Anglo-Vernacular education in Burma only did well with the Karen population. Each Karen mission station had its own anglo-vernacular school and almost every Christian village had its own day school (Robbins, 1922, p. 58). The Karen were the largest demographic in anglo-vernacular special schools with the Tamils and Telugus soon behind.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1905-06,” 1907, 21.} There were also efforts “to bring the wilder tribes (Chins, Kachins and others), within the educational fold.”\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16,” 1916.} The Shans and the Chins also took part in English education, but they never advanced as much as the Karen.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08,” 1908, 34.} Karen students enrolled in Anglo-Vernacular learned two languages at school but still used their native tongue back home.\footnote{Office of the Superintendent, “Third Quinquennial Report (1902-03 -- 1906-07),” 8.}
Over time, efforts to increase Karen representation in schools increased. The Anglo-Vernacular Conference of 1921 proposed that the local government accept Karen as a second language up to and inclusive of the anglo-vernacular high school course. Readers in the S’gaw-Karen dialect were to be prepared for this purpose.\textsuperscript{29} Eventually, the Government accepted the recommendation and Karen was recognized as a second language up to high school examination.\textsuperscript{30} This demonstrates how the Karen’s common education experience did not result in assimilation. Rather, it reinforced their sense of being an other.

\textit{Instructors}

Overall, Karen instructors were preferred due to their community’s commitment to education. The Deputy Commissioner of Papun wanted to lower the qualifications needed for instructors because they wanted to prevent “non-Karen outsiders,” from teaching. Even in cases where hiring and retention of instructions was difficult, especially in the remote villages of the Karen, officials felt confident in relying on the Karen due to their enthusiasm as instructors.\textsuperscript{31} Karen communities also made regular contributions in kind to fund schools and instructor salaries. They combined these funds with Government grants.\textsuperscript{32} Most students did not pay a fee to attend school.\textsuperscript{33}

While there are not always concrete numbers for total Karen instructors, they were a strong presence in schools and officials noted the commitment of the Karen to the mission schools (Robbins, 1922, p. 60). The Inspector of Schools, Meiktila Circle, noted

\textsuperscript{29} Sixth Quinquennial Report 1917-18 to 1921-22, 71.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 78.
\textsuperscript{31} Office of the Superintendent, “Sixth Quinquennial Report,” 1923, 72.
\textsuperscript{32} Office of the Superintendent, “Third Quinquennial Report,” 1908, 32.
that the instructors were all Burmans or Karens, even in the Shan schools for his circle.\textsuperscript{34} The Karen were also instructors and educational missionaries for pioneer schools that served the Kachins and Chins in the hills of Upper Burma. In some cases, schools in remote areas in the hills had better staff and enrollment.\textsuperscript{35}

Karen instructors also attended conferences in each of the Circles. The content of these conferences included lectures and papers on topics ranging from physiography, hygiene, religious and moral instruction, teacher responsibilities, improving teaching in monastic schools, and the spelling of Pali words in Burmese. Aside from the regional conferences open to all instructors that were attended by the Karen, the Karen had their own conference in Toungoo and Tharrawaddy.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{The Karen Development of National Identity & Early Seceders}

The establishment of the Karen National Association (KNA) in 1881 indicated the presence of a cohesive, possibly national, identity (Cheesman, 2003; Marshall, 1921). The KNA (or Dawkalu) was supposedly formed in response to the Third Anglo-Burmese War with a focus on Karen identity and improvement of the Karen so as to “keep the nation together in the march of progress” (Smith, 1991, p. 45; Po, 1928, p. 62). This involved the broad goal of establishing unity between the diverse and scattered Karen population (Smeaton, 1887). The focus was on Karen identity, despite internal differences in religion and dialect. All districts with Karen inhabitants were represented at the first meeting of the KNA. While only Christians were in leadership positions, non-Christian Karen also attended (Marshall, 1921).

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{34} Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1918-19,” 1919, 23.\
\textsuperscript{35} Office of the Superintendent, “Sixth Quinquennial Report,” 1923, 71.\
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid; Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1915-16.”
\end{flushright}
Several primary and secondary sources converge on the idea that missionary activity in the 19th century was crucial in creating a Karen national identity (Bung, 1984):

Karen nationality was in part developed through Christian missionary activity, for proselytization encouraged a feeling of common ethnic identity contrasting with that of Buddhist Burmans or Mons.

One of the most successful organizations to assist with fostering a Karen national identity was the American Baptist Mission who began work in the late 1820s. These organizations not only set up pastoral networks in Karen villages but also built schools, such as the Judson College in Rangoon (Christie, 1997). The efforts of missionaries, and later the British colonial education system, facilitated the formation of a stronger group cohesion and colonial attachment. These two things would be the basis for a Karen national identity.

