Binding Contestation: How Party-Military Relations Influence Democratization

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Abstract

From setting restrictions on popular sovereignty and open contestation, to yielding entirely to civilians, there is substantial variation in how militaries behave in transitions from military rule. I argue that the extent to which a military sets parameters on electoral and political institutions during a regime transition, what I call bounded democratization, is a function of a military’s confidence that parties will protect the military’s corporate interests following the transition. A military’s confidence in political parties is influenced by the degree of trust between the parties and the military, the institutionalization of the incumbent party, as well as the electoral and political strength of the incumbent party. When these factors are high, the military’s confidence increases and it becomes more willing to yield to civilian parties. Using comparative historical analysis on a paired comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay I test the causal mechanisms and then use quantitative models to show that the mechanisms are generalizable.

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When considering democratization, a key dilemma for the military is securing credible commitments that their institutional interests will be secured following a transition. Democratization, when it returns civilians to power, reduces a military’s control over its own interests and may re-expose it to the same issues that enticed it out of the barracks in the first place. If democratization creates uncertainty surrounding the security of the military’s interests, why do some militaries support democratization while others do not? I argue that the military’s support for democratization is a strategic decision shaped by its relationship with political parties.

Democracy without parties is unthinkable, yet parties cannot sustain democracy without the military’s consent due to the military’s control of coercive force. The issue of the military deferring to political parties becomes most pronounced when the parties and military have divergent interests. If the military is uncertain about the security of its interests, or fears civilian rule, the military may use its powers to constrain parties by setting parameters on political and electoral institutions. By shaping institutions, the military creates credible commitments that parties will not violate its interests. While some militaries directly intervene in politics to subvert political parties’ control over terms of the transition, other militaries are more willing to yield to parties when it is confident that a shift to democracy will not endanger its core interests. I argue that a military’s confidence is shaped by three factors: trust in civilian parties, the institutionalization of an incumbent party, and the strength of the incumbent party.

A military can be confident that civilian rule will not endanger its interests if it has an allied party in the system. The military can be confident that, should democratization

\footnote{Schattschneider 1942}

\footnote{In many cases this is the authoritarian incumbent party should the military rule alongside a party, or it is a party formed by the military or its civilian allies in expectation of democratization.}
proceed, trusted parties will advocate on its behalf under the new system. Even if the military trusts a party, it must expect that the party can survive the transition and garner sufficient power to protect its interests. Thus, the military’s partisan ally must also be institutionalized and demonstrate electoral and political strength.

When the military has an allied party it trusts, which is institutionalized and electorally and politically strong, the military’s confidence in parties increases, and so does its support for democratization. When the military’s confidence in parties is low, the military uses its power to set parameters on democracy by imposing specific restrictions on electoral and political institutions, procedures, and actors. Should the military use its power to constrain parties, the military engages in what I call bounded democratization. Bounded democratization may produce a democratic system, but whose institutions are designed to prevent certain opposition parties from gaining sufficient power to endanger the military’s interests. Bounded democratization may also result in a competitive authoritarian regime, where contestation and participation are sufficiently restrictive that the military’s opponents do not stand a reasonable chance at winning or exercising power.

The literature on comparative authoritarianism and democratization has given significant attention to the military, often keying in on how militaries seek specific protections for prerogatives within its own traditional sphere. I contribute to the democratization literature by highlighting the strategic interaction between the military and parties, demonstrating that the military does not need to act unilaterally to secure its interests when it is confident that civilian parties will govern on its behalf. Understanding why a military uses its power to shape political institutions is key to explaining variation in democratic development, which is a literature dominated by explanations centered on civilian actors.

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3 Stepan 2015; Hunter 1997; Loveman 1994; Agüero 1998
4 Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Riedl et al. 2020; Slater and Wong 2013; Ziblatt 2017; Putnam 1994; Przeworski 1991; Przeworski et al. 2000; Inglehart 1997; Moore 1993; Lipset 1959; Haggard and Kaufman 2018
This paper proceeds as follows. I begin by laying out some previous work on democratization and then situate how the concept of bounded democratization builds on this literature. I then present a theory which explains variation in militaries’ confidence in civilian parties. Following the discussion on the theory, I outline a mix-methods research design to test the theory and then conclude.

**Returning the Focus to the Military**

Democratization has a central place in comparative politics, with a rich literature exploring explanations varying from structural,[5] cultural,[6] authoritarian-led,[7] and elite-agency oriented[8] theories of democratization. Beyond these explanations many incorporate the military into their analysis. Those that incorporate the military highlight how the military’s characteristics situate it as a unique political actor that does not share the same characteristics or incentives as other more traditional political actors.[9] The characteristics of the military within an authoritarian regime have been used to explain regime durability and whether there is even a chance of democratization.[10] Should authoritarianism fail, the question of demobilizing the military is crucial for the prospects of democracy,[11] as the military may seek to maintain specific missions,[12] prerogatives,[13] autonomy,[14] or even leave specific legacies.[15] But too often these approaches overlook the military’s relationship with organized parties and how this relationship shapes the military’s behavior.

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5 Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Ansell and Samuels 2014; Boix 2003.
6 Lipset 1959; Inglehart 1997.
7 Slater and Wong 2013; Ziblatt 2017; Riedl et al. 2020.
10 Bellin 2004; 2012.
11 Bunce 2003.
13 Hunter 1997; Stepan 2015.
The military is given significant attention largely due to its control of the tools of coercive force and capacity to unilaterally derail democratization. The military’s coercive power is not the sole justification for greater emphasis on the military when explaining democratization. One defining feature of the development of political regimes in the post-WWII era was the rise and proliferation of military-backed regimes. Military rule was common after WWII, reaching nearly 50% of all regimes at its peak in the 1980s. Because the military played such a prominent political role, and continues to do so today, we should use greater care with the scope of inquiry when developing theoretical frameworks to address democratization. The patterns of democratization differ significantly for systems emerging from military rather than civilian rule. Theories of democratization that ignore the military cannot adequately explain the historical development of democracies which emerged from failed military regimes.

To help explain how the military’s behavior during democratization is a function of its relationship with political parties, I use a concept which I term bounded democratization. I define bounded democratization as a transition towards a more competitive system wherein the military sets parameters on electoral and political institutions or actors to constrain open contestation and popular sovereignty. For a transition to qualify as bounded or unbounded, there must be a shift to a system in which elections are used to select those in power, and where there is at least nominal decentralization of power between a legislature or parliament and the chief executive.

Bounded democratization can vary by degree and ranges from the military taking a minimal role in developing political institutions, to the military taking an active role where it develops formal institutions and requires explicit concessions from civilians in exchange for its depoliticization. While the military allows democratic-like procedures and institutions, theories of democratization that ignore the military cannot adequately explain the historical development of democracies which emerged from failed military regimes.  

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17 Bratton and Van de Walle 1997.
the bounds it sets on political contestation or participation may be sufficiently restrictive that it fails to meet a minimalist definition of democracy, even if the resulting system is more competitive than the antecedent regime. I use the concept of bounded democratization to improve our understanding of how democratic transitions can vary in the resulting quality of democracy, even if the transition meets thresholds for procedural democracy under minimalist conceptions.\footnote{Dahl 1973; Schumpeter 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000}

Over time, work has turned from conceptualizing more ideal forms of authoritarianism\footnote{Arendt 1973; Moore 1993; Linz 1985} to conceptualizing authoritarian regimes which incorporate democratic-like institutions, such as tutelary democracy\footnote{Loveman 1994} illiberal democracy\footnote{Diamond 2015} and a plethora of other concepts of democracy with adjectives\footnote{Collier and Levitsky 1997}. The proliferation of concepts arose from the difficulty of describing regimes which are more competitive than ideal forms of authoritarian rule, but still fall short of minimalist definitions of democracy. The difficulty of conceptualizing these regimes was addressed, in part, by Levitsky and Way (2010). With the concept of competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way highlighted how some aspects of democratic rule (e.g. elections or freedom of association) may be present, but the political playing field is tilted beyond a reasonable advantage for the incumbents.

**Civilians Versus Military Actors**

Levitsky and Way argue that the pathway to competitive authoritarianism is shaped by civilian incumbent parties using their power to tilt the playing field to guarantee power for themselves. Yet many regimes, including those which can be described as competitive authoritarian, emerge from military rule where it is the military which uses its power to exclude certain actors from power, rather than guarantee seats of power for themselves.
The military behaves differently than civilian parties because its political interests differ. Where civilians are concerned with monopolizing power for themselves, a military’s political interests center around fulfilling its war-making mission, and thus are more concerned with preventing parties, which would undermine its mission, from winning political power. Militaries would prefer that allies win power, but too often the military lacks a strong relationship with a party, or its allies are too weak to win power. When the military is concerned with who can win power, it shapes the terms of electoral and political contestation to prevent certain actors from winning elections, or exercising power freely should its opponents win power. I take care to distinguish between civilian and military actors because the military can wield its coercive power to set restrictions on who can contest elections, how votes are translated into power, and how power is shared following elections, in a way which leads to a competitive authoritarian system that looks similar to those created by civilians, but which was created and is upheld in distinct ways. I visualize this difference in Figure 1 below.

Table 1: Forms of Civilian and Military Competitive Authoritarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competitive Authoritarianism</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Incumbent tilts playing field</td>
<td>Military sets parameters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Level playing field</td>
<td>Level playing field</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For over a decade we have thought of competitive authoritarianism as composing solely the left half of this 2x2, where competitive authoritarian regimes are situated against a democratic ideal, but wherein the regime was shaped by civilian incumbents. This approach ignores the meaningful distinction between the regimes which emerge following military rule and how they differ from those created by civilians. I contribute to our understanding
of democratization by demonstrating that we indeed have multiple quadrants. With an updated conceptualization of competitive authoritarianism, within the framework of bounded democracy, we can account for how militaries set parameters on regime transitions, which results in a system ranging between the two quadrants in the right-half.

In the right-half are regimes emerging from military authoritarian rule, which may result in a democratic system (lower-right) or a competitive authoritarian regime, should the military constrain electoral and political contestation (upper-right). It is important to distinguish the concept of competitive authoritarianism by the paths out of authoritarian rule because it demonstrates the role strong or institutionalized parties can play. For Levitsky and Way, the presence of strong parties increases the likelihood of an outcome falling in the upper-left of the quadrant. I argue that the presence of a strong or institutionalized party may actually make it more likely that the outcome falls in the lower-right quadrant when emerging from military rule.

**Bounded Democratization and Other Concepts of Democracy**

I highlight the distinction between civilian and military paths out of authoritarian rule to explain why militaries shape the parameters of electoral and political contestation. Bounded democratization is conceptually distinct from other types of transitions which have been developed elsewhere in the literature. The concept of "pacted" transitions was developed in the late 1980s and evolved from the debate on strategic transitions towards democratization. These transitions are characterized by an explicit agreement between regime insiders and their opponents over the conditions of a democratic transition. Pacted transitions differ from ruptures or collapses where the opposition sweeps into power. Both these concepts fail to account for authoritarian-led democratization where incumbents control democratization.

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24 Munck and Leff [1999].
It is under incumbent-led democratization where bounded democratization is most likely, but bounded democratization differs from recent conceptualizations of incumbent-led democratization because of the centrality of the military’s role.

Bounded democratization is also conceptually distinct from protected or tutelary democracy. Loveman (1994) conceptualizes protected democracy as a form of democracy where there are free and fair elections, but where the civilians elected to power are not free to govern independent of the military. Tutelary democracy and bounded democratization differ primarily on procedural aspects of how the military uses its power to influence civilian politicians. Under tutelary democracy, the military uses implicit or explicit threats to coerce civilians to govern in a way that aligns with the military’s interests. Under bounded democratization, on the other hand, the military uses its power to shape institutions to bias the procedures used to select those in power and how power is shared. Rather than directly influencing the decisions of civilians on individual matters of policy, the military sets parameters on who can contest elections, the institutions which are used to select political officials, and how power is formally shared following elections, to indirectly shape civilian’s behavior create a credible commitment that the military’s interests will not be violated.

Tutelary democracy can co-exist with bounded democratization but is functionally distinct. Under tutelary democracy, the military uses the threat of employing its power to coerce civilians to govern according to its preferences, but electoral and political procedures are otherwise left to civilians. After stepping down from power, Pinochet made it clear that civilians in power would not remain in their positions should they pursue policies against Pinochet’s and the military’s wishes. Under bounded democracy, on the other hand, the military uses its power to tilt electoral and political procedures in favor of its political allies and away from its opponents, but does not necessarily use threats to coerce civilians. For example, the Thai military has repeatedly used its power to design institutional systems.

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25Riedl et al. 2020
26Loveman 1991
that prevent non-conservative parties from winning majorities in both the upper and lower houses of parliament. After designing these institutional systems, the military then hides behind the veneer of professionalism and uses the bounded institutions to protect its interests, rather than relying entirely on the threat of mobilizing the military to ensure civilians govern according to its preferences. It is when the military’s institutional engineering fails that the military mobilizes to coerce civilians.

**When Militaries Tie the Hands of Civilians**

One of the key problems regarding a military’s return to the barracks is uncertainty concerning the security of its interests under democratic rule. Democracy introduces uncertainty concerning electoral and political outcomes, yet the institutional framework, and the resources actors within the system have, generates some certainty about the range of possible outcomes. If the military perceives danger to its interests within the range of certain uncertainties, or that the range of possible outcomes is too large, the military uses its power to reduce the range of uncertainty.

To explain why militaries bind democratization I focus on three key factors which shape the military’s behavior; the degree of trust the military has with a given political party, the degree of institutionalization of the authoritarian incumbent party, and the electoral and political strength of the incumbent party. Combined, these three factors influence the military’s confidence in civilian parties and its expectations of who will win power.

For the military to be confident that parties will not violate the military’s corporate interests it must first trust some of the parties in the system. By trust I mean the expectation that a party will act on the military’s behalf. Military’s are more likely to trust parties that share their interests, a vision of the national project, an ethnic identity, or ideology. Most important for trust, however, is a developed relationship over repeated interaction. Senior officers are more likely to trust politicians they have worked closely with and when the officers

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Przeworski 1991
are certain of the politicians’ worldview.

The military shapes its expectations of how a civilian party will govern by evaluating its relationship with parties, which is historically contingent. If the incumbent party, or other parties, hold the military’s trust, the military becomes more confident that these parties will govern in a way that protects the military’s interests.

While trust is important, it does not help shape expectations of which party will come to power nor how effective a party will be should it win power. Thus, the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party is critical because it helps the military know whether the incoming party system will include an ally. I define an institutionalized party as one in which the party has control of its own internal procedures, its processes are routinized, its organization is broad and stable, and that has capacity for national-level mobilization.

The degree of institutionalization of the incumbent parties reduces uncertainty for the military because it affects the ability of the incumbent party to survive a regime transition and electoral cycles. Party institutionalization also affects how the party will look in the future, how cohesively it will act in power, and how the party influences the development of the subsequent party system. Institutionalized parties are more likely to survive the end of the regime than parties which were personalist vehicles for the ruler due to their autonomy and routinization. Institutionalized parties also improve their odds at surviving regime transitions if they have a social base they can draw on for political support through clientelistic or programmatic linkages. Additionally, institutionalized parties are less prone to radical shifts in policy programs and leadership as the party can agree on its policy goals. Should the authoritarian incumbent party survive the transition, it also anchors and stabilizes the subsequent party system.

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28 Meng 2017.
30 Self and Hicken 2018.
31 Riedl et al. 2020.
32 Meng 2017.
I center the theoretical framework around the presence of an institutionalized party, but in many circumstances incumbent militaries do not form political parties until democratization is imminent, or the military simply fails to build a party. When the military lacks an allied party, or the allied party is new, the uncertainty surrounding the military’s future is greater and reduces its confidence in the party.

While the degree of institutionalization of the incumbent party affects its stability, it does not endow the party with the capacity to win and hold power. Thus, the strength of the party also matters for the military’s confidence in civilian rule. By strength I mean the scope of the parties hold on sub-national and national political office and ability to govern independent of the military. The military can evaluate a party’s strength by looking to history and determining whether the party was able to win elections or hold power without the military’s interference.

I argue that militaries use bounded democratization as a strategy when they are faced with the uncertainty inherent in regime transitions. Because transitions often take place in the context of elite coalition breakdowns, economic contraction, or popular unrest, the military looks for factors which reduce uncertainty. The volatility of a transition means that there is no guarantee that the constraints the military imposes will be enforceable, but binding democratization is a strategic decision the military can make in attempt to make commitments credible.

Parties play a central role for the military because established, stable parties reduce uncertainty. In cases where the military is uncertain about the stability of parties, lacks an allied party, or its allied party is weak, the military does more to control the terms of democratization. When uncertainty over the military’s allies’ capacity to win power is high, the military does more to take a direct role in designing formal institutions to generate stronger commitments. If uncertainty is more moderate, the military may become active in

\[34\text{Although the military may evaluate its relationship and the stability and strength of alternative parties in the system.}\]
negotiations and only seek informal agreements with civilians over who will participate in
elections and/or how power will be shared.