The Karen had the means to rebel, but they did not turn to separatist rebellion against the British. Cheesman refers to the third Anglo-Burmese War (1885-86) as a period in which “the embryo Karen nationalist movement militarised rapidly,” yet he does not define what made the effort nationalist (Cheesman, 2003). Their use of violence was not about mobilizing for self-rule on the basis of Karen identity. Instead, it was in collaboration with the British. The Karen had the means to rebel. This is evident in how the British employed Karen-staffed armies to handle anti-British rebellions led by ethnic Burmans in Lower Burma in 1886. But it was not in the name of a Karen national identity just yet.

During WWII, attacks by the BIA resulted in Karen coordination. For example, the BIA placed all of the Karen in Myaungmya under arrest upon their arrival. A nearby Karen ex-army officer immediately moved to gather forces to assist his co-ethnics under arrest (Morrison, 1947). In 1946, the Karen sent four people to London to advocate for
Karen “Home Rule” (Tinker, 1957). This was not home rule for just the Christian-practicing Karen or the Sgaw-speaking Karen. Instead, it was for all Karen, even the “heathens.”

It was much clearer that a Karen nation existed by the time that Burma became independent. A month after Burma’s independence, 400,000 members of the Karen community engaged in a “peaceful demonstration” calling for the recognition of a Karen state, Kawthoolei (KNU, 1991; KNU, 2018). There was also a clear demarcation of territory to which Kawthoolei referred. More importantly, the size of the protest demonstrates that the Karen had the capacity to mobilize. Given their history of fighting for the British, it is logical to assume that the Karen could have waged a separatist rebellion at this time. The absence of rebellion here should not be taken as a sign of lacking capacity. Instead, it should be seen as a sign of restraint. This restraint, I argue, is due to a lack of an extensive threat on the basis of national identity.

The Karen national movement emerged more formally with the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1949, a year after Burmese independence. There was already a territory to which the KNU sought to have as an independent Karen State, which spanned several divisions in which most of the Karen population resided: Irrawaddy, Tenasserim, Hanthawaddy, Insein and the Nyaunglebin Sub-Division (KNU, 1991). The goals of the KNU outlined in their manifesto also make it evident that there was a Karen national identity (Rajah, 2010):

1. The establishment of a Karen state with the right to self-determination

37 There is a discrepancy between the four slogans. The Karens and Their Struggle for Freedom identifies “1. Give the Karen state at once; 2. Show Burman one Kyat and Karen one Kyat; 3. We do not want communal strife; 4. We do not want civil war.” The website of the KNU identifies “1. For us, surrender is out of the question; 2. Recognition of the Karen State must be completed; 3. We shall retain our arms; 4. We shall decide our own political destiny.”
2. The establishment of national states for all the nationalities, with the right to self-determination
3. The establishment of a genuine Federal Union with all the states having equal rights and the right to self-determination

Rebellion would be fulfilled by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which also formed in 1949. The KNLA served as the military arm of the KNU.

Initially, the Karen did not greet an independent Burmese state with rebellion. Several events prompted Prime Minister U Nu to ask for Karen assistance in securing Rangoon: Communist revolts in 1947 and 1948; mutiny of the 1st and 3rd Burma Rifles (KNU, 1991). At one point, the Karen Commander-in-Chief was given the rank of Lieutenant-General and had command over defense and police forces. The Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) formed in response to this and was recognized by the government for protecting Rangoon, often “without any support from the regular army other than river transport” (Tinker, 1957, p. 56).

Despite Karen efforts to assist the Burmese state, their efforts were not rewarded. Tinker argues “it would be profitless to attempt to establish who offered the first, and most, provocation” (Tinker, 1957, p. 39). But it is evident that Burmese-Karen clashes increased at the end of 1948. The attitude towards the Karen changed by December 1948. Karen leaders were arrested and those serving in armed services were disarmed and jailed. Karen villages were attacked, looted, and destroyed. The KNDO was outlawed in January 1949 and Burmese troops attacked its headquarters, targeting top Karen leaders in the process. In response, “an order was issued to all the Karens throughout the Country to take up whatever arms they could find and fight” (KNU, 1991).

The Burmese government’s attack on the KNDO headquarters was the extensive threat that served as a catalyst triggering the onset of separatist rebellion. The Burmese
government coordinated with other rebel groups against the Karen. The resulting scenario, in which “the Karens found themselves fighting against all the armed elements in the country,” served as the extensive threat against the Karen (KNU, 1991, p. 11). Recognizing and mobilizing against this threat was made possible by the cohesive identity fostered through a common education experience.