The three factors outlined above affect the degree of uncertainty the military faces when
considering democratization. It may be that there is little uncertainty and the military knows
which parties will win power. Even when the military is certain about electoral outcomes,
it acts in a similar fashion to use its capacity to bind the power of opposition parties if it
is certain opponents will win power. Thus, instead of solely relating the military’s behavior
to uncertainty, I explain bounded democratization as a function of the military’s confidence
that parties will not violate its core interests. If there is a high degree of uncertainty about
how politics will look in the future, the military will have low confidence that its interests
will be secure after democratization. Similarly, if the military is certain that democracy will
bring opponents to power, it will also have low confidence that its interests will be secure
should it return to the barracks without binding democratization.

This is not to say that the military faces no potential costs for its decisions. A military
must weigh the costs of various strategies, ranging from violent repression, to retreating to
the barracks and yielding entirely to civilians. Each decision the military makes carries with
it some cost, but binding democratization is a strategy the military pursues when the costs
of using repression or retreating are both high and when the military can reasonably expect
to secure its interests in a more competitive system.

I visualize the theory in Figure 1 below. On the left are the three background conditions
which affect the military’s confidence in civilian rule. Together, these factors influence the
likelihood the military uses its power to influence the regime transition, with the possibility
of either a bounded or unbounded transition.

As a note on military institutionalization and corporate interests, I assume that mili-
taries are relatively institutionalized, with a well-defined and stable command hierarchy and
cohesive officer corps. I assume a relatively high degree of cohesion within the officer corps
to demonstrate how the logic of a party-military relationship alters the military’s behavior
as the party’s characteristics vary. It is certainly the case that the military’s behavior is also a function of internal dynamics, and likely to change depending on which set of officers control the military’s hierarchy. It may be that the command hierarchy breaks down and junior officers rebel, or that there is significant factionalism within the officer corps. These circumstances often lead to political instability and are more likely to result in closed regimes, rather than orderly political transitions, and fall outside the scope of inquiry.\footnote{Harkness 2018}

When a military is more institutionalized its interests become more corporate and it acts to secure these interests with an orderly transition to civilian rule, rather than producing a breakdown in order as competing factions struggle to capture power.

I also note that the military’s strategic actions may play out through a lengthy period and is contingent on factors which may vary over time. For example, the military may engage in negotiations with parties over certain parameters of the emerging political system, but alter its behavior as it learns more about parties through its interactions with them, or as it simply gains more information about the parties’ strength and interests by observing the parties’ behavior during the transition.
Case Selection and Methods

To evaluate whether militaries are more likely to bind democratization when confidence in parties is low, I use a mixed-methods research design. A mixed-methods approach is most appropriate given certain constraints analyzing democratization and military behavior, including incorporating the historical record into the analysis, and factors that cannot be manipulated by a researcher. Using observational methods allow me to collect data and analyze the historical record using both qualitative and quantitative tools.

For part of the empirical evaluation I use comparative historical analysis to compare historical trajectories and identify causal mechanisms during the critical juncture of a regime transition. To perform comparative historical analysis I conducted extensive field work on location which included use of national, military, and party archives, paired with semi-structured interviews of elites from the authoritarian regime.

While comparative historical analysis is an appropriate method to identify causal mechanisms, one potential weakness is ensuring that explanatory mechanisms are generalizable. To assess the external validity of the paired comparison, I use quantitative analysis using cross-national data on regime transitions. Using secondary resources on 252 unique regime transitions across four datasets, I code nineteen features of regime transitions to measure whether it is bounded. I limit the scope of analysis to regime transitions following military rule and ignore situations where the military was not politically active, or was under complete civilian control, and had little influence over the transition or post-transition contestation. Cases are only included in the final sample if the transition resulted in a competitive regime. I combine my original data with data on party institutionalization and strength, along with other factors relevant to democratic transitions. I then use OLS to test the association of bounded democratization with the characteristics of the incumbent party to establish the

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36 Thelen and Mahoney [2015]; Slater and Simmons [2010]; Slater and Ziblatt [2013]; Skocpol 1979; Brady and Collier [2010]; Riedl and Roberts [2020].
37 Refer to appendix for coding decisions and sampling criteria.
generalizability of the theoretical claims.

For the comparative historical analysis I select the post-authoritarian cases of Indonesia and Paraguay. I select Indonesia and Paraguay because they meet necessary conditions to test a theory wherein the military’s strategic behavior is influenced by the characteristics of civilian parties. Indonesia and Paraguay are an appropriate comparison because they are similar on several dimensions critical to explain the military’s behavior during democratization, yet differ on the key explanatory variable.

Even though Indonesia and Paraguay are different on social, economic, cultural, and geographic factors, they do share important similarities on military characteristics and their authoritarian experience. Both the Indonesian and Paraguayan militaries were well-institutionalized and unitary actors that played a major political role for decades prior to democratization. Indonesia and Paraguay experienced over thirty years of military rule where a former army general led the regime, while the military ruled in a coalition with a civilian party. The key difference between the two cases, which allows for a comparison that identifies the causal mechanisms at play, is the variation in the characteristics of the authoritarian incumbent party and the military’s confidence in civilian parties. Should I compare either of these cases to another former military regime which did not feature a political party, it would be difficult to establish that the military’s behavior was related to the absence of a party. Instead, by using Indonesia and Paraguay I hold the military and regime characteristics constant, and vary the characteristics of the incumbent party to demonstrate how variation in the party’s institutionalization and strength influences the military’s behavior.

While the differences between Indonesian and Paraguay on social, economic, cultural, and geographic factors may seem to matter, they do not play a significant role in explaining variation in bounded democratization between Indonesia and Paraguay. Both Indonesia and Paraguay passed the threshold for procedural democracy following three decades of military-backed authoritarian rule, but democratization in the case of Indonesia was bounded, whereas democratization in Paraguay was unbounded. I emphasize that the conceptual frameworks
which are used to explain traditional democratization differ substantively from bounded democratization. I also argue that theoretical frameworks used to explain traditional procedural democratization cannot account for the difference in bounded democratization between the two cases.

I present the explanatory variables of prominent theoretical frameworks of traditional democratization to demonstrate how these explanations fail to explain variation in bounded democratization. If a given explanatory variable aligns in both the Paraguayan and Indonesian cases, and conforms with expected outcomes, I cannot dismiss that framework as an alternative explanation because it may also explain bounded democratization. If an explanatory variable of traditional democratization diverges between Indonesia and Paraguay, I can dismiss that explanation because both cases passed the threshold for procedural democracy, and it is unlikely that that variable could pass by procedural democratization and explain variation in bounded democratization.

Furthermore, if the explanatory variables align between the two cases, but contradict the expected outcome, I can also dismiss that explanation because it failed to explain traditional democratization in the two cases. If a variable is unable to explain traditional democratization in both Indonesia and Paraguay, it is unlikely to be a plausible cause of the variation in bounded democratization between the two cases. I present several theoretical frameworks, their explanatory mechanisms, and outcomes in Table 2.

In Table 2 I stipulate whether the prediction of a given theory aligns with the observed outcome. For example, both Indonesia and Paraguay were relatively poor at the time of democratization, having a GDP per capita between $1,000 to $1,500. Thus, the two cases converge on the explanatory variable, but contradict the expected outcome given that economic growth models would expect that poorer countries to, either not democratize, or not survive long after democratization. Because both Indonesia and Paraguay democratized while poor, and continue to be democracies to this day, the economic growth thesis is an unlikely explanation of the variation in bounded democratization between the two cases.
Table 2: Alternative Explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Indonesia prediction</th>
<th>Indonesia outcome</th>
<th>Paraguay prediction</th>
<th>Paraguay outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite agency</td>
<td>Insider - outsider pact →</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>Higher GDP →</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratization + Survival</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>Modern values →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Redistributions</td>
<td>Higher inequality →</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No democratization</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic inclusion</td>
<td>Higher inequality →</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td></td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>Islamic culture</td>
<td>Islamic majorities →</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rentier effect</td>
<td>Resource wealth →</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No democratization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indonesia and Paraguay also diverge on various explanatory mechanisms of traditional democratization, but given that both democratized, I can also dismiss those mechanisms as potential explanations of bounded democratization. For example, at the time of democratization Indonesia had far greater income and land equality than Paraguay. Income and land inequality have been used to either explain the emergence of democracy or the lack of democratization. If any of these explanations are applied to both cases, they fail to explain how both cases democratized. Because these explanations cannot explain how both cases passed the threshold of procedural definitions of democracy, they should not be used to explain variation in bounded democratization.

I select Indonesia and Paraguay because the two cases allow me to dismiss alternative explanations of the countries’ democratization. By dismissing these alternative explanations, I can hold the factors on which they are similar (i.e. political characteristics of the military) constant, and demonstrate how the factors where they diverge (i.e. characteristics of the party-military relationship) explain the variation in bounded democratization.

38Ansell and Samuels 2014.
39Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006.
Antecedent Conditions in Indonesia and Paraguay

In this section I outline the antecedent conditions which shaped the military’s decision-making. Specifically, I outline the relationship each military had with political parties, and how the development of the authoritarian incumbent party shaped the military’s confidence in democratic rule. I show that the Indonesian military’s tumultuous relationship with parties made it distrustful of civilian parties, and more reluctant to yield to parties than in Paraguay, where military had more amicable relationships with parties. I also show that the Colorado Party in Paraguay was more developed than its Indonesian counterpart, and its institutionalization and strength increased the military’s confidence.

I begin with the case of the Indonesian military and Golkar. The foundation of Indonesia’s military was built under Japanese colonial rule. To hold territory in Indonesia, Japan created a military throughout the archipelago known as *pembela tanah air* or PETA. PETA training was extremely harsh, and created a strong sense of unity within its officer corps. Even though PETA was disbanded after Japan’s surrender, officers from PETA would go on to make up the revolutionary army’s core after being organized by independence leader Sukarno. Many of these officers were fervent nationalists, who supported Indonesia’s nationalist philosophy of *Pancasila* which centers around the idea of a unified national territory and non-sectarian belief in god.

The military’s nationalist officers were highly distrustful of politicians and officers who did not share their ideals, especially those within Islamist or leftists organizations because they viewed these actors as undermining *Pancasila*. The belief that these actors were undermining *Pancasila* was formed by several leftist and Islamist armed rebellions that were violently countered by the military. When the military would eventually take power in 1965, it was in response to an attempted coup by communists that killed six out of the seven highest

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40 Indonesia 1948
41 Lee 2013
42 FS Posts Indonesian Djakarata Embassy 1964a 1964b
ranking army officers, all of whom had either served in PETA or the revolutionary army. After taking power the military would purge, not only the military of these factions, but politics and society in general.

Prior to the 1965 abortive coup, the military sought to balance the power of leftist and Islamist organizations in the government by creating its own nationalist organization known as Sekber Golkar. Sekber Golkar was an amalgamation of nationalist oriented corporate interests groups. After taking power in 1965, the military initially ruled directly, but its need for a civilian partner grew over time as demands for elections increased. Prior to organizing the first elections since taking power, the military began reforming Sekber Golkar into an organization that could compete in elections on the military’s behalf.

To prepare Sekber Golkar for elections, the military focused its reforms on creating institutionalized leadership committees and a national organization. The military’s efforts paid off as Sekber Golkar, now renamed Golkar, performed well in the first authoritarian elections of 1971. Golkar was further developed in the 1980s under the leadership of retired Lt. General Sudharmono, who recruited and trained millions of party cadres at the local and national level. Sudharmono’s work strengthened Golkar substantially and replaced many retired officers, who had dominated the party, with civilian cadres.

Despite Sudharmono’s work, Golkar remained politically and electorally untested, and its capacity to win power before the end of military rule was unknown. During the entirety of authoritarian rule in Indonesia, opposition parties were barred from campaigning at the local level, while Golkar was free to do so. Furthermore, the president of Indonesia, retired General Suharto, steered state resources to Golkar. Thus, Golkar developed without ever facing genuine electoral or political difficulty. Golkar’s lack of experience in free and fair elections created significant uncertainty for the military, leaving the military unsure that Golkar would win power and protect its interests.

That Golkar remained untested was not the only problem for the military when con-

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\[43\text{Manihuruk 1991.}\]
sidering democratization. Throughout Indonesia’s history Islamist parties, whose vision of an Islamic oriented state, had demonstrated electoral strength. Even though these parties were not free to organize during the authoritarian period, the structure of Islamic organizations and potential foundations for Islamist parties remained in place, posing a threat to the nationalist oriented military. Furthermore, the opposition party PDI’s historical links with Sukarno’s PNI, which had embraced leftism, remained a major party. That Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, controlled the PDI strengthened the military’s wariness of the party. Together, these factors created uncertainty as to whether Golkar would be strong enough to protect the military’s interests.

The Colorado Party and Military Development in Paraguay

The development of Paraguay’s military and ruling party differ significantly from Golkar and was critical for the military’s confidence in the party. Unlike in Indonesia, the incumbent party developed separately from the military, and the military and party would become close allies after a major civil war. The two largest parties in Paraguay, the Liberal and Colorado parties were founded by oligarchs in attempt to capture control of the government after the disastrous Triple Alliance War. At the turn of the 20th century the Liberal Party held power and began a process of institutionalizing the military, while keeping it small to maintain control.

The military’s relationship with the Liberal Party was positive until the Chaco War with Bolivia in the 1930s. Prior to war with Bolivia, the Liberal Party ignored calls from the military to increase the size of military forces to counter the possibility of a Bolivian incursion into the Chaco region. After war broke out, the Liberal government delegated authority to the military to manage the war effort, and the military drastically increased the size of the military, and eventually defeated the Bolivian forces. The Liberal’s mismanagement of the

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44 Abente 1995
45 Alvarenga 2012
Chaco issue turned officers against the party. The party’s relationship with the military deteriorated further when the Liberal government agreed to a full scale demobilization as part of its peace settlement, and then refused to pay enlisted soldiers. Problems between the party and military came to a head when the Liberals exiled outspoken officer Rafael Franco. In reaction to Franco’s exile, sympathetic officers conducted a coup to remove the Liberal government and placed Franco into power but the military would remove Franco from power a year and a half after he took power.

After removing Franco, the military installed war hero José Félix Estigarribia into power. Estigarribia would die a short time later, leaving General Higinio Morínigo as president. Morínigo would first align with Franco’s Feberistas and the Colorado Party. Morínigo’s alliance with both parties lasted a few years, before Morínigo threw his full support to the Colorado Party. In pushing the Feberistas out of the government, Morínigo spurred a civil war between the Colorado aligned faction of the military against the parts of the military allied with all other parties. The result of the civil war was an outright victory for the Colorado Party, which took full control of the government and allied with an officer corps dominated by those loyal to the party.

One reason for the Colorados’ victory was the strength of the party when the civil war broke out. When the party was founded, however, it was an oligarchic party with shallow social roots and a poorly organized national structure. Power was centralized around the party’s founder, Bernardino Caballero, and the lack of institutionalized leadership led the party to splinter after Caballero’s death in 1912. With Caballero’s death and the breakdown of the party, the Colorado Party lacked the strength to challenge the Liberal Party’s hold on power and remained a minor political actor for decades.

The factors which produced the party’s strength to take power in the late 1940s began to develop in the 1920s. Building on the national structure left by Caballero, party activist and son of one of the party’s founders, Juan Manual Frutos, and a group of party cadres spent years developing local party community centers known as seccionales. Prior to Frutos’
work, the party had a limited number of seccionales concentrated in more urban areas, yet after years of Frutos’ team of cadres organizational efforts, the party boasted hundreds of seccionales, and smaller sub-seccionales throughout the entire country.\footnote{Basualdo 2009}

These seccionales became the lifeblood of the party. Each seccional had a designated territory and administered party business down to the neighborhood level. Seccionales were staffed by cadres who were elected by party members of each local seccional. Yet these seccionales did more than just generic party business, they stimulated and intertwined in the social life of everyday Paraguayans and forged strong ties between the party and local society, crystallizing an identity of being a Colorado for vast swaths of the Paraguayan society.

After Morínigo expelled the Feberistas from his cabinet and the military split, the Colorado Party marshalled its own armed forces by using its seccionales to mobilize thousands of pynandi\footnote{Pynandi is a Guarani word which can be roughly translated to shoe-less.} peasant foot-soldiers from throughout the country. The broad territorial organization which was developed by Frutos endowed the party with the capacity to defeat the rebels in concentrated battles around the capital, and then go on to exert political control throughout the entire territory.