Karen separatist rebellion in 1949 challenges both rationalist and emotive explanations for rebellion. The KNU had not been prepared for a full rebellion at the time the headquarters was attacked, since the Burmese government turned on them swiftly (KNU, 1991). Yet even without resources, the KNU rebelled. Furthermore, they engaged in rebellion against the state after their headquarters was attacked. It did not matter if independence was an opportune window to act, they did not take it. Some of the Karen wanted to utilize this opportunity of state weakness. But mutineers led this movement, not Karen leaders who preferred avoiding rebellion. Different leaders quickly moved to curtail this response. KNU President Ba U Gyi, for example, pledged the loyalty of the KNU to the government in order to undermine movements to rebel against the state (Tinker, 1957). Even when it was evident that the new state would promote the majority, a clear indication of relative depravation emphasized by emotive explanations, the Karen still cooperated. It was only after the government demonstrated an extensive threat against them, signaled through an attack on KNU headquarters, that separatist rebellion occurred.

**Conclusion**

This paper outlines the salience of colonial education policies. The language of instruction, identity of instructors, content of curricula, and extent of enrollment all
contribute towards assessing how much room for local identity the colonial education structure leaves. Muslims experienced a shallow education policy, which did not facilitate the development of their national identity. There were threats, but they were not perceived as extensive and there would be no rebellion until changes in education facilitated the development of their national identity. The Karen experienced penetrative education policies, which did foster the development of national identity. Thus, they were more likely to recognize and mobilize against an extensive threat.

High Karen enrollment promoted group cohesion, through a shared education experience, and a stronger colonial attachment, since they interacted more with colonial officials administering the schools. British officials noted that the Karen displayed a “want of solidarity” in their schools. There were fewer schools serving a wider range of communities, thus increasing the likelihood that Karen students who would be otherwise separated could have a shared education experience. Their Buddhist counterparts had grown accustomed to one monastery per village. But the Karen benefitted from one school serving multiple areas, since it increased interaction between the Karen. Unlike the smaller pandita schools, having one school for many communities fostered the development of a national identity. Such a mentality would serve as a basis for making it easier to recognize and mobilize against an extensive threat.

My first contribution concerns the literature on political violence and critical junctures. The lion’s share of research on separatist rebellion is atemporal, focusing on whether rebellion occurs overall. Many existing theories assume that separatists have the same perceptions at all points in time. Instead, I focus more on situating separatist rebellion within a specific context. Independence might serve as a critical juncture in that

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it is a period in which actors have more choices than at another point. Additional options, with a significant reach, may become possible during independence as colonial powers retreat and native interest groups vie for power either through institutions or violence. The same options may not be as available later.

My second contribution concerns the legacies of colonial rule as antecedent conditions. I move beyond proximate causes by considering what policies or institutions shaped them in the first place. This study builds upon a growing literature that specifically considers how colonial factors affect violence in the post-colonial period (Verghese, 2016; Ray, 2016; Mukherjee, 2018; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). My third contribution concerns the literature regarding studies of colonial rule, overall. There is a vast literature that categorizes colonial rule based on the identity of the colonial power or the indirect-direct divide. But colonial powers varied their decision between their colonial holdings, within a single colony, and across time. Because “local context conditions change over time,” colonial strategies had to adapt (de Juan and Pierskalla, 2017). My work demonstrates that there is greater analytical leverage in focusing on specific policies implemented to measure the influence of colonialism, rather than relying on the heuristic of the identity of the colonizer.

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39 Critical junctures are “periods in history when the presence or absence of a specified causal force pushes multiple cases onto divergent long-term pathways, or pushes a single case onto a new political trajectory that diverges significantly from the old.” During a critical juncture, “agents face a broader than typical range of feasible options and the notion that their choices from among these options are likely to have a significant impact on subsequent outcomes.” See Dan Slater and Erica Simmons, “Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in Comparative Politics,” Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 7 (2010): 886-917; Giovanni Capoccia and R. Daniel Kelemen, “The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism,” World Politics 59 (2007): 341-69.
Appendix A
Karen Enrollment

Table 2: Karen Anglo-Vernacular Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Anglo</th>
<th>Vernacular</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3659</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Karen Vernacular Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916-17</td>
<td>1165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-18</td>
<td>1153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>1106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-22</td>
<td>1044</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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48 This was a 10% increase during the school year. Office of the Superintendent, “Report on Public Instruction in Burma for the Year 1907-08,” 25.
52 Ibid.
Table 4: Schools and Total Enrollment of the Special Classes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Year</th>
<th>Total Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1907-08</td>
<td>48264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908-09</td>
<td>49375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>1276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913-14</td>
<td>1320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-15</td>
<td>66646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-16</td>
<td>70628</td>
</tr>
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<td>1915-16</td>
<td>54367</td>
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<td>1916-17</td>
<td>1715</td>
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<td>1704</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918-19</td>
<td>90143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-20</td>
<td>90262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

public schools for special classes
special classes in public schools
special classes in public schools
special schools
special schools
special classes in any school
special classes in any school