While the party used mass-mobilization to win the civil war, the party’s deep roots in society would have been less effective had the party’s elites remained fractured. Decades after Caballero’s death, party elites began to cohere when the Liberal Party moved to ban political parties in an attempt to hold on to power in the wake of the Chaco War.

The attempt to ban parties served as a catalyst to induce cohesion amongst Colorado elites\footnote{Patria 1936a}. In early 1936, party elites called for a national convention to discuss party unity. Up to this point, there had been no national conventions, and the party lacked a standing national committee that could handle party business. In addition to signing a unity pact, party elites agreed to form a new national committee (Junta de Gobierno) that would govern the party.
and coordinate party business on a regular basis. This new committee was elected by leaders of the various seccionales during a national convention. Members of the Junta de Gobierno then elected an executive committee, comprised of a president, multiple vice-presidents, secretaries, and treasurers. The executive committee coordinated efforts of the broader national committee, and made executive decisions on behalf of the party while coordinating efforts with like-minded officers in the military.

The routinization of national leadership, strong social roots, and close relationship with the military enabled Colorado dominated rule for decades. When long time president Alfredo Stroessner’s tenure ended in 1989, the party’s strength, institutionalization, and close ties to the officer corps meant that the military was confident that the party could win power and protect its interests under democracy.

Democratization and Military Uncertainty in Indonesia and Paraguay

In this section I present evidence of the Indonesian military’s behavior to bind the democratic transition. I argue that the Indonesian military constrained civilians because the military lacked confidence in Golkar’s ability to control the transition and effectively advocate on the military’s behalf. Prior to the New Order regime the party system was fragmented with the communist party (PKI), a fierce opponent of the military and nationalists, demonstrating significant strength. Not only did the PKI threaten the military, but the other largest parties in the system did not share the military’s nationalist orientation. The largest party, Sukarno’s PNI, moved increasingly leftward to the chagrin of the military and the two other major parties were Islamist parties that the military distrusted. When the PKI killed several commanding generals, the military took full control of the political system and focused reforms on the party system. After taking power the military would keep control of politics under General Suharto until the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.

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49Patria 1936b.
50Jenkins 1984.
In response to the financial crisis and former general Suharto’s inability to promote a coherent response, unrest emerged throughout Indonesia with large scale popular mobilization in the capital of Jakarta. Protests strengthened even in response to crackdowns by the police and military and swelled in the early weeks of May 1998, bringing student protesters in direct confrontation with the military. Leading the military at this time was General Wiranto who had been promoted as commander of the armed forces just months before. Wiranto was tied to the nationalist faction within the military which was dedicated to a united Indonesia.

The challenge facing Wiranto and the regime peaked in mid-May when students stormed the national legislature and occupied its grounds. After students stormed the legislature’s grounds, the legislative leadership, which included a representative of the military faction within the legislature, met and unanimously supported a resolution calling for Suharto’s resignation. Should Suharto refuse to resign, the legislature’s leadership would call a special session to impeach Suharto and elevate civilian vice-president and Golkar member, B.J. Habibie, into the presidency.

In response to the legislature’s resolution calling for Suharto’s resignation, Wiranto and the military’s upper brass pushed back and called the legislature’s actions illegitimate. Thus, at this point in the crisis, Wiranto and other high ranking officers demonstrated a lack of confidence in Golkar’s ability to manage a transition in the military’s interests. Wiranto and the military would hold this line until Suharto himself moved to resign.

On the night prior to Suharto’s resignation, Suharto met with Wiranto and gave him authority to form a military council to control the transition. Later that night, Wiranto informed senior officers of Suharto’s plans to resign and the power he delegated to the military, but also his reluctance to use the military to take control of the transition. Wiranto

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51Pepinsky 2009
52Mietzner 2009
53Perry 1998
54Said 2013
worried that protests would continue, and that more students could be killed as a result. Instead, Wiranto directed the military to support a transition of power to Habibie. Even though Wiranto was reluctant to take control of the transition, the military could still use its political power and partnership with Golkar to bind the transition without taking full control.

It is clear that the factors of the crisis were not deterministic on the military’s behavior. The military’s behavior was a function of strategic decisions made by high-ranking officers of the military, who were uncertain of the best course of action. After the legislature’s call for Suharto’s resignation the military could have demonstrated its confidence in Golkar and immediately backed the civilian leadership. Instead, Wiranto continued to support Suharto because he was uncertain of how a civilian-led transition would play out.

In the time between the legislature’s call for Suharto’s resignation and his actual resignation, Wiranto and the military could have taken many other actions, including full suppression of the student-led movement. Even with Suharto’s resignation, there was no guarantee that Wiranto would not have used the military’s power to take control of the transition. All of these alternative options were available to Wiranto and the military, yet the military eventually allowed civilians to lead, but not control, the transition.

On the morning of 21 May 1998, Suharto resigned and passed power to Habibie. After becoming president, Habibie set Indonesia on the path of democratization by calling for elections in the following year. While Habibie’s leadership was key for democratization, the transition was still very much steered by the military prior to the first free and fair elections. Because the 1997 elections were held under authoritarian electoral institutions, the legislature was dominated by Golkar and the military. The incumbents’ large majority granted Golkar and the military significant influence over reforms during the early stages of the transition and helped ensure that the institutions favored by the military would not be removed. One major demand of the protesters and opposition parties was political decentralization.

For most of its time since independence, Indonesia was a centralized state with limited
regional autonomy. The centralization of the state was viewed within nationalist factions to be critical to uphold the national philosophy of *Pancasila*. At the time of Suharto’s resignation, sub-national legislative and executive offices where dominated by Golkar and retired officers. Full decentralization would weaken the nationalist’s hold on regional political offices, and the military feared this would potentially fan the flames of regional tension.

To preempt decentralization on the opposition’s terms, Golkar and the military used their power in the interim period to pass decentralization on their terms. Instead of extensive decentralization, Golkar and the military allowed moderate autonomy at the sub-national level, including direct elections for mayors, governors, and local legislatures, but significant power over taxation and security remained with the central state. During debate over these reforms, the military openly stated its opposition to extensive decentralization, and warned that any decentralization could endanger national unity. Despite fears of Indonesia breaking apart as a result of decentralization, the military helped vote to pass limited decentralization reforms prior to the 1999 elections.

Following the 1999 election, the military’s presence in the legislature was reduced. With only 40 seats the military could no longer unilaterally influence policy, but in combination with allies it could check more ambitious reforms. Thus, the military bound democratization by maintaining a formal presence in the legislature. Because the military was formally represented in the legislature, it was also given a deputy speaker position in the upper house. With this position, the military was directly involved in bargaining at the leadership level over policy, reforms, and other actions taken in the legislature.

Another way the military bound the transition was by constraining executive power. Instead of allowing direct presidential elections, Habibie, Golkar, and the military kept the president indirectly elected via the legislature. Keeping the president indirectly elected meant the military voted on who could become president. After the 1999 election, and failed

\[55\] Jenderal 1999.

\[56\] Ziegenhain 2008.
attempts by two Golkar candidates to win the presidency with Wiranto as a vice-presidential candidate both times, the military threw its support to Abdurrahman Wahid, better known as Gus Dur.

As president, Gus Dur was frequently checked by the military. In addition to the military’s continued presence in the legislature, several recently retired officers joined Gus Dur’s cabinet and controlled key roles in security affairs. These officers rebuffed Gus Dur’s attempts to reform the military and use it for political support.

The retired officers’ control of the security portfolio was key for the military’s continued support of democratization. With their close ties to the officer corps, retired officers held a high degree of trust of the military and were able to advocate for the military’s mission within the executive. The retired officers’ control of the security portfolio guaranteed that Gus Dur could not stray too far from the military’s preferences. Indeed, when Gus Dur tried to do so, the military pushed back and supported the move to impeach and remove him.

With events in Indonesia spiraling out of control, Gus Dur tried to dig in and hold on to power. Refusing calls from members of his own cabinet to resign, Gus Dur ordered the Minister for Politics and Security, retired Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to implement a state of emergency. Yudhoyono refused to follow this order and resigned. Just days later, the military would mobilize as a show of force against Gus Dur and protected the special legislative session organized to impeach and remove him. On 23 July 2000 the impeachment resolution was adopted without a single vote in dissent, including votes in favor of impeachment by the military faction. After Gus Dur was removed, and Megawati sworn in as the new president, the military returned to the barracks and the turbulent transition to democracy continued.

Gus Dur’s impeachment provides a clear example of the military binding the democratic transition. In response to an executive who acted against the military’s interests, the military mobilized in opposition and used institutions to remove him from power. In its bid to remove him from power, the military employed its coercive capacity and only demobilized after a
more nationalist oriented politician became president.

As president, Megawati did little to antagonize the military and other elites. Where Gus Dur was more ambitious in seeking military reforms, Megawati only pursued reforms offered by the military itself. Megawati would serve out the rest of the presidential mandate which expired in 2004, but would run for reelection. Prior to 2004 the rules were changed to allow for direct presidential elections. In her bid for the presidency in 2004, Megawati faced two prominent retired generals; Wiranto and Yudhoyono.

Following the collapse of authoritarian rule, Wiranto joined Golkar and defeated several civilian members of the party to capture Golkar’s nomination for the 2004 presidential election. For Yudhoyono, the retired general formed the Democrat Party a year after he resigned from Gus Dur’s cabinet. Thus, the 2004 election featured two prominent nationalist retired generals against Megawati. Wiranto would finish a close third behind Megawati in the first round, leaving Megawati and Yudhoyono to contest the second round. With a prominent Golkar businessman as his vice presidential running-mate, Yudhoyono ran away with the election and easily defeated Megawati in the second round. Despite his success on the presidential ticket, Yudhoyono’s party performed poorly in the legislative elections. Instead, Golkar would go on to regain its position as the largest party after Megawati’s PDI-P saw a large drop in support.

With the 2004 election Indonesia saw a former prominent nationalist general elected to the presidency, and the military’s old political ally, Golkar, regain its position as the largest party in the legislature. With nationalists in power, civilians had demonstrated their ability to secure power – with the help of several retired officers – and protect the military’s interests. With former officers and allies in power, the military fully resigned its formal political powers in the legislature and finished its protracted return to the barracks. Having successfully bound the transition, the military was confident that the transition to a democratic system no longer endangered the military’s interests.

Indonesia’s experience demonstrates the need to incorporate the military into analyses
of democratization following military rule. While Suharto resigned in the face of mass-mobilization against the regime, alternative explanations of democratization fail to explain Indonesia’s path out of authoritarian rule. Because of its Muslim majority society with more traditional values, oil wealth, and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity, Indonesia was an unlikely case of democratization. Despite each of these factors Indonesia successfully democratized due to the actions taken by the military to bind the transition.

Indonesia’s path out of authoritarianism not only pushes against religious or modernization approaches to democratization, but it also does not fit with elite-agency or distributional conflict models. Indonesia does not fit with distributional conflict models because mass-mobilization occurred even though income inequality was low. Furthermore, while popular mobilization certainly emerged in response to the economic crisis, distributional conflict models cannot explain why the Indonesian military bound the transition despite clear popular mobilization calling for the depolitization of the military. As for elite-agency models, regime insiders did not form pacts with outsiders over the terms of democratization. Instead, incumbents initiated and drove the transition on their own. Indonesia’s democratization fits more with the recent developed incumbent-led transition thesis, but highlights how the strategic interaction between the military and party influenced Indonesian democratization.

**The Fall of Stroessner and Party-led Democratization**

The military’s behavior during Paraguay’s democratic transition differed significantly than Indonesia’s. Where the Indonesian military was active throughout the transition, the Paraguayan military stepped away and completely deferred to civilians.

The crisis which produced the downfall of authoritarian rule in Paraguay is linked to Alfredo Stroessner betraying the trust of both the party and military. For most of his thirty-four year rule, Stroessner did little to upset either the party or military. As the old guard of the party, whose fathers and grandfathers had created the party, began to retire Stroessner became more active in the party and worked to elevate loyalists within party
leadership. By throwing his support behind loyalists Stroessner helped create two factions within the party; the militantes who were militant in their support of Stroessner, and the tradicionales. The militantes slowly gained power in the 1980s and eventually captured the party, by literally locking the tradicionales out of a party congress used to select party leadership. In the middle of the night prior to the party congress the militantes entered the grounds and locked the gates and used their connections within the Ministry of the Interior to deploy the police to protect the grounds.

With the tradicionales barred from the party congress, the militantes captured the entirety of the party’s leadership in both the Junta de Gobierno and executive committee. With total control of the party the militantes renominated Stroessner to the presidency, and he would go on to win the 1988 election. In addition to renominating Stroessner, the militantes developed a plan to clear a path of promotions in the military for Stroessner’s son Gustavo, who was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Air Force.

Gustavo Stroessner had little path to rise to the rank of general like his father for two reasons. First, there were several officers in front of Gustavo and, with few retirements, there simply were not enough positions to provide promotions. Second, Gustavo was not widely liked in the military, which was dominated by the Paraguayan Army. As an officer in the Air Force, Gustavo had weak ties to those who had served in combat in the military, especially the army, and was seen as benefiting from nepotism. To open the way for Gustavo to rise through the ranks, Stroessner and the militantes planned to force the retirements of officers who blocked Gustavo. A majority of officers at the time saw the party’s attempt to force retirements as a violation of the previous institutional autonomy they had enjoyed when the tradicionales controlled the party.

With the trust between the military and party eroding, the military turned to the tradicionales for help. Even though the tradicionales had been locked out of the party,

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57 Abente-Brun 2009
58 Riquelme 1992
the military trusted them because they had fought together in the 1947 civil war, and then ruled side-by-side for several decades. Outside of power, the tradicionalistas had little sway within the party committees, but their experience and links to the seccionales throughout the country meant they had a credible base of power should they regain control of the party’s leadership committees. It was within this context that officers reached out to some of the party’s old guard to develop a plan to oust Stroessner and his militantes.

The conspiracy to oust Stroessner was led by two prominent members of the Colorado Party. First was Edgar Ynsfrán, who’s family had long ties to the party and who had served as the Minister of the Interior for years under Stroessner. In addition to Ynsfrán was Luis María Argaña. Argaña had served as the President of the Supreme Court for several years before being ousted after the militantes took over the party. Together, these two prominent Colorados worked with General Andrés Rodríguez, who was the commander of the Army’s First Division. As head of the First Division, Rodríguez commanded the army’s largest and best equipped armored and infantry units, in addition to his strong ties to other commanders throughout the army.59

As part of the plan for the coup, the three elites agreed that the party would give Rodríguez political support and make him president should he remove Stroessner and return the party to the tradicionalistas. When Stroessner moved to force Rodríguez’s retirement in February 1989, Rodríguez launched the coup.60 In the middle of the night, all military units throughout the country were mobilized and Rodríguez commanded the forces that removed Stroessner.

After removing Stroessner from power, Rodríguez helped the tradicionalistas recapture the party. Back in power, the old guard immediately forced out the militantes and established an interim Junta de Gobierno and executive committee comprised of retired tradicionalistas. The behavior of the military in returning power to the party, rather than taking power for

59 Yegros 1988
60 Lezcano and Martini 1994
itself, demonstrates that the coup was about reestablishing the trust between the party and military, which had existed prior the rise of the militantes. With the tradicionalistas back in power, the military could be confident that its institutional interests would be secure.

After recapturing the party, and installing another general as president, the military and party reestablished the military-party coalition that had sustained authoritarian rule since 1947. Soon after Rodríguez was installed as president, multiparty elections were held in which opposition parties were given greater freedom. Even with greater freedom for the opposition parties, the Colorados won significant majorities and demonstrated their strength by maintaining control of the presidency and both houses of congress. Despite the Colorados’ electoral win, there were many in the party that worried that they were repeating the same mistake they had made with Stroessner.

Wary of keeping a general in power, the party could initiate democratization via a provision in the constitution which granted power to revise the constitution, in part or totality, to the National Assembly. Should the National Assembly call for revisions to the constitution, a constitutional assembly would be formed which included both houses of the National Assembly and the Council of State. The Council of State was comprised of the executive cabinet, the chiefs of each arm of the military, the archbishop of Asunción, and other leaders of labor, agricultural, and education sectors.

Having determined to pursue democracy and prevent another Stroessner, party leadership determined that the President of the Senate, Waldino Ramón Lovera, would call for the constitutional assembly. Catching word of their intentions, President Rodríguez undercut the party and announced the call for the constitutional assembly himself.

With the call for a new constitution, Paraguay held an election to select a constitutional assembly. The Colorado Party dominated this election, winning 122 of the 198 elected seats. With a large majority in the constitutional assembly, the Colorado Party was positioned to design the subsequent democratic system largely on its own terms. A potential challenge for the party was the presence of the military in the assembly due to its place in the Council of
State. Despite its formal prerogative, the military deferred to civilian leadership throughout the process of designing the new constitution, even on matters of military reforms.