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60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
Appendix B

Based on various theories of rebellion, the Moros were more likely to rebel and the Karen were less likely to rebel. Yet the opposite happens. The Moros are late seceders while the Karen are early seceders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literature</th>
<th>Moros</th>
<th>Karen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups with a history of prior mobilization are more likely to rebel (Gurr, 1993)</td>
<td>Spain did not conquer all of the Philippines due to Muslim resistance over a 300 year period. The Moros turned to armed resistance against the Americans several times. Even after defeats, Muslims were armed and trained to fight alongside Americans during WWII.</td>
<td>The Karen did not engage in armed resistance against the British. While they were employed in army units, their efforts went towards repressing the rebellion of other groups in Burma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups with a history of self-rule are more likely to rebel (Gurr, 1993)</td>
<td>Several tribes in the Moro community were accustomed to being organized into sultanates in which sultans had treaties with existing states prior to the arrival of the Spanish.</td>
<td>The Karen claim to have arrived in modern-day Burma first, calling it Kaw-lah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups with perceptions of relative deprivation of backwardness are more likely to rebel (Horowitz, 1981; Kaufman, 2015; Gurr, 1970)</td>
<td>The 13 tribes exhibited different levels of political centralization.</td>
<td>The Karen were the most advanced of the special classes, enrolling in higher education or technical schools alongside the majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic inequality increases the likelihood of rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Windows of opportunity, such as state weakness or reformation, make rebellion more likely (Posen, 1988; Walter; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Bertrand, 2005)</td>
<td>Philippine independence was an organized transition with the American government.</td>
<td>Burma’s independence was an organized transition with the British government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups are more likely to rebel when there are additional challengers</td>
<td>The socialist Hukbong Laban sa Hapon movement emerged to fight the Japanese in WWII</td>
<td>There were many ethnic groups at the time of Burma’s independence. Some received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous state response of negotiation or indiscriminate violence can make rebellion more likely (Walter, 2009; Lindemann and Wimmer, 2018)</td>
<td>The American government did not negotiate with Muslim rulers after revolts took place.</td>
<td>There was no need for the British government to negotiate with the Karen since the Karen did not turn to armed resistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic exclusion makes rebellion more likely but may not be a necessary condition (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2010; Vanhanen, 2012; Lewis, 2017)</td>
<td>The Moros were not awarded separate political representation or specialized positions in the government or armed forces. They were also not specifically banned.</td>
<td>The Karen were included in the British civil service and armed forces. Separate political representation, sometimes disproportionate, was also present.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic concentration and a shared language/customs make mobilization for rebellion easier (Denny and Walter, 2014)</td>
<td>All of the Moros practiced Islam, albeit with some differences. They were concentrated to the southern Philippines in Mindanao and Sulu.</td>
<td>The Karen were geographically scattered, had at least two major dialects, and did not identify with the same religious practice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

Portion of Martial Law Addressing Muslim Rebellion

Proclamation No. 1081 is lengthy. A majority of the document singles out the problem of Communist support groups in the Philippines, but a portion specifically singles out Muslims in the southern region:

WHEREAS, in addition to the above-described social disorder, there is also the equally serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu resulting from the unsettled conflict between certain elements of the Christian and Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu, between the Christian “Ilagas” and the Muslim “Barracudas”, and between our government troops, and certain lawless organizations such as the Mindanao Independence Movement.
WHEREAS, the Mindanao Independence Movement with the active material and financial assistance of foreign political and economic interests, is engaged in an open and unconcealed attempt to establish by violence and force a separate and independent political state out of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu which are historically, politically and by law parts of the territories and within the jurisdiction and sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, because of the aforesaid disorder resulting from armed clashes, killings, massacres, arsons, rapes, pillages, destruction of whole villages and towns and the inevitable cessation of agricultural and industrial operations, all of which have been brought about by the violence inflicted by the Christians, the Muslims, the “Ilagas”, the “Barracudas”, and the Mindanao Independence Movement against each other and against our government troops, a great many parts of the islands of Mindanao and Sulu are virtually now in a state of actual war;
WHEREAS, the violent disorder in Mindanao and Sulu has to date resulted in the killing of over 1,000 civilians and about 2,000 armed Muslims and Christians, not to mention the more than five hundred thousand of injured, displaced and homeless persons as well as the great number of casualties among our government troops, and the paralysis of the economy of Mindanao and Sulu;
Bibliography


Working paper - do not cite


Saleeby, N. M. (1913). *The Moro Problem; an Academic Discussion of the History and Solution of the Problem of the Government of the Maros of the Philippine Islands.*