According to interviews with civilians who participated in drafting the constitution, the trust between the military and the Colorado Party was key for the military to not interfere with democratization. Trust between the Colorado Party and the military was high for several reasons. The relationship between the officers and the party was strong due to a shared vision of the national project, with a close alignment between the two actors due to their alliance during the civil war and conservative ideology. In addition to a shared ideology, the party’s old guard demonstrated its willingness to act on behalf of the military by providing political support in removing Stroessner and the militantes, who had threatened the institutional interests of the military.

Another key to the military’s confidence in the Colorado Party was the party’s political strength. In addition to holding the military’s trust, the party had demonstrated its political power and ability to secure the military’s interests under democratic rules. The party demonstrated its strength in the two elections following the 1989 coup. By gaining over 60% of the seats in both elections, the party had sent a clear signal to the military that the party would remain in power after democratization.

Overall the transition to complete civilian rule was relatively smooth, with the military deferring to civilians to design the new political system. One point of friction was whether Rodríguez could run for reelection. Because the party wanted to prevent anyone, especially a general, from holding power indefinitely, the constitutional assembly imposed term limits that prevented any president from running for reelection. Not only did the constitutional assembly set a single five year term limit on the president, but it also barred any family

\[ ^{61} \text{Nohlen et al. 2005} \]

\[ ^{62} \text{There was also little reason for the military to fear the opposition. The primary opponents to the Colorado Party did not hold radical views that would threaten the military even in the unlikely event that they won power.} \]
As with Indonesia, the case of Paraguay demonstrates the need to understand party-military relations to explain the strategic behavior of the military during democratization. Like Indonesia, democratization in Paraguay was led by incumbents who did not form any pact with the opposition. Not only did the incumbents not form a pact with the opposition, but democratization occurred in Paraguay with muted popular demands for democracy. Furthermore, Paraguay democratized even though land and income inequality was high. To understand how Paraguay democratized we must account for the military’s confidence in the Colorado Party. Because the Colorado Party held the military’s trust, and was a stable and strong party, the military could allow civilians to drive democratization without fearing the prospects of civilian rule.

The cases of Indonesia and Paraguay highlight the importance of the institutionalization and electoral and/or political strength of the incumbent party. In Indonesia, the development of Golkar under military rule produced a party that was untested. Even though the military trusted Golkar’s leadership, it could not be confident that Golkar could survive the transition and defend the military’s interests under a competitive democratic system. Unlike Golkar, the Colorado Party had demonstrated its strength in the civil war and in elections before full democratization in 1993. The Colorado’s strength, combined with the military’s trust, produced a high degree of confidence that the military could return to the barracks without danger to its interests. This dynamic can be seen in Table 3. Had either military lacked a trusted party, or had the parties been weakly institutionalized, as is often the case following military rule, the military would have had to act more unilaterally to secure its interests during democratization.
Using a qualitative comparison between Indonesia and Paraguay I have outlined the causal pathway which affects the formation of bounded democratic systems. I now evaluate the theory using a global sample of regime transitions following military rule to assess the generalizability of this theory. To test whether bounded democratization is related to the military’s confidence, I use an original dataset which codes the behavior of militaries during regime transitions. With this original data I use OLS models to build on the qualitative comparative historical analysis, and demonstrate that the evidence of my theory is generalizable beyond the cases of Indonesia and Paraguay.

To begin the quantitative analysis I construct a global sample of military regimes. The datasets I use are Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) GWF, Svolik (2012) PAR, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) DD, and Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013) WTH. These datasets code military regimes differently, and range from a conservative to more inclusive definition of military rule. I use each of these datasets to cover the breadth of
conceptualizations of military rule and to assess under which conditions my theory holds. A breakdown of regime transitions and military rule, along with an explanation of each dataset is provided in the appendix.

To measure bounded democratization I develop a latent variable using IRT analysis which comprises several observable component variables. I measure Bounded Democracy across four component categories. These four component categories are structured by key political and electoral institutions which correspond to democracy and include the executive, legislature, elections, and transitional institutions. Within each component there are several binary indices for how the military behaved in a transition, with a total of nineteen binary indices. To code Bounded Democracy I identify all regime transitions following any type of military rule, as coded by one of the four datasets previously mentioned, and use the historical record to score each index. These indices capture whether the military acted to set conditions on the transitions. For example, some indices measure whether a uniformed or retired officer stood for election, if the military designed electoral, legislative, or executive institutions, or whether the military exercised power in institutions which designed constitutions. A full description of each component is provided in the appendix.

To construct Bounded Democracy I first draw a sample of all transitions which moved from a closed system to either a semi-competitive or fully competitive system, by each dataset I use these scope conditions to capture any regime transition that could have plausibly resulted in a democratic system and ignore instances where the military or civilian incumbents shifted to closed authoritarian rule. Using the nineteen indices and this sample, I create a measure of Bounded Democracy using an IRT 2PL model. These IRT models measure a latent trait, which in this case, is the degree to which the military sets bounds

63This reduces the number of observations significantly, as most authoritarian regimes transition to another closed regime.

64I also drop cases which feature a ruptured transition. Models with these cases included can be found in the appendix.
on democratic transitions. I use IRT analysis because it does not assume each index is equally weighted, but instead models how certain indices are associated with each other across observations. I map the IRT output with cases of regime transitions, and create a normally distributed value of *Bounded Democracy* ranging from 0-1. Validation for this measure is provided in the appendix.

**Measuring Military Confidence**

I argue that the *Bounded Democracy* should decrease as the military’s confidence in parties increases. I theorize that the military’s confidence is a function of trust, party institutionalization, and party strength. To measure the military’s confidence I create two variables which capture party institutionalization and party strength. I measure both the degree of party institutionalization and party strength in the year of the regime transition. By structuring party institutionalization and strength around the incumbent party I also measure whether the military trusts the party, as the military is less likely to rule with the incumbent party should there be any significant hostility between the two.

For each regime I identify the incumbent party and use data developed by the the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization project or V-Party. V-Party codes several dimensions pertinent to party politics, ranging from a party’s position on social issues to the organizational features of the party. V-Party collects data on individual parties by surveying country experts on several factors relevant to parties. Each V-Party indicator is constructed using a measurement model that maps coders’ scores into a continuous latent variable using a Bayesian IRT model.\(^{65}\)

To measure the incumbent party’s institutionalization I select three components from V-Party’s battery of questions on individual parties. I include measures on the degree to which the party maintains permanent local offices (organizational breadth), degree of party control over candidate nomination (routinization and independence), and to what extent

\(^{65}\)Pemstein et al. 2018
the party maintains ties to prominent social organizations (durable social linkages)\textsuperscript{66} With these three components I pair each party in the V-Party dataset with the ruling party of a given regime for each of the four datasets used in the analysis. After sub-setting the data by each dataset and pairing the parties, I use Factor Analysis to create a normally distributed continuous measure of party institutionalization that ranges from 0-1\textsuperscript{67}

Even with data on individual parties, a significant issue with the data is that a large portion of military regimes do not feature a ruling or support party. I address this problem by supplementing the individual party institutionalization index using data developed by Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self (2017). Bizzarro et al measure the average level of party institutionalization in the party system even when there is no ruling or support party, as there still may be parties which are allowed to organize legally. Bizzarro et al used V-Dem data to develop a measure of party institutionalization. The key difference between their index and my own is that their data measures party institutionalization at the party system level, rather than the individual party level. I argue that their data is an appropriate supplement to the incumbent party institutionalization data because, should the military lack any ruling party, it can then evaluate the stability and routinization of the other parties in the system. When the military sees a relatively stable and professionalized set of parties, uncertainty regarding the future party system declines. I also argue that the average party institutionalization is an appropriate measure of the military’s confidence because militaries frequently ban or

\textsuperscript{66}I exclude party cohesion for several reasons. Cohesion is artificially high in in authoritarian regimes because centralized power incentives cohesion, rather than any type of value infused with the party. Furthermore, it may be that factionalism within the party leads to the breakdown of the ruling coalition, but routinization, breadth, and independence endow the party with the capacity to survive the transition and regain cohesion following a change in power. When cohesion is included in the Factor Analysis, it significantly penalizes incumbent parties which have robust organizations, misclassifying them as weak parties.

\textsuperscript{67}A validation of the Factor Analysis is provided in the appendix.
eliminate opposition parties which they view as substantial threats. Thus, a measure of the
average party institutionalization captures the party institutionalization of parties that the
military, at a minimum, tolerates.

In addition to measuring party institutionalization, I also account for the political and
electoral strength of the incumbent party as a proxy for the military’s confidence. To measure
party strength I focus on partisan control of political office at the national and sub-national
level and electoral strength. I use three components in the factor analysis, national party
seat share in the legislature, national electoral share, and control of sub-national office. The
first two components are drawn from the same V-Party dataset used to create the Party
Institutionalization index, and are combined with V-Dem data on the degree to which sub-
national office is dominated by a single party. I again use Factor Analysis to extract a
continuous score of Party Strength which is normalized and set to range between 0-1. A
validation of this exercise is also provided in the appendix.

Alternative Explanations

To account for alternative explanations and reduce omitted variable bias in the regression
models, I include several control variables. One major alternative explanation is the distribu-
tional consequences thesis. To account for the distributional consequences thesis I include
measures of income and land inequality. I measure income inequality using Babones and
Alvarez-Rivadulla (2007) (Hereafter BAR) which was one of the primary measures of in-
equality used in Ansell and Samuels (2014). In addition to using BAR to measure income
inequality, Ansell and Samuels also constructed a measure of land inequality by adjusting
for the number of family farms by the degree of urbanization, which I use in the analysis.
From Ansell and Samuels I also use data on whether a country has a Muslim majority to
account for the thesis that Muslim majority countries a less likely to democratize.68

Because I am focused on democratization following military rule, I also control for the

68Tessler 2002
coercive capacity of the military which may be used to sustain authoritarian rule. Using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities data, I construct a proxy of military capacity with data on military expenditures. This data is taken from the CoW NMC dataset and then standardized to the 2000 U.S. dollar, divided by the total population, and then logged. I use the lag of military expenditures to account for the military’s coercive capacity prior to the transition. From this same dataset I also control for the level of urbanization, which has been shown to correlate with the likelihood of democratization.

Lastly I use data from V-Dem to control for the countries wealth as measured by GDP per capita (logged), the political region, the size of the territory, oil and resource wealth, and the average years of education for citizens older than fifteen years old.

**Modeling Bounded Democracy**

In this section I establish the generalizability of my theoretical claims. To model how the military’s confidence affects regime transitions, I use *Bounded Democracy* as the dependent variable, and sample regimes that have a military component and which transitioned to a more competitive system. I then create a cross-section of data on the year of the transition.

Because *Bounded Democracy* is a continuous variable ranging from 0-1, I use OLS models with robust standard errors to estimate the correlation between a military’s confidence and the degree of *Bounded Democracy*, and provide the results in Figure 2. Using OLS I find substantial evidence that an increase in *Party Institutionalization* is associated with less *Bounded Democracy*. In Figure 2 I plot the results for two models. The first model (*Base*) includes all controls save for income and land inequality. The second model (*Inequality*) includes the same controls as *Base*, but also includes controls for income and land inequality.

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69 Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972, V5.0.
70 Wallace 2013.
71 I use linear interpolation to reduce the number of missing values. Tables with models run without linear interpolation are found in the appendix.
Using the OLS models I find support that Party Institutionalization leads to lower Bounded Democracy and is directionally consistent using data from both GWF, PAR, and WTH.\footnote{These three datasets conceptualize military rule more conservatively than DD, which codes cases as military rule had the leader of the regime been a career officer at any point in time. When controlling for land and income inequality the results weaken slightly, but are still significant for PAR but also have stable coefficients for GWF and WTH. The larger confidence intervals may be an artifact of losing some observations, as income inequality data is missing for several cases in the early Cold War period. Overall these results suggest that the theory is generalizable, and that militaries are more willing to yield to civilians if there is an institutionalized party present.}

After modeling the relationship between Bounded Democracy and Party Institutionalization, I also plot the predicted probabilities of Bounded Democracy given Party Institutionalization and present the results in Figure 3. To construct these plots I use the Inequality models for each dataset. The plotted predicted values are smoothed using a Loess function and I also provide a rug plot for each dataset, to show the frequency of observations of the

\footnote{Associated tables for the coefficient plots are provided in the appendix.}
explanatory variable. Figure 3 shows that the decrease in Bounded Democracy as Party Institutionalization increases and is stable across values of Party Institutionalization when using GWF and PAR. The negative relationship between the independent and dependent variable appears for GWF, PAR, and WTH, but shows a very slight decrease even for DD.

Having found an association between an increase in Party Institutionalization and a decrease in Bounded Democracy, I now evaluate the relationship between Party Strength and Bounded Democracy. To model the relationship between Party Strength and Bounded Democracy I use the same specifications as in Figure 2 but simply substitute Party Institutionalization out for Party Strength and plot the results in Figure 4. With these models I find evidence that an increase in Party Strength is associated with a decrease in Bounded Democracy. Using these specifications, there are similar results as I find that the correlated decrease in Bounded Democracy as Party Strength increases is present when using GWF, PAR, and WTH.

As with Party Institutionalization, I plot the predicted probabilities of Bounded Democracy given the degree of Party Strength. Again, I use the models which use income and rural inequality as controls to construct the predicted probability plots. I present the re-
The results I have presented improve our understanding of how incumbents, including the military, influence democratization. These models demonstrate that the military will forgo imposing parameters on democracy when its confidence, as measured by party institutionalization and party strength, is high. By showing that a military is more supportive
of democratization when its confidence is high, I provide a more nuanced understanding of incumbent-led transitions. Over the past decade the incumbent-led democratization literature has focused on how strong incumbent parties find democratization more palatable than weak parties. In the context of these findings, it is not solely that strong parties pursue democratization when they are confident they can win power, but also that militaries are more willing to hand power over to civilians when they are confident that their allies can win power.

These findings also substantiate the theory and evidence which was presented using comparative historical analysis. Using quantitative models, I have demonstrated that the causal mechanisms, first demonstrated with the paired comparison of Indonesia and Paraguay, are generalizable. On average, militaries appear more willing to support democratization when they are confident in allied parties’ capacity to survive the transition and win power.

Conclusion

Distrust between the military and political parties is a common feature of military rule. When militaries rule, they frequently bar or weaken parties that threaten their corporate interests. While it may be easy for the military to come to power, the military faces a considerable dilemma; returning to barracks and allowing democratization necessarily means that parties will return to power. I theorized that militaries are more supportive of a transition to democratic rule when they are confident that political parties will not violate their corporate interests.

I have argued that the military’s confidence is a function of trust, incumbent party institutionalization, and incumbent party strength. As each of these factors increase, the military can be more confident that political parties will not violate its interests, and becomes more supportive of democratization. I provide evidence for this theory using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. Using a paired comparison of Paraguay and Indonesia, I demon-

73Riedl et al. 2020; Ziblatt 2017; Slater and Wong 2013.
strated that the Indonesian military used its political power to constrain opposition parties during the transition because it was not fully confident in Golkar’s capacity to manage the transition alone. Unlike the Indonesian military, the Paraguayan military quickly returned to the barracks and did not interfere in the development of democratic institutions because it was confident in the Colorado Party’s capacity to act independently.

I coupled the qualitative comparison with quantitative analysis to demonstrate that the theory is generalizable. Using original data on transitions from military rule, I demonstrated that bounded democratization decreases as the factors of the military’s confidence, incumbent party institutionalization and strength, increase. By showing that the military refrains from imposing parameters on democracy when party institutionalization and strength is high, I have demonstrated that the strategic interaction between militaries and parties helps explain why democratization following military rule is difficult. When militaries lack confidence in civilian partners, they become more likely to constrain popular sovereignty and contestation.

In recent history, some militaries have shown reluctance to cede to demands for democracy. Following its 2014 coup, the Thai military resisted calls for full democratization, and instead engaged in institutional engineering because there is no conservative pro-military party sufficiently strong to serve as a buffer against non-conservative parties. Likewise, the military in Sudan resisted massive popular mobilization and calls for democratization. The Sudanese military only reluctantly agreed to form a transitional council, on which it holds half the seats, after heavy international pressure. Like the Thai military, the lack of a developed partisan ally pulls the Sudanese military into politics to directly protect its interests during the transition.

By understanding that a military’s support for democratization is partially dependent upon its confidence in political parties, we should do more to incorporate the party-military relationship into analyses of the political behavior of the military more generally. For example, are militaries more willing to use force in responding to popular protests if the
incumbent regime leader or party are not endowed with a strong and institutionalized party organization? We can also ask why some militaries choose to build parties, and why some are more effective at building parties than others. Overall, my theory and findings justify greater attention to the party-military relationship in authoritarian regimes, and also new democracies, to better explain political development.
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